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Sacrament; the matter consists in the words or other signs by which each gives him or herself over to the other; the form, which gives a determinate character to the matter, consists in the acceptation of this surrender by each of the contracting parties." Nevertheless, people are expected to be married in Church, and to receive the blessing of a priest. Whether marriage be regarded as a Sacrament or not, every one imbued with the Christian spirit will fully sympathize with the Catholic Church in attaching an inviolable sanctity to the marriage bond.2 Whatever laxity secular governments may think it prudent to allow, facility of divorce is only a concession to men's hardness of heart; and it is a matter for inquiry whether it does not tend to degrade the whole conception of marriage, and to foster the very evils which it is intended to alleviate. Whatever we may call it, the love which subsists in Christian marriage is a heavenly gift, which bears the Divine signet seal, and testifies to its own eternity; and it will be a sad thing if the selfish savagery, or the wild animal passion, which sometimes dares to usurp the holy name of love, succeeds in expelling the sanctity of this union, and lowering it into a mere earthly contract. And so we close this review of the Catholic Sacraments, finding ourselves in fullest harmony with the Church's aspiration for a Divine grace to rest upon all the great occasions of human life; only we cannot confine this Divine grace to ecclesiastical channels, but believe that every soul may place itself under the bountiful hand of God, and through self-surrender receive the grace and truth which are needed for its guidance, and that every man who seeks in prayer for the gift of the Holy Spirit may pass on some Divine blessing to his brethren.

1 Addis and Arnold, Catholic Dictionary, p. 547.

2 Coleridge declares that it is perfectly a sacramental ordinance,' but not retained as a Sacrament at the Reformation, because it is not distinctive of the Church of Christ, and not of universal obligation. Aids to Reflection, ed. 1866, p. 29.

CHAPTER VII

RISE AND PROGRESS OF RELIGION IN THE

INDIVIDUAL

FROM the consideration of institutions which aid the development or the expression of the Divine life in man we must pass on to a subject which, perhaps more than any other, bristles with controversy, namely, the growth and effect of religion in the individual and in society.

In viewing the rise and progress of religion in the individual several subjects present themselves for discussion. These may be arranged in a chronological order, beginning with the purpose of God, and ending with the ultimate destiny of man.

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The doctrine which treats of the eternal purpose of God is known as the doctrine of Predestination, a word derived from the Vulgate praedestinavit, by which, in Romans viii. 29 and 30, the Greek poúpurev is rendered. All who believe in God and Providence must necessarily assume that there was a Divine purpose in the creation of man, and that the progressive development of the race must tend towards the realization of some great idea. We have already seen that, so far as we are concerned, we may regard the manifestation of the sons of God as the ultimate goal towards which the world is moving; and accordingly St. Paul declares that 'whom he foreknew he also did predestinate to be conformed. to the image of his Son, that he might be first-born among

many brothers.'1 In some such inchoate form the doctrine remained through the early centuries, and it was not allowed to interfere with a belief in the freedom of the will and individual responsibility. It was not till the time of Augustine and the Pelagian controversy that thought on this subject began to present itself in those definite and startling conclusions which have perplexed the minds of men through so many generations. Even Augustine, in his early revolt from Manicheism, declared that nothing but its own sins could injure any nature, that there was no natural evil, that sin could not be rightly imputed to anyone but the man committing the sin, and that, if he had not the power of resisting the cause of his volition, he yielded to it without sin.2 At a later time, under the stress of the Pelagian controversy, he formulated a doctrine which, though never ratified by the Catholic Church, influenced the thoughts of men for centuries, appeared as a rigid dogma among the Reformers, and, though gradually yielding to a more Christian view, has cast its dark shadow even into the present age. It seemed to him that the doctrine of Pelagius was essentially shallow, and opposed not only to the testimony of Scripture but to the facts of the spiritual life; and the repulsion which he felt from what he deemed to be error drove him into a position which was opposed to the conscience of mankind.

In order to understand the Protestant dogmas of Predestination we must observe the roots out of which they grew. The spiritual roots are (1) a profound sense of sin, as a hostile power that thwarts, and even renders impotent, the human will, which, in the strong language of Paul, is 'sold under sin';3 (2) an overwhelming sense of the supremacy of God, and of the nothingness of man before his

1 Rom. viii. 29.

2 See the passages quoted by Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, I, p. 418, from De Gen. contra Manich. ii. 43 (c. 29), and De lib. Arb. iii. 50 (c. 17, 18). 3 Rom. vii. 14.

infinite power and holiness; (3) an experience of having been rescued, and translated into a kingdom of light, and purity, and love, not by the exercise of the will, but through a Divine influence taking the soul captive, and filling it with the unutterable peace of filial communion. In connexion with these inward experiences Augustine assumed certain external facts which seemed to agree with or to explain them. Adam fell through voluntary disobedience, and thereby not only he himself, but all his posterity, passed into a state of slavery, so that, if left to itself, the whole world would be damned, and every man, by being a child of Adam, incurred the doom of eternal hell. Any deliverance, therefore, was a pure act of grace; and accordingly God predestined a certain fixed number to be saved, and these he elected, while he left the rest to their merited fate.1 The elect were sons of God before they were born, and could not perish.2

The doctrine in its extremest form, involving reprobation as well as election, was worked out by Calvin with logical precision and completeness. In this form it appears in

1 Augustine does not hesitate to apply the word Predestination to both classes of men :-' duas societates hominum, quarum est una quae praedestinata est in aeternum regnare cum Deo, altera aeternum supplicium subire cum diabolo' (De Civ. xv. 1). The predestination, however, refers to punishment, not to sin. It is assumed that the whole mass of mankind deserves eternal punishment, from which the elect are saved by grace. 2 See numerous passages cited in Hagenbach.

3' Praedestinationem, qua Deus alios in spem vitae adoptat, alios adjudicat aeternae morti.' 'Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes: sed aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna praeordinatur' (Institutio III, xxi. 5). 'Ipsa electio nisi reprobationi opposita non staret' (xxiii. 1). 'Quos ergo Deus praeterit, reprobat: neque alia de causa nisi quod ab haereditate quam filiis suis praedestinat, illos vult excludere' (xxiii. 1). The predestination applies to the original fall: Dico, Deum non modo primi hominis casum, et in eo posterorum ruinam praevidisse, sed arbitrio quoque suo dispensasse.' But even Calvin's hard logic was not without a moment's shrinking, 'Decretum quidem horribile, fateor' (xxiii. 7). He defends the justice of this by making the Divine will the supreme and unconditioned cause Adeo enim summa est justitiae regula Dei voluntas, ut quicquid

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several of the Confessions. It is sufficient for our purpose to quote the Westminster Confession, where it is stated with unmistakable clearness :- Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions. . . . Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace. . . . The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice." The doctrine of the Church of England, as set forth in the seventeenth Article, seems to imply the same view; but it carefully avoids an explicit reference to reprobation, and it adds a caution that we must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture.' His overwhelming sense of the Divine supremacy and causality drove Luther into extravagant, and what might seem irreverent, expressions. In his book De servo Arbitrio he maintains that God is the moving agent in everything, even in Satan and the impious, and that his prescience, since it cannot be mistaken, differs nothing from absolute predestination.2 Melanchthon, in his earlier period, vult, eo ipso quod vult, justum habendum sit' (xxiii. 2). But while the Divine judgment which assigns men to damnation is just, it is incomprehensible (xxi. 7).

1 Chapter III.

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2 Quoted by Grimm, Instit. Theol., p. 392, note 4.

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