no skill can guard against nor mitigate that this should be totally beyond our present comprehension, is no more than must of necessity be, we being what we are, and the universe what it is. That it is adopted for wise and good reasons, is an unavoidable inference from what we know of the benignity of the Creator; that in many instances it promotes our happiness, we actually experience, since it is often the monitor of danger, the corrector of error, the punisher of vice, the incentive to exertions which issue in the production of immeasurable and exquisite pleasures. That it does not indicate the imperfection of the benevolence of him who appointed it, is certain; for, let it even be supposed that there really is in its appointment an apparent want of benevolence—of this apparent want of benevolence, two accounts may be given: it may arise either from the reality of the appearance, or from the ignorance, the confined views, and the disadvantageous situation of the observer for perceiving the whole plan of the Great Agent. 'It may be owing either to an actual want of goodness, or to the infinity and unfathomableness of it. The first of these accounts contradicts numberless phenomana of nature, is inconsistent with the perfection apparent in the general frame of the world, and opposes our most reasonable apprehensions concerning the nature and attributes of the First Cause. The latter account is in the highest degree easy, natural, and obvious. It is suggested to us by what we have experienced in similar instances, and agreeable to what, from the reason of the thing, we might have foreseen must have happened to such creatures as we are, in considering such a scheme as that of nature. Can we then doubt to which of these accounts we shall give the preference? Is it reasonable to suffer our conviction of a fact, for which we have good evidence, to be influenced by appearances which may as well be consistent as inconsistent with it-nay, by appearances which, on the supposition of its truth, we must beforehand have expected?'*

* Four Dissertations, &c. By RICHARD PRICE, D.D., F.R.S., p. 105.

Let us, then, observe the exact state of the case. It can be proved, in the most satisfactory manner, that the Deity is good, because it can be proved that he has imparted pleasure where it can answer no other purpose than that of promoting the happiness of its recipientthat he has therefore rested in the production of happiness as an ultimate object. One such case is a demonstration of his goodness. On the other hand, it cannot be proved that pain is ever occasioned where no purpose is answered by it but the misery of the sufferer. Not a single example can be found in all nature, from which it can be concluded that pain is rested in as an ultimate object; * while numberless instances can be adduced, from which it can be demonstrated, that it is the means of producing good. The utmost which can be said on the opposite side is, that there are particular cases of such a nature that we cannot explain how they will terminate in good. Even with respect to these, no one can show that they will end in evil, no one can render it probable; but the probability produced by all which we really know is altogether against the conclusion. Although we are ignorant of the exact means by which, in these cases, good is promoted, yet we are equally ignorant of the exact means by which a thousand other things are brought to pass, which we are certain happen; and at all events our ignorance of what we do not know cannot bring doubt upon what we do know; nor can we, without manifest absurdity, conclude that the Deity is not good, merely because we are ignorant of the mode in which, in particular cases, he chooses to accomplish the purposes of benevolence. Belief is founded upon evidence, not upon ignorance; but the notion, that the Deity is not perfectly good, is founded altogether upon our ignorance. Evidence is completely against it-evidence is wholly in favor of his perfect benignity-evidence amounting to absolute demonstration.

*No anatomist ever discovered a system of organization calculated to produce pain and disease, or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever said, "This is to irritate-this to inflame."'-Paley's Natural Theology, p. 502.

Thus we have entered into a particular consideration of the various classes of evil. We have seen that the appointment of it is consistent with infinite wisdom and goodness-that, while its actual amount is by no means so great as is commonly supposed, in every instance in which it does prevail, it produces a preponderance of good, and that it exists only for the sake of that greater good which it is the means of securing. We have seen, then, that the positive proof of the benevolence of the Creator is absolutely irresistible, and that the partial and temporary prevalence of evil, which alone can involve in doubt the perfection of his goodness, is not only not irreconcilable with it, but is as real an evidence of it, as the appointment of the sweetest pleasures of which he has permitted the heart to taste. The human faculties cannot be better employed than in investigating such subjects; and perhaps the review of them that has now been taken may tend to remove some doubts which may sometimes have perplexed and disturbed the mind, and to render its conviction of the most glorious and cheering of all truths more complete, more impressive, and more stable.

SECTION IV.

OF THE DESIGN OF GOD IN THE CREATION.

SUPPOSE, then, the Deity really possesses the attributes which we have endeavored to show must belong to him; suppose that he is self-existent, independent, infinitely powerful, wise, and good, and that he determies to call into existence millions of beings endowed with such a capacity of happiness, and furnished with such faculties as distinguish man; what could induce in him such a determination? By the supposition, he is infinitely powerful, wise, and good; he must therefore be infinitely happy, because infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, must render him self-sufficient-must supply him, that is, with all the means of happiness, whatever they may be, and at the same time exclude every thing which is incompatible with perfect felicity.

Being, then, infinitely powerful, wise, good, and happy, the inquiry recurs, What could determine him to call into existence a world of sentient and reasonable creatures? Could it be weakness? That is impossible; for, by the supposition, he is infinitely wise, and therefore must act not only with some design, but with wise design; Could it be to occasion misery? That also is impossible; for, to suppose that a Being who is infinitely wise, good, and happy, can purpose the production of misery for its own sake, is a contradiction. What, then, could he design? It is impossible to suppose that he could have any other object in view than the bestowment of happiness-the communication to the creatures his wisdom might form, according to the capacities with which that wisdom might endow them, of a portion of his own felicity.

The happiness of his sentient and reasonable creatures, then, must be God's ultimate end in the creation. It is true, he is sometimes said to have executed this

wonderful work in order to display his own glory; but the display of his glory and the happiness of his creatures are identical.

For the reason already assigned, he cannot have been induced to give existence to the vast universe in order to satisfy any want in himself, or to add any thing to his own happiness; because, being self-sufficient, he could have no want, and must always have been in himself completely happy. Nor is it possible that the creation should impart to him any thing which he did not originally possess; for all that it is, he made it, and all that it has, he gave it. All the beauty, excellence, and happiness, with which it is adorned, and in which it rejoices, it derives entirely from him; it cannot, therefore, communicate to him any thing which it did not receive from him. But without creation his attributes could have had no exercise. His wisdom could have been exerted in no wise contrivance-his power in producing no magnificent works-his goodness in communicating no happiness. There is in him transcendant beauty, inexhaustible excellence, immeasurable happiness. Of these, much is capable of communication. By giving being to sentient and intelligent creatures, he saw that he could impart without limit, that he could diffuse without measure, various degrees of these glorious perfections. A disposition thus to communicate himself is an original attribute of his nature; and being so, it is not more certain that he exists, than that he has communicated as high degrees of his perfections as are communicable, to as great a number of creatures as is possible, and that he has communicated them because they are good, that is, because they are happiness. It follows, that the purpose for which he gave being to intelligent creatures was, that he might communicate to them his own happi

ness.

Still he is sometimes said to have created the world for his own glory, or for his own sake, or to have made himself the ultimate object of his creation; and it is very important to observe what is really meant by this language. Strictly speaking, there is no excellence im