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so delivered in execution, shall be liable and is hereby required to make, perform and render to the lord of the manor, or other person entitled, all such and the like payments and services as the person against whom such execution shall be issued would have been bound to make, perform and render in case such execution had not issued; and that the party so suing out such execution, and to whom any such copyhold or customary lands shall have been so delivered in execution, shall be entitled to hold the same until the amount of such payments and the value of such services as well as the amount of the judgment shall have been levied Provided also, that as against purchasers, mortgagees or creditors, who shall have become such before the time appointed for the commencement of this act, such writ of elegit shall have no greater or other effect than a writ of elegit would have had in case this act had not passed." It often happens that a creditor obtains a judgment against his debtor, after the latter has contracted bonâ fide and for valuable consideration to sell his land, but before actual conveyance. Now, it is a familiar rule of equity, that from the date of the contract the vendor is a trustee of the estate for the purchaser, and the latter a trustee for the former, of the purchase-money. Hence, it would seem to follow, that such a judgment cannot impede the progress of the legal estate to the purchaser. But, the authorities go far to show, that if the purchaser has notice of the judgment, before the payment of the whole or part of his purchase-money, the judgment After trust will operate as a lien upon the money so unpaid. The same, as a general rule, would seem to apply to a judgment after trust for After mort- sale.b So, a judgment entered up against a mortgagee, after the

Effect of

judgment after contract of sale.

for sale.


Upon a power of appoint


Upon goods and chat


mortgage, will operate, in equity, as a lien upon the surplus monies in the hands of the mortgagee, arising from a sale under a power contained in the mortgage deed. Before the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, in consequence of the rule of law that where a power is executed, the person taking under it takes under him who created the power, and not under him who executes it, an appointment, under a power exercisable by the donee for his own benefit, without the assent of any other person, defeated a judgment entered up against him between the creation and the execution of the power; d but a judgment cannot now be so defeated.


By the common law, goods and chattels were bound from the time of the teste of the writ of execution. By the Statute of Frauds, as between subject and subject, this was altered to the time when the writ of execution should be delivered to the Sheriff, Under-sheriff, or Coroner, to be executed : when that takes place, the goods are, by force of the statute, immediately attendant to satisfy

a Finch v. Earl of Winchelsea, 1 P. Wms. 282; Forth v. Duke of Norfolk, 4 Mad. 503; Sugd. V. & P. 390.

b Vide 2 Sugd. V. & P. 388, 389, 11th edit.

e See Forth v. Duke of Norfolk, 4 Mad. 506; Clare v. Wood, 4 Hare, 81.

d Doe d. Wigan v. Jones, 10 B. & C.


e 1 Wms. Saund. 219 g, n. (t); Giles v. Grover, 9 Bing. 285.

f Or to his deputy, under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 20; Woodland v. Fuller, 11 Ad. & Ed. 867.

the judgment. In other words, they are bound by the delivery of the writ; not that the property in the goods is altered by the delivery of the writ,a (for this does not take place until sale,b) nor are they absolutely bound in all cases, as in the case of bankruptcy, before sale. The meaning of the term bound is, that the execution creditor thereby obtains what has been called a quasi lien upon it; and if the debtor transfer the goods after the delivery of the writ to the Sheriff (which he may do), the Sheriff must execute the writ upon them, although in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, except the transfer took place in market overt. If the transfer did, in truth, take place in market overt, the right of the Sheriff ceased altogether. As regards Crown process, the teste of the extent, and Crown pronot the delivery to the Sheriff, is the time when the goods become cess. bound; the Crown not being named in the Statute of Frauds.f A sequestration seems to be on the footing of an execution at Sequestracommon law, and to bind from the time of awarding the commission,g tion.

The doctrine of judgments relating to the essoign or first re- Relation of turn day of term, though signed after, no longer exists; for "all judgments. judgments, whether interlocutory or final, shall be entered of record, of the day of the month and year, whether in term or vacation, when signed, and shall not have relation to any other day; but it shall be competent for the Court, or a judge, to order a judgment to be entered nunc pro tunc."h Because of the Registration difficulty of finding out such judgments, and the confusion and mis- of judg. chief resulting therefrom, especially to purchasers and mortgagees, the legislature required them to be docketed and now they must be registered, from time to time, as prescribed by the statutes referred to below; otherwise they will not affect any lands, &c., as

a Payne v. Drewe, 4 East, 522; Rex v. Allnutt, 16 ib. 282; Lucas v. Nockells, 10 Bing. 182; Giles v. Grover, 9 ib. 128; Samuel v. Duke, 3 M. & W. 630; Woodland v. Fuller, suprà : and see Wheatley v. Lane, 1 Wms. Saund. 219 g, n. (t).

b Giles v. Grover, 9 Bing. 128. Smallcomb v. Buckingham, 3 Salk.


d 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 133; Hutton v. Cooper, 6 Exch. 162.

e Samuel v. Duke, suprà. In Woodland v. Fuller, it was contended in vain that a vesting order, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 37, had the effect of a sale in market overt. In Harding v. Hall, 10 M. & W. 47, Parke, B., is reported to have used these words:" The only meaning of the words being bound by the delivery of the writ is, that notwithstanding a sale of them afterwards, no property passed to the purchaser." There must be a mistake in the report.

f See Rex v. Allnutt, 16 East, 282; Giles v. Grover, suprà; Wheatley v. Lane, suprà; R. v. Edwards, 9 Ex. 32.

