able ;

a

thing, by which, God should, in some way, manifest himself. And how could this be effected, but by the exertion of his power, or the manifestation of his infinite knowledge? That is, by miracles, or by prophecies, or by both. There is, then, just as much probability,

, , that miracles will exist, (for prophecy may be considered one kind of miracle, as that a revelation will be given. The conjunction of these two things is reason

if we find the one, we may be sure the other exists also.

It is admitted, that a revelation from God would have internal evidence of its origin, but this does not strike the attention, at once. It requires time before it can be perceived; but in the first establishment of a revelation, there is need of some evidence which is obvious to the senses, and level to the capacities of all. Just such an evidence are miracles. Moreover, internal evidence requires, in order that it may be perceived and appreciated, a certain favorable state of the moral feet ings, without which it is apt to be overlooked, and produces no conviction; whereas, external evidence is not only level to every capacity, but adapted to bring home conviction to every description of men--to the bad as well as the good.

Miracles, then, furnish the best proof for the estab lishment of a revelation. They seem to be its proper seal. They are the manifest attestation of God. Nothing can be conceived which will more strikingly indicate his power and presence, than a visible suspension of the laws of nature. He is invisible: he must make himself known by his works and a miracle is such a work, as no other can perform. When, therefore, a person professes to have received a revelation

from God, and when we behold the effects of Almighty power accompanying his words, all are sure that God is with him, and that he is a teacher sent from God; for, otherwise, he could never perform such wonderful works; or rather, to speak more correctly, God would never exert his power to confirm the pretensions of an impostor, or to attest doctrines wbich are not true.

CHAPTER VI.

MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM TES

TIMONY

I do not know that any one has denied that a miracle would be credible, if exhibited to our senses. А man might, indeed, be deceived by an illusion arising from some disorder in his senses; but if he was conscious of being in a sound state of body and mind, and should witness not only one, but a variety of miracles; not only a few times, but for years, in succession; and, if he should find, that all around him had the same perceptions of these facts as himself, I need not say, that it would be reasonable to credit his senses, for the constitution of his nature would leave him no choice: he would be under the necessity of believing, what he saw with his eyes, heard with ears, and handled with his hands. But are there facts which a man would credit on the evidence of his senses, which can, by no means, be rendered credible by the testimony of any number of witnesses? Then there might be facts, the knowledge of which could never be so communicated as to be worthy of credit. Accordiog to this hypothesis, the constitution of our nature would require us to withhold our assent from what was true, and from what others knew to be true. If a thousand persons of the strictest veracity should testify, that they had repeatedly witpessed a miracle, and if all circumstances should coneur to corroborate their testimony, yet upon this prin

ciple it would be unreasonable to credit them; even if they should consent to die in confirmation of what they declared to be the fact. This is the ground taken by Mr. Hume, in his boasted argument against miracles. But, it appears to me, that every man, previously to examination, must be convinced that it is false; for it is contrary to common sense, and universal experience of the effect of testimony. The true principle on this subject, is, that any fact which would be believed on the evidence of the senses, may be reasonably believed on testimony. For there may be testimony of such a nature, as to produce conviction as strong as any other conceivable evidence; and such testimony in favor of a miracle, would establish it as firmly as if we had witnessed it ourselves. But, notwithstanding this is the conclusion of common sense and experience, the metaphysical argument of Mr. Hume has had the effect of perplexing and unsettling the minds of many: and as he boasts, that "it will be useful to overthrow miracles as long as the world endures,” it seems necessary to enter into an examination of his argument, that we may be able to expose its fallacy. This has already been done, in a convincing manner, by several men,* eminent for their learning and discrimination ; and if their works were read by all who peruse Hume, I should think it unnecessary to add a single word on the subject. But it may not be without use, to present a refutation, in a condensed form, for the sake of those who will not take the trouble to go through a minute and extended demonstration.

The argument of Mr. Hume will be best exhibited in his own words. "A miracle,” says he, “supported

* Dr. Campbell, Prof. Vince, Mr. Adam, Dr. Douglas.

by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision, than of argument. No testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability."--"We establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force, as to prove a miracle, and make a just foundation for any system of religion.”_"Our belief or assurance of any fact from the report of eye witnesses, is derived from no other principle, than experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our own observation ; here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witness, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; if, besides, the testimony considered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the very nature of the fact is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle, therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible, even in the lowest degree."

Here we have the substance of Mr. Hume's argument, on which I propose to make some remarks, intended to show that its whole plausibility depends on the assumption of false principles and the artful use of equivocal terms.