BOOK IV. local influence. The wealth and commercial prosperity of Gujrát enabled Beháder Shah to bring into the field a large regular army and a powerful artillery; the Rána's gallant followers were ever prepared to sacrifice their lives for their chief or their tribe, in the day of battle, but they had no means of keeping the field for any great length of time, or of securing permanently such conquests as they made. A battle being gained, or a city stormed and pillaged, they were eager to return to their homes, with their glory and their plunder. The constitution of the Rájpút states, a confederacy of tribes or of little chieftains, was little suited for retaining distant possessions. Successes of Beháder The attack of Beháder Shah on Siláh-ed-dín had brought the Rána into the field, in his defence. But the Rájpút army were no longer directed by a warrior like Rána Sánga. Rána Ruttonsi, after a short reign, had yielded the sword of command to his brother Bikermájít. This impolitic prince, having disgusted the chiefs, who formed the strength of his armies, could offer but an imperfect resistance to the attack of Beháder; who now, flushed with victory, invaded his territories, year after year. In the summer after the A. p. 1582- death of Siláh-ed-dín, following up his success, he re A. H. 939, 3. D. A. H. 940. in Malwa duced the important fortress of Gágrown, and sent an army to besiege Rantambór. Though compelled to hasten back to Diu, to check the encroachments of the Portuguese on his coasts, he next season returned to Malwa; marched victorious through its provinces; and, not only wrested from his rival the conquests made by Rána Sánga in that kingdom, but even advanced into and Rajpu- the Rána's hereditary dominions, and besieged him in tána. The period of the death of Ruttonsi, and accession of Bikermájít, is not well known. The Musulman historians do not fix it; and the chronology of the Rájpúts themselves is in general extremely erro neous. As Colonel Tod allows Ruttonsi a reign of five years, and as he ascended the masnad in A. H. 934, his death may be placed a. H. 939. SECT. II. Cheitúr itself. We have seen, that, in spite of the CHAP. II. march of the Emperor Humáyun, as far as Guáliár, to his assistance, the Rána was compelled ignominiously to purchase, at a high price, the retreat of the King of Gujrát. league These continued successes added fuel to the naturally He forms a ambitious temper of Beháder. He and Humayun had against Hunow become neighbours, and the events of the last mayun. campaign had shown that they must inevitably soon come to a collision. The King of Gujrát, indignant that his prey should have been wrested from him, looked round for means to occupy and injure the Emperor; and they were not wanting. Many Afghán Amírs, and other refugees from Delhi and the eastern provinces, who had been driven into exile by the successes of Báber, had fled to his court for shelter. Sultan Beháder, who had himself been a fugitive from Gujrát at the time of Báber's invasion, and who had spent some time in exile at the court of Sultan Ibráhím Lodi, as well as at Juánpúr, stood in too great awe of the late Emperor to hazard any hostile proceedings during his lifetime. But after the succession of Humayun, he was incessantly urged by Tátár Khan Lodi, and other fugitives from what had been the Afghán, and were now the imperial, dominions, to lend them even a moderate aid; as they boasted, with that, to be able, if not to exterminate the Chaghatái invaders, at least to drive them back beyond the Indus. We have seen that Sultan Alá-ed-dín Lodi, the father of Tátár Khan, the uncle of the late Sultan Ibráhím, and twice an unsuccessful competitor for the throne of Delhi, had been sent by Báber to be imprisoned in the distant fort of Kila-Zefer, in Badakhshán*, for reasons unknown, but probably for the crime of being dangerous from his birth and his pretensions. Having escaped Akbernáma, f. 37. MS. B. f. 74. Joined by ed-din Lodi, and his son Tátár Khan Lodi, BOOK IV. from custody, by the assistance of some Afghán merchants, he found his way in disguise, through many perils, across the Afghán country and Baluchistán, to the court of Gujrát. Beháder, who had long resisted the solicitations of the exiles, at last, prompted by what he regarded as his own wrongs, yielded to their importunity; and, entering into their views, began to make preparations for an attack on Humáyun. He secretly employed considerable sums in drawing off the adherents of his rival, and received, with distinguished favour, the refugees from Agra, who flocked to his and by Muham Mirza, court. It was about this period that Muhammed Zemán med Zemán Mírza, having escaped from Biána, arrived in his camp*, with his keeper, Yádgár Taghái Beg, whom he had seduced to accompany him in his flight. Beháder Shah, situated as he was, and indulging the plans which he did, regarded the arrival of a prince of his rank and talents as a fortunate occurrence, and warmly entered into his animosities. The fugitive