is not contrary to reason, and therefore cannot be set aside by the mere difficulty which reason experiences in endeavouring to grasp it. Let us attempt to indicate the precise points where reason interposes a query.1 It is maintained that the dogma does not involve a contradiction. If it did, this would amount to absolute disproof, for no piling up of the evidences of revealed religion could ever overthrow a fundamental law of intelligence. It is, however, true that of the various propositions which constitute the dogma no one expressly asserts what another as expressly denies; in other words, there is no explicit contradiction. Nevertheless, certain propositions seem to be involved which it is impossible for the human mind to entertain. I. If each person has, or rather is, the whole of the Divine essence, and if that essence includes in its eternal nature a trinity of persons, then each person contains a trinity, to which in its turn the same argument may be applied; and thus we are conducted to an endless multitude. Or if, to escape this result, you say that each person contains the Trinity, then surely you fall into the error of confounding the persons; for if each person is in essence all three, there is no real distinction between them, and they become mere names without a difference. In this way the doctrine is self-destructive, and, whatever we may say, we are compelled in thought either to confound the persons or to divide the substance. 2. If each person has the whole essence, and at the same time has incommunicable properties which are necessary to constitute him a person, then he must have something beside the Divine essence. Or, to put it in another way, if, as Hooker says,2 the three persons are distinguished by 'their several ways of having' the one substance, there must 1 The various forms in which the doctrine of the Trinity has been presented have been examined, from the Unitarian side, with great acuteness by John Barling, A Review of Trinitarianism, London, 1847. 2 Ec. Pol. V. lvi. 2. in each case be something other than the Divine essence, to be distinguished by the way of having it. But by the hypothesis there is nothing else. We are required therefore to believe that a substance which is mere unity remains. unalterable and self-identical, and yet at the same time is differentiated into three persons who are distinguished from one another by different properties. This borders very nearly on contradiction, and seems to me a form of words which presents no real meaning to the mind. 3. This appears to follow still more certainly from the notion that there is only one will and one reason among the three persons; for then each person must be composed of something impersonal made personal by having the common reason and will. Thus the personality of all three is one and the same, and it is only by certain impersonal properties that they are distinguished from one another. But this is inconsistent with the notion of one sole essence, constituting the totality of each person. 4. Lastly, the idea of three persons possessing one reason and one will in common is quite unthinkable. It is reason and will that constitute personality; and if there be only one personality, then there are not three persons, but one. seems to me wholly impossible to think otherwise. It These difficulties cannot be evaded by calling the doctrine a mystery, before which our reason must sit dumb. The whole dogma is an attempt to translate mystery into that which is not mystery, and to present the eternal mode of the Divine existence in clearly cut intellectual propositions. These propositions appeal to reason; and if either by themselves or in combination they bring before the mind that which has no coherent meaning, which, as I said, is unthinkable, it is only through pure self-deception that we can say we believe them. The objection to the dogma of the Trinity is not that it is a mystery, but that reason, having daringly grappled with these profound problems, has been driven on from point to point, as difficulties arose on this side and on that, and has ultimately framed a doctrine the parts of which will not fall into a consistent whole, and cannot be held together in a single act of judgment. For my part, I think it is at once more rational and more reverent to leave these high themes undisturbed in the mystery from which the Church has vainly endeavoured to disengage them. This might seem to be the proper place to speak severally of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The doctrines respecting these, however, will have to be discussed in other connexions. The distinct personality of God the Father and of Jesus Christ is admitted on all hands; and the relation between them may be reserved for consideration as a part of our Christology. The effects of the Holy Spirit cannot be disregarded in noticing the life of the Church; but though the latter forms the basis of the doctrine, and cannot be separated from it, there are certain questions which come naturally