of the modes of treatment which have been adopted: But I maintain, that this whole procedure is contrary to right reason. The plain course which reason directs us to pursue, is, after examining the evidences of revelation, and being satisfied, to come to the interpretation of the Scriptures with an unbiassed mind; and in the exercise of a sound judgment, and with the aid of those helps and rules which reason and experience suggest, to obtain the sense of the several parts of the document; and although this sense may contradict our preconceived opinions, or clash with our inclinations, we ought implicitly to receive it; and not by a refined ingenuity, and labored critical process, extort a meaning, that will suit our own notions. This is not to form our opinions by the Word of God, but to cut down the sublime and mysterious doctrines of revelation, to the measure of our narrow conceptions. And thus, in the creed of many, called rational Christians, the divine system of heavenly truth is shorn of its glory, and comes forth little more than an improved theory of Natural Religion. There is no reason in this. But what if the plain sense of Scripture be absolutely repugnant to the first principles of reason? Let that be demonstrated, and the effect will be, rather to overthrow the Scriptures, than to favor such a method of forming a theory from them. But no such thing can be demonstrated. The reasonings by which it has been attempted to prove, that the doctrines, commonly called orthodox, are contrary to reason, are fallacious; and a similar mode of reasoning, on the truths of Natural Religion, will land us in atheism. Deistical writers have been fond of representing faith and reason as irreconcilable. They have insinuated, and even asserted, that revelation cannot be received: а without a renunciation of reason; and have affected to regret, that it should be subjected to the trial of a rational investigation, which they allege, it can by no means bear. This was a favorite topic with Morgan, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, and Hume. The last mentioned author, in the close of his far famed Essay on Miracles, uses the following language; “Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason, and 'tis a sure mea thod of exposing it, to put it to a test, which it is, by no means fitted to endure.”—And again : “Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its [the Christian Religion's] veracity, and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continual miracle, in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding." On the insidious nature of this attack, I shall not stop to remark, except to observe, that it may be taken as a specimen, not only of Hume's method of treating Christianity, but of that of the whole tribe of deistical writers, until very recently, when they have come out boldly. Under the mask of friendship, and with the words of respectfulness on their lips, they have aimed the most deadly thrusts at the vitals of Christianity. But in regard to the sentiment, expressed in this extract, the friends of revelation utterly disclaim it, and hold it to be false and unfounded. The state of the controversy between Christians and deists, did not authorize any such assertion. The defenders of the truth have ever been ready to meet their antagonists on the ground of impartial reason. They have met them at every point, where they have chosen to make the assault; and I may safely say, that no deistical argument remains unrefuted, no infidel objection undetected and unexposed. As Mr. Hume wrote this immediately after finishing his argurnent against miracles, perhaps he felt a confidence, that he had achieved what none before were able to effect. But his confidence was premature: the argument which he claims the honor of having discovered, (though this might be disputed on good ground,) has been refuted, with a clearness of evidence, sufficient to bring conviction to any mind, but that of a sophist and a skeptic. But we shall have further occasion, in the sequel, to consider the force of Mr. Hume's reasonings against miracles. It may, perhaps, require some apology, that a subject which has been so fully and ably discussed, in numerous volumes, should be attempted to be treated in a short essay. My only apology is, that the poison of infidelity is imbibed by many, who never have access to the antidote. It is much to be regretted that some of the books which are almost sure to fall into the hands of literary youth, are deeply tinctured with skepticism. How many read Hume and Gibbon, who never have seen the answers of Campbell and Watson. Now, if we can present, even a brief outline of the evidences of Christianity, to those who may not be disposed to read larger works, we may be contributing, in some small degree, to prevent the progress of one of the greatest evils to which men are liable, CHAPTER 11. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BANISH ALL RELIGION FROM THE WORLD; AND IF IT WERE POSSIBLE, IT WOULD BE THE GREATEST CALAMITY WHICH COULD BEFAL THE HUMAN RACE. It is not my object here, to consider religion as it is a matter of duty, or a means of obtaining happiness in a future world; for both these would be equally disregarded by those men who aim at the subversion of all religion. What I shall attempt, at present, is to state and establish the fact, that man is so constituted, that he must have some sort of religion. And the truth of this will be manifest, from an inspection of the principles of human nature, and from the history of the world. Man has naturally a sense of moral obligation, a perception of the difference between right and wrong, feelings of remorse or approbation on the review of his conduct, fears of future retribution when he has committed a crime, and a propensity to pay religious homage to some object, visible or invisible. These are what have been called his religious feelings, and from them he has received the appellation of a religious animal. And certainly there is nothing by which man is so clearly distinguished from the creatures below him, as this capacity for religion ; for whatever indications they give of sagacity in other matters, it is impossible to communicate to them any ideas of morality, or any impressions of a religious nature. Now, that these feelings are natural, and not adventitious, is manifest, because they are found to exist in men of all ages, of all countries, and in every different state of society. And hence, no nation, ancient or modern, has ever been found without some kind of religion. It would be as difficult to find a whole nation without religion, as to find one destitue of speech. Some travellers, it is true, from superficial observation, have reported that some savage tribes had no ideas of religion, and no species of worship; but on more accurate examination, it has been ascertained, that this was a mistake. And from our present knowledge of the nations of the earth, we are authorised to assert, that there is not one totally destitute of some sense of religion, and some form of worship. The same thing was well known to all the wisest men of antiquity. It is a fact from which both Plato and Cicero have derived many important conclusions. And these principles of our nature are so deeply radicated, that they never can be removed. Men may be induced to abandon their old religion, and to adopt a new one; but they never can remain long free from all religion. Take away one object of worship and they will soon attach themselves to another. If unhappily they lose the knowledge of the true God, they will set up gods of their own invention: or receive them from others. The history of all nations bears such ample testimony to this fact, that it cannot be denied. Now, this univer, sality of religion evinces, in the clearest manner, that the principle is natural, that it is an essential thing in the constitution of man: just as the fact, that men are always found living in society, proves that the social principle exists, and is natural to man. |