confirmed the opinion given by Tátár Khan, of the ease with which the Emperor might be expelled. He represented the discipline of the army as relaxed since the late Emperor's death; the troops, as giving themselves up to ease and luxury; the nobles, as discontented; and both the native and Afghán chiefs and officers, as only waiting for an opportunity to revolt. Humayun remonstrates without effect. These proceedings could not escape the notice of Humayun, who called upon Beháder Shah to dismiss Muhammed Zemán Mírza†, and the other rebels and An instance of Beháder's luxurious and ostentatious magnificence is mentioned on this occasion. When Muhammed Zemán reached Beháder's camp, before Cheitúr, he was suffering from the heat of the weather. His physicians recommended Gúl-kend (candied conserve The of roses) to allay the heat. + No mention is made of any He fugitives from the imperial dominions, who were entertained in his court. This the King of Gujrát declined, on the general ground of that hospitality which all princes are accustomed to extend to the distressed. adduced the precedent of Sultan Alá-ed-dín himself, Sultan Sekander Lodi's brother, who, as well as several other princes of the blood, in circumstances resembling the present, had found refuge with his predecessor, Mozeffer Shah, without giving offence to the sovereigns of Delhi. Humáyun, in return, maintained, that the reception afforded to the fugitive enemies of his government was inconsistent with the relations of amity that subsisted between them, and must lead to dangerous consequences. He denied that the case of Alá-ed-dín, referred to, had any similarity to the present; he reminded the King, with something of a menace, that, unwilling as the great Taimúr had long been to attack Beyezíd* Ilderim, while he was engaged in war with the infidels of Europe, and many as were the injuries which on that account he long bore, yet that his patience was finally exhausted, when that monarch refused to withdraw his protection from Kara Yúsef Túrkomán, and Sultan Ahmed Jeláir, Taimúr's rebellious subjects, who had taken refuge with him. That the consequences were sufficiently well known. And he insisted, that Beháder Shah should either deliver up Muhammed Zemán Mírza, or at least expel him from his dominions. Beháder obstinately persisted in his refusal. CHAP. IL A. D. 1534. The demonstration which Humáyun made on the Preparaside of Gualiár, during the siege of Cheitúr, was a suf- hostilities. demand to deliver up Sultan Alá-eddín Lodi; either, because he had not then arrived; or, as is more probable, because his situation was different from that of Muhammed Zemán, and did not in the same degree justify the Emperor's demand. The former, though a claimant of the throne of Delhi, was an Afghán Called Bajazet by our his torians. tions for A. D. 1534. BOOK IV. ficiently intelligible indication of what he would have attempted, had the internal disorders, which occupied him at home, admitted of his marching beyond the limits of his own dominions. Beháder, offended at the tone of his rival's remonstrances, now entered heartily into the views of the exiles, and lent every assistance in his power to the claims of Sultan Alá-ed-dín or Alim Lodi, who once more put forward his pretensions to the throne of Delhi. Tátár Khan, Alim's son, who managed the affairs of his father, urged the King to declare for him openly; contending, that the Emperor's army, in its present state, would not dare to meet that of Gujrát. But Beháder was still anxious not to come prominently forward; and it was, therefore, arranged, that the intended attack should have only the air of an unauthorised irruption of the Afghán refugees, for the recovery of their former empire; and that the King himself should not appear to take any share in it. He privately, however, supplied them with large sums of money, to enable them to put their army on an effective footing. The amount stated, probably with some exaggeration, to have been not less than a million sterling*, was sent to Rantbór, to be employed by Tátár Khan. Adventurers and exiles flocked to his standard, from every quarter; and a formidable force was soon ready to take the field. A. H. 941, A. D. 1534 5. An extensive plan of operations was formed, and vigorously acted upon. Sultan Alá-ed-dín Lodi, Tátár Khan's father, led a considerable force † to Kalinger, *Twenty krór of old Gujrát gold coin, which Abulfazl (Akbernama, f. 37.) estimates at double the currency of his time, or forty króis. This, if reckoned in rupees, would give forty millions sterling, which cannot be admitted. If reckoned in dáms, the current mode of Treasury computation, it would amount to one million sterling; if in double dáms, to two millions. Briggs's Ferishta calls the sum three krors of rupees, or about three millions sterling. I have been sometimes tempted to believe that this army was commanded by Alá-ed-dín or Alim Khan Jilál Khan Jigat, who, we have seen, now held Raisen, Bhílsa, and Chándéri. Abulfazl, however, says |