under the present head. The origin of the Christian profession of belief in the Holy Spirit must be sought in the experience of a new Divine life within the heart. New faith, new emotions, new impulses to holiness, new discernment of spiritual truth, came upon the disciples, appealing to them with an authority, and wielding them with a power, which were not their own, so that they felt as never before that they lived and had their being in God. A breath of holy life swept through the Church; and this was interpreted as the life of God, changing and controlling the lower human life. It was a passage from death into life,1 a being born out of God,2 an indwelling of God-' God abideth in him, and he in God.'3 It made man ' a temple of God.'4 It showed that God was really among (or, in)' his worshippers.5 I might also refer to the passages. in which Christ is represented as ascribing his works and words directly to the Father. It is apparent, then, that the first Christians believed in the immediate presence of God 3 Ibid. iv. 15. 1I John iii. 14. 2 Ibid. 9. 5 I Cor. xiv. 25. among them, and in the reality of the most intimate communion with him. Why was it necessary to modify the expression of this belief? Such language as I have quoted might seem to imply that God in the totality of his being was incarnate in each disciple. In order to avoid this, men sought for some way of describing the mode of the Divine indwelling. Just as Philo, in order to avoid the doctrine of the complete immanence of God in creation, placed him as pure Being far from all contact with material things, and regarded him as present in the universe only through his Logos or Thought, so God was conceived as present in the soul, not in the transcendent fulness of his Being, but through his Spirit. This did not mean that not God himself, but some one else was present, but only indicated the limitation and character of the Divine presence. Thus, when Paul says, 'Ye are a temple of God,' he adds,' and the Spirit of God dwells in you';1 and John says, 'We know that we abide in him, and he in us, because he has given us of his Spirit.'2 It is clear that the Spirit is that which comes into consciousness, and bears its own witness to its divinity. John practically identifies it with love. God is love';3 and of love we can be conscious as a living principle in ourselves. Of this love almost the same words are used as of the Spirit: He that abides in love abides in God, and God in him '; we know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren.'5 The double truth of transcendence and immanence seems expressed in the words, 'No one has ever seen God; if we love one another, God abides in us.'6 The word 'Spirit,' which was in both philosophical and religious use long before the founding of Christianity, was admirably adapted to express these ideas. Used in relation to persons, it denoted (among other meanings) the pervasive tone and quality of the mind, as in the words, 'ye know not 2 I John iv. 13; iii. 24. 1 I Cor. iii. 16. 5 Ibid. iii. 14. 3 Ibid. iv. 8. 6 Ibid. iv. 12. what manner of spirit ye are of," the spirit and power of Elijah." So, when it is applied to God, it refers habitually to what, for want of a better term, we must call his character, those attributes of holiness, justice, and love, which reveal themselves in human consciousness. Again, spirit' is used of an all-pervading energy, and in relation to God it denotes the power which issues forth, as it were, from the central personality, and works with diffused operation in the souls of men. In ancient times such attributes and powers were thought of as distinct essences, and essences came to be looked upon as persons. Our modern modes of thought are different, and to some of us at all events it has become impossible to recognize persons in love, reason, and holiness. Nevertheless, the power that worketh in us,'3 though not a separate person, must be regarded as personal, for 'it is God who worketh in us'; and when he sends out his light and his truth to abide in us, these are not detached from him, and turned into attributes of ours, but are his own indwelling according to the measure of his gift and of our capacity. 6 In what way this influence is exerted, and diffused through innumerable souls, we cannot comprehend. But there is some faint analogy in the mysterious power which one human mind exercises over another. A man's spirit goes forth, and lays its impress on thousands of other minds. This spirit may extend through many lands, and come down. through many ages; but it has radiated from one centre, and remains always the personal power of one commanding soul. In this way man is working for good or for evil far beyond the limits of his conscious and deliberate activity. But in the case of God we must suppose that all his sanctifying influence is in accordance with his knowledge and his will, and that he himself speaks to us through his Spirit. This 1 Luke ix. 55, in the received text. 3 Eph. iii. 20. 2 Luke i. 17. 4 Philip. ii. 13. M |