instance or the matter of sin is all one to God, so also is the disobedience. The result of this consideration is this: 1. That no man should indulge to himself the smallest sin, because it is equally against God as the greatest: and though accidentally it may come not to be so exacted, yet of itself it may, and God is just if he does. 2. There is no sin, but if God enters into judgment with us, he may justly sentence us for it to the portion of accursed spirits. For if for any, then for all, there being (as to him) no difference. But these things are to be proved in the following section. SECTION III. That all Sins are punishable as God please, even with the Pains of Hell. 11. I. In the aggravation of sins, the injured person is as considerable as any other circumstance. He that smites a prince, he that fires a temple, he that rails upon the Bible, he that pollutes the sacraments,-makes every sin to be a load: and, therefore, since every sin is against God, it ought not to be called little, unless God himself should be little esteemed. And since men usually give this account, that God punishes a transient sin with an immortal pain, because though the action is finite, yet it was against an infinite God; we may, upon the same ground, esteem it just, that even for the smallest sin, God, in the rigour of his justice, can exact the biggest calamity. For an act of murder, or a whole year of adultery, hath no nearer proportion to an eternity of pains, than one sinful thought hath: for greater òr less are no approaches towards infinite; for between them both, and what is infinite, the distance is equally infinite. 12. II. In the distinction of sins, mortal and venial, the doctors of the Roman church define venial sins to be such which can consist with the love of God, which never destroy or lessen it; in the very definition, supposing that thing which is most of all in question; and the ground of the defi m Venialia peccata, ex consensu omnium theologorum, neque tollunt neque minuunt habitum caritatis, sed solum actum et fervorem ejus impediunt. Bellarm. de amiss, grat. c. 13. sect. alterum est. nition is nothing but the analogy and proportion of the intercourses and usages of men, who, for a small offence, do not neglect or cast away the endearments of an old friend": of which when I have given account, I suppose the greatest difficulty of the question is removed. Against this, therefore, I oppose this proposition, the smallest sins are destructive of our friendship with God.-For although God's mercies are infinite and glorious, and he forgives millions to us that grudge to remit the trifles of our brother; and therefore, whatsoever we can suppose a man will forgive to his friend, that and much more, infinitely more, may we expect from the treasures of his goodness and mercy; yet our present consideration is, not what we can expect from God's mercy, but what is the just demerit of our sins; not what he will forgive, but what he may justly exact; not what are the measures of pardon, but what are the accounts of his justice for though we have hopes upon other reckonings, yet upon the account even of our smallest sins, we have nothing but fear and sadder expectations. For we are not to account the measures and rules of our friendship with God, by the easiness and ignorance, by the necessities and usual compliances of men, For, 13, I. Certain it is, that in the usual accounts of men some things are permitted, which are not so in the accounts of God. All sorts of ignorance use to lessen a fault amongst men, but before God some sorts of ignorance do aggravate; such as is the voluntary and malicious, which is the worst sort of vincible. Not that men do not esteem him vicious and unworthy who inquires not for fear he should know, but because men oftentimes are not competent judges whether they do or no. 14. II. Because men know not by what purpose their neighbours' action is directed, and therefore reckon only by the next and most apparent cause, not by the secret and most operative and effective. 15. III. Because by the laws of charity we are bound to think the best, to expound things fairly, to take up things by the easier handle; there being left for us no other security of not being confounded by mutual censures, judgments, and inflictions, but by being restrained on the surer side of cha n Idem ib. cap. 11. sect. quartum argum. `rity, on which the errors of men are not judged criminal and mischievous, as on the other side they are. But God knows the hearts of men, their little obliquities and intricatè turnings, every propensity and secret purpose, what malice is ingredient, and what error is invincible, and how much is fit to be pitied, and therefore what may justly be exacted. For there are three several ways of judgment, according to the several capacities of the judges. First, the laws of men judge only by the event, or material action, and meddle not at all with the purpose, but where it is opened by an active sign. He that gives me a thousand pounds to upbraid my poverty, or with a purpose to feed my crimes, is not punishable by law, but he that takes from me a thousand shillings, though secretly he means to give it to my needy brother. Because as in the estimation of men nothing is valuable but what does them good or hurt; so neither can their laws and tribunals receive testimony of any thing but what is seen or felt. And thus it is also in the measures of sins. To break order in a day of battle, is but a disorder; and so it is to break order at St. George's show, at a training, or in a procession; and yet that is punished with death, this with a cudgel; the aptness to mischief, and the evil consequent, being in human judicatories the only measures of judgment: men feel the effects, and the laws do judge accordingly. 