Burdett v. Rockley, 1 Vern. 58;
Payne v. Drewe, 4 East, 536.

Reg. Gen. Hil. T. 1853, r. 56;
Reg. Gen. (Plead.) Hil. T. 1853, r. 32;
Greenway v. Fisher, 7 B. & C. 436; Cum-
ber v. Wane, 1 Smith's L. C. 146, as to
such an entry; and Miles v. Bough, 3
D. & L. 109. The 17 Car. 2, c. 8, s. 1,
enacts "that in all actions personal,
real or mixed, the death of either party
between the verdict and the judgment
shall not hereafter be alleged for error,
so as such judgment be entered within
two terms after such verdict." This is
re-enacted by the Common Law Proce-
dure Act [15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 139].
When, therefore, a party dies after ver-
dict and before judgment, a judgment
entered within that time binds the pro-
perty as if the party had been alive,
Burnett v. Holden, 1 Lev. 277; Saun-
ders v. M'Gowran, 12 M. & W.
224; Freeman v. Tranah, 12 C. B.


4 & 5 W. & M. c 20, made perpetual by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 36.



Effect of decrees, orders, rules of Court, &c.

to purchasers, mortgagees, or creditors, otherwise than as before the act. A judgment, not registered, has no preference against heirs, executors, or adininistrators. These later statutes also provide in the case of purchasers and mortgagees, without notice of judgment, that such judgment, even though registered, shall not bind any lands, &c., or any interest therein, otherwise than a docketed judgment would have done before, and that even notice of such judgment, &c., shall not affect such persons, unless and until the memorandum or minute be left with the senior master of the C. B.c To affect purchasers or mortgagees, Crown judgments must also be registered. Where, after registry, the defendant was taken in execution, and a purchaser of his realty, because of the registry, refused to complete, the Court of Q. B. ordered the plaintiff's attorney to attend the senior master of C. B. and to consent that an entry of the arrest be made in the Register book.e

Registration of judgments, &c., as regards lands, &c., in the counties of York and Middlesex, is enjoined and regulated by the 5 & 6 Ann. c. 18, s. 4 (West Riding); 6 Ann. c. 35 (East Riding and Kingston-upon-Hull); 7 Ann. c. 20 (Middlesex); and 8 Geo. 2, c. 6 (North Riding). They declare, in almost the same words, that no judgment, statute, or recognizance (except Crown judgments, &c.) shall affect or bind any lands, &c., unless a memorial of such judgment, &c., shall be entered. In all, except the Middlesex Acts, it is provided that an entry within a prescribed period shall, by relation, have the effect of a registration in the first instance; and the judgment, a memorial of which has been so registered, will bind all the lands that the defendant had at the time of signing thereof, except copyhold estates, leases at a rack-rent, and leases not exceeding twenty-one years, when the actual possession and occupation goes along with the lease. The general design of these Registry Acts is to protect persons taking, by representation, as heirs, executors, or administrators, the property of another, subject to such other person's liabilities; or persons taking an interest by purchase, or mortgage; and not to apply to judgments obtained against the party himself; in other words, " as between the parties it is not more or less a judgment because it is not registered." Upon this principle it was held that a judgment obtained against an executor (before the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11) was entitled to preference, in the administration of the testator's estate, over simple contract debts, though not docketed pursuant to the 4 & 5 W. & M. c. 20.f

By the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18, "all decrees and orders of

a What kind of interest it affects is fully explained in 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82: see 1 Vict, c. 110, s. 19, and 2 Vict. c. 11, ss. 2, 4; Harris v. Davison, 15 Sim. 128; Sugd. V. & P. ch. 12, s. 27.

b Landon v. Ferguson, 3 Russ. 349; Wms. Exors. 859; Jeffreson v. Morton, 2 Wms. Saund. 9 d, n. (e); Gaunt v. Taylor, 3 Sc. N. C. 714.

c 3 & 4 Vict. c. 82, s. 2.
d 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, s. 8.

e Lewis v. Dyson, 21 L. J. 194. (Q.B.) f Gaunt v. Taylor, 3 Sc. N. C. 710. A registration of the issue is not suf ficient. Hopwood v. Watts, 5 B. & Ad. 1056; Braithwaite v. Watts, 2 Cr. & J. 319.


