THE FIRST PART OF THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD: ENTREATING OF THE TIMES FROM THE SETTLED RULE OF ALEXANDER'S SUCCESSORS IN THE EAST, UNTIL THE ROMANS, PREVAILING OVER ALL, MADE CONQUEST OF ASIA AND MACEDON. BOOK V. CHAP. I. Of the first Punic war. SECT. I. A discussion of that problem of Livy, Whether the Romans could have resisted the great Alexander. That neither the Macedonian nor the Roman soldier was of equal valour to the English. THAT question handled by Livy, Whether the great Alexander could have prevailed against the Romans, if after his eastern conquest he had bent all his forces against them? hath been, and is, the subject of much dispute; which, as it seems to me, the arguments on both sides do not so well explain, as doth the experience that Pyrrhus hath given of the Roman power in his days. For if he, a commander (in Hannibal's judgment) inferior to AlexRALEGH, VOL. IV. B ander, though to none else, could with small strength of men, and little store of money, or of other needful helps in war, vanquish them in two battles, and endanger their estate, when it was well settled, and held the best part of Italy under a confirmed obedience; what would Alexander have done, that was abundantly provided of all which is needful to a conqueror, wanting only matter of employment, coming upon them before their dominion was half so well settled. It is easy to say that Alexander had no more than thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse, (as indeed at his first passage into Asia he carried over not many more,) and that the rest of his followers were no better than base effeminate Asiatics. But he that considers the armies of Perdiccas, Antipater, Craterus, Eumenes, Ptolomy, Antigonus, and Lysimachus, with the actions by them performed, every one of which (to omit others) commanded only some fragment of this dead emperor's power, shall easily find, that such a reckoning is far short of the truth. It were needless to speak of treasure, horses, elephants, engines of battery, and the like; of all which the Macedonian had abundance; the Roman having nought, save men and arms. As for sea-forces, he that shall consider after what sort the Romans in their first Punic war were trained in the rudiments of navigation; sitting upon the shore, and beating the sand with poles, to practise the stroke of the oar, as not daring to launch their ill-built vessels into the sea; will easily conceive how far too weak they would have proved in such services. Now for helpers in war; I do not see why all Greece and Macedon, being absolutely commanded by Alexander, might not well deserve to be laid in balance against those parts of Italy which the Romans held in ill-assured subjection. To omit therefore all benefit that the eastern world, more wealthy indeed than valiant, could have afforded unto the Macedonian; let us only conjecture how the states of Sicily and Carthage, nearest neighbours to such a quarrel, (had it happened,) would have stood affected. The Sicilians were, for the most part, Grecians; neither is it to be doubted, that they would readily have submitted themselves unto him that ruled all Greece besides them. In what terms they commonly stood, and how ill they were able to defend themselves, it shall appear anon. Sure it is, that Alexander's coming into those parts would have brought excessive joy to them that were fain to get the help of Pyrrhus, by offering to become his subjects. As for the Carthaginians; if Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse, hated of his people, and ill able to defend his own besieged city, could, by adventuring to sail into Afric, put their dominion, yea, and Carthage itself, in extreme hazard; shall we think that they would have been able to withstand Alexander? But why do I question their ability, seeing that they sent ambassadors, with their submission, as far as Babylon, ere the war drew near them? Wherefore it is manifest that the Romans must without other succour than perhaps of some few Italian friends (of which yet there were none that forsook them not at some time, both before and after this) have opposed their valour, and good military discipline, against the power of all countries to them known, if they would have made resistance. How they could have sped well in undertaking such a match, it is uneasy to find in discourse of human reason. It is true, that virtue and fortune work wonders; but it is against cowardly fools, and the unfortunate for whosoever contends with one too mighty for him, either must excel in these, as much as his enemy goes beyond him in power; or else must look both to be overcome, and to be cast down so much the lower, by how much the opinion of his fortune and virtue renders him suspected, as likely to make head another time against the vanquisher. Whether the Roman or the Macedonian were in those days. the better soldier, I will not take upon me to determine; though I might, without partiality, deliver mine own opiuion, and prefer that army, which followed not only Philip and Alexander, but also Alexander's princes after him, in the greatest dangers of all sorts of war, before any that Rome either had, or in long time after did send forth. Con ander, though to none else, could with small strength of men, and little store of money, or of other needful helps in war, vanquish them in two battles, and endanger their estate, when it was well settled, and held the best part of Italy under a confirmed obedience; what would Alexander have done, that was abundantly provided of all which is needful to a conqueror, wanting only matter of employment, coming upon them before their dominion was half so well settled. It is easy to say that Alexander had no more than thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse, (as indeed at his first passage into Asia he carried over not many more,) and that the rest of his followers were no better than base effeminate Asiatics. But he that considers the armies of Perdiccas, Antipater, Craterus, Eumenes, Ptolomy, Antigonus, and Lysimachus, with the actions by them performed, every one of which (to omit others) commanded only some fragment of this dead emperor's power, shall easily find, that such a reckoning is far short of the truth. It were needless to speak of treasure, horses, elephants, engines of battery, and the like; of all which the Macedonian had abundance; the Roman having nought, save men and arms. As for sea-forces, he that shall consider after what sort the Romans in their first Punic war were trained in the rudiments of navigation; sitting upon the shore, and beating the sand with poles, to practise the stroke of the oar, as not daring to launch their ill-built vessels into the sea; will easily conceive how far too weak they would have proved in such services. Now for helpers in war; I do not see why all Greece and Macedon, being absolutely commanded by Alexander, might not well deserve to be laid in balance against those parts of Italy which the Romans held in ill-assured subjection. To omit therefore all benefit that the eastern world, more wealthy indeed than valiant, could have afforded unto the Macedonian; let us only conjecture how the states of Sicily and Carthage, nearest neighbours to such a quarrel, (had it happened,) would have stood affected. The Sicilians were, for the most part, Grecians; neither is it to be |