2. In the private judgments of men, mercy must interpose; and it can oftener than in the public: because in the private intercourses of men, there is a sense, and can be a consideration of particulars, and little accidents and significations of things, and some purposes may be privately discerned, which cannot publicly be proved. He that went to help his friend out of a river, and pulled his arm out of joint, was excused by the wronged preserved person: the evil accident was taken off by the pious purpose: but he that, to dishonour his friend, throws a glass of wine in his face, and says he did it in sport, may be judged by his purpose, not by his pretence; because the pretence can be confuted by the observation of little circumstances and adherences of the action, which yet peradventure cannot legally be proved. "Alitèr leges, alitèr philosophi tollunt astutias: leges, quatenus tenere manu res possunt ; philosophi, quatenus ratione et intelligentiâ :" "Laws regard the great materialities of obedience, the real, sensible effect. But wise men, philosophers, and private judges, take in the accounts of accidental moments and incidences to the action," said Cicero. But, 3. God's judgment is otherwise yet; for he alone can tell the affection, and all that which had secret influence into the event: and therefore he can judge by what is secret, by the purpose and heart, which is indeed the only way of doing exact justice. From hence it follows, that what ought not to dissolve the friendship of man, may yet justly dissolve our friendship with God, for he takes other measures than men may or can. 16. IV. Because offences against God may be avoided; but it is not so in our intercourses with men; for God hath told us plainly what is our duty, what he expects, what will please and what will displease him: but men are often governed by chance; and that which pleases them to-day, shall provoke them to-morrow; and the next day you shall be their enemy, for that for which, three days ago, they paid you thanks. 17. V. If men exact little things, it becomes their own case; for we sin against our brother and need his pardon : and therefore Hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim ; We give and ask pardon; Det ille veniam facilè, cui venià est opus: But we never found iniquity in God, or injustice in the Most High, and therefore he that is innocent may throw a stone at the criminal. 18. VI. God hath in the smallest instance left us without excuse; for he hath often warned us of small offences. He hath told us their danger. He that despiseth little things, shall perish by little and little.'-He hath told us, they asperse us with a mighty guilt; for he that offends in one commandment, is guilty of all.' He hath told us, that we are not certainly excused, though our conscience do not manifestly accuse us; for so St. Paul; "I am not hereby justified, for God is greater than my conscience." He hath threatened loss of heaven to him that is guilty of the breach of one, kav taxíorwv, "though of the least of these commandments" (TOUTWV, these' which Christ hath reckoned in his sermon, where fetters are laid upon thoughts and words), ⚫ Offic. lib. 3. 6 "shall be called the least in the kingdom," that is, he shall be quite shut out: for minimus' here is as much as 'nullus;' minimus vocabitur,' that is, "minimi æstimabitur,' he shall not be esteemed at all' in the accounts of doomsday mercy, ἐν τῇ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἀποκαταστάσει, ἐν ᾗ γίνεται κολαζομένων τε καὶ δοξαζομένων ἡ διαίρεσις, in the accounts of the doomsday book, "where there shall be a discerning of them who shall be glorified, from them that are to be punished"." And this, which is one of the severest periods of Holy Scripture, can by no arts be turned aside from concluding fully in this question. Bellarmine says it means only to condemn those, who by false doctrines corrupt these severe precepts, and teach men as the Pharisees did of old; not all those who break them themselves, if they teach others to keep them. "He that breaks one of these, and shall teach men so to do;" so are the words of Christ. But it is a known thing that Kai is oftentimes used for ; "He that breaks one of these, or shall teach others." The words were spoken to the persons of the apostles, who were to teach these doctrines Kar' Emírαow exactly as Christ preached them;' but without peradventure they were also intended to all the church and the following words, and the whole analogy of the adjoined discourse, make it clear to every observing reader; and the words plainly say this, 'He that shall break one of these least commandments,' and 'He that shall teach men so,' each of them shall be called the least in the kingdom.' -But, 2. Why did our blessed Lord so severely threaten those that should teach others to break any of these severe commandments by false interpretation, but only because it was so necessary for all to keep them in the true sense, and so fearful a thing to any to break them? 3. Those who preach severe doctrines to others, and touch them not with one of their fingers, are guilty of that which Christ reproved in the Pharisees; and themselves shall be castaways, while they preach to others: so that the breaking it by disobedience is damnable, as well as the breaking it by false interpretation; Odi homines ignavâ operâ, philosophâ sententiâ, Qui sibi semitam non sapiunt, alteri monstrant viam ". Indeed it is intolerable to teach men to be vicious; but it is De amiss. grat. cap. 12. sect. Restat ultim. |