Courts of Equity, and all rules of Courts of Common Law, and all orders of the Lord Chancellor or of the Court of Review in matters of bankruptcy, and all orders of the Lord Chancellor in matters of lunacy, whereby any sum of money, or any costs, charges or expenses shall be payable to any person, shall have the effect of judgments in the superior Courts of Common Law, and the persons to whom any such monies or costs, charges or expenses shall be payable, shall be deemed judgment creditors within the meaning of this Act, and all powers hereby given to the judges of the superior Courts of Common Law, with respect to matters depending in the same Courts, shall and may be exercised by Courts of Equity with respect to matters therein depending, and by the Lord Chancellor and the Court of Review in matters of bankruptcy, and by the Lord Chancellor in matters of lunacy; and all remedies hereby given to judgment creditors are in like manner given to persons to whom any monies or costs, charges or expenses are by such orders or rules respectively directed to be paid." But no order of any judge as to any stock, funds, annuities or shares standing in the name of the accountant-general of the Court of Chancery, or the accountant-general of the Court of Exchequer, or as to the interest, dividends or annual produce thereof, shall prevent the Governor and Company of the Bank of England or any public company from permitting any transfer of such stocks, funds, annuities or shares, or payment of the interest, dividends or annual produce thereof, in such manner as the Court of Chancery or the Court of Exchequer respectively may direct, or shall have any greater effect than if such debtor had charged such stock, funds, annuities or shares, or the interest, dividends or annual produce thereof, in favour of the judgment creditor, with the amount of the sum to be mentioned in any such order." c In other words, it affects the debtor's interest alone, just as if by his own act and deed he himself had charged it; such order neither affecting the Bank nor prior incumbrances, nor any other interest but his own.d A Judge's order, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 43 (Attorney's Act), for entering up judgment for the amount of the Master's allocatur, has the same

a See Farmer v. Mottram, 1 D. & L. 781; In re Spooner, 5 D. & L. 310; Doe d. Smith v. Roe, 6 ib. 544; In re Harvey, 14 Q. B. 404. An order may be granted before the time for moving to set aside an award has expired, Hare v. Fleay, 11 C. B. 472.

b The E. I. Co. granted to C. D. a pension; held, that this was not chargeable with a judgment debt by a judge's order under this act. Morris v. Manesty, 7 Q. B. 674. As to the power of the Court to charge retiring pension of a Master in Chancery payable out of the suitors' fund, see Witham v. Lynch, 1 Exch. 399; the stock, &c., must be standing in the parties' "own right," 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 14; Fuller v.

Earle, 7 Ex. 796.

c 3 & 4. Vict. c. 82, s. 1: and see Fowler v. Churchill, 11 M. & W. 61; Churchill v. Bank of England, ib. 324; Rogers v. Holloway, 6 Sc. N. R. 274. A charging order cannot be made by a judge in equity, only by a judge at common law. But a Court of Equity will make a stop order as auxiliary thereto. As to the necessity of registering these quasi judgments, see 2 Sugd. V. & P. 404, 407.

d Hulkes v. Day, 10 Sim. 46; an ex parte order under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 15, seems to have the effect of a distringas, until it be made absolute or discharged.

force as a rule of Court under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110. A consent rule in ejectment, whereby upon a certain event either party was to pay costs, was held to be an order for payment of money within the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 18, and after the Master's allocatur execution might issue. When a rule of Court for the payment of money has the effect of a judgment, execution may issue at once. So assignees, and creditors who have proved under a petition of Bankruptcy, are to be deemed judgment creditors, and the Court is to grant a certificate thereof, which has the effect of a judgment of a superior Court at Westminster. A judgment, &c., Judgments removed from an inferior Court, has the same force, charge, and effect, as a judgment, &c., of a superior Court, except in this, that a judgment, &c., so removed does not affect any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, as to purchasers, mortgagees, or creditors, any further than the same would have done if the same had remained in the Court below, unless and until a writ of execution thereon shall be actually put into the hands of the Sheriff or other officer appointed to execute the same.

removed from inferior Court.

Statutes staple, re


bonds, &c.

Statutes merchant, statutes staple, and recognizances, in the nature of statutes staple, are wholly disused;f but it must be kept in mind, that the 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, s. 50, declares all obligations and specialties made to the Queen, or to her use, for any cause, to be of the same nature, kind, quality, force, and effect, as statutes staple. What, then, is a statute staple ? and what is its nature, kind, quality, force, and effect? The statute staple is of two sorts: the one by force of the 27 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. 9; the other, by force of the 23 Hen. 8, c. 6. The former is an obligation of record, acknowledged before the mayor of the staple, in the presence of one of the constables of the same staple, and is sealed with the seal of the staple, and the seal of the party: it is only between merchants of the same staple, and for merchandize of the same staple. The other is likewise an obligation of record, and of the same nature and force as the former, as regards the execution of it; but it is acknowledged before one of the chief justices, and in their absence (out of term), before the Mayor (of the staple at Westminster) and the Recorder of London, and is sealed with three seals; that of the conusor, that of the Queen, and with that of one of the said justices, or of the mayor and recorder. Both are, therefore, debts of record to the Queen; and, being so, they fall for the pur

a Griffiths v. Hughes, 16 M. & W. 809.

b Doe d. Pennington v. Barrett, 4 D. & L. 755.

e Doe d. Harrison v. Hampson, 4 C. B. 745.

d 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 257.

e 1 & 2 Vict. 110, s. 22. As to executions out of the Courts at Westminster on judgments in the C. P. at Lancaster, see 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 62, s. 31; 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, ss. 129, 134. Stannaries Courts in Cornwall, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 11. The Courts of the Counties Palatine are original supe

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