mind of every rational being, that the fair creation of the Deity may no longer be falsified by the deceptive medium through which it is viewed, and that our Maker may not be charged with injustice because our eye is evil!

SECTION VI.

OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FRUSTRATING THE DESIGN OF THE DEITY.

If the Deity created all men with a design to make them happy, their ultimate felicity is certain; for, if a being propose to himself the accomplishment of a design, he will perform it, unless some motive arise from within to induce him to change it, or some circumstance arise from without to oblige him to change it. Nothing can explain the failure of his purpose, unless it be supposed, either that he has voluntarily changed it, or has been forced by some superior power to abandon it.

If the Deity voluntarily change his plan, it must be for the better or for the worse. If for the better, the orignal plan must have been imperfect; if for the worse, since he knows all things perfectly, and must therefore foresee the consequence, it follows, that what he perceives to be a good plan is relinquished for one which he knows to be bad; but the supposition, that a wise and good Being can thus act, is impossible.

If, on the contrary, he has been forced to change his plan, that which obliged him to do so must be stronger than he; for no being will permit his design to be frustrated by a power which is weaker than himself. Whatever, therefore, it be, which frustrates the design of the Deity, must be stronger than omnipotence, which is a contradiction.

In a word, God is a Being of perfect goodness. He created man with a design to make him happy.* There

*It is nothing to say that the happiness intended to be bestowed upon his creatures by the Deity is conditional. There can be no doubt that it is so far conditional, that no being can be happy until he becomes virtuous. But the circumstances in which men are placed, and the ultimate effect of those circumstances upon their character, were clearly foreseen by the Deity; and if he perceived that any individual, under any particular combination of circumstances, would never become virtuous, he would either have altered his circumstances, or not have called him into existence. One or other of these measures benevolence required.

is nothing in the universe capable of frustrating his design. However, therefore, that design be opposedthrough whatever long or painful discipline man may be conducted to happiness, he must finally attain it.

It does not seem possible to avoid this conclusion, but by saying that the Deity possesses other attributes, which are of a nature contrary to that upon which the whole of this reasoning is founded; and in fact this is affirmed. To all the arguments in favor of the final happiness of mankind, deduced from the goodness of God, it is replied, that God is a Sovereign, and can do what he pleases; that he is just, and must maintain the rights of his law; that he is holy, and must punish sin. All these positions are strictly true; but it is difficult to conceive how they can oppose the conclusions which are deduced from his goodness. They cannot possibly do so, unless the attributes of sovereignty, justice, and holiness, are contrary to goodness, and this is what is really affirmed. These perfections are conceived to be tremendous attributes, which are different from and opposite to goodness. It would seem like trifling, to confute this opinion, and to show that they can be only modifications of benevolence; yet it is necessary to prove it, and this is attempted in another part of this work. At present it may be sufficient to show, in general, that a Being of perfect goodness can possess no attribute which is inconsistent with that perfection.

SECTION VII.

OF THE HARMONY OF THE DIVINE PERFECTIONS.

A BEING of perfect goodness can possess no attribute which is inconsistent with that perfection; for whatever is inconsistent with goodness is evil, and to affirm that a Being may be perfectly good, while he possesses a single attribute which is contrary to goodness, is to say that he may be perfectly good at the same time that he is evil.

Since whatever is inconsistent with goodness is evilsince it has been proved, that all evil has its origin in want or weakness-since it is universally acknowledged, that God is almighty, and therefore can have no want nor weakness, it follows, that he can possess no attribute which is inconsistent with benevolence.

We have only to determine the nature of an attribute, to decide whether or not it can belong to the Deity. If an attribute be evil, it certainly cannot belong to God. Now the attribute, whatever it be, which inflicts endless misery on any being, is evil. It is not affirmed merely that the attribute is evil which inflicts endless misery on the great majority of men, but that attribute is so which inflicts it even upon one single individual; and the proof is obvious.

Misery, considered in itself, is evil. Misery is only another word which is used to express pain of some kind or other. Pain, considered simply in itself, is universally admitted to be evil. Whatever produces pain, without doing any thing else, is evil.

Is all pain, then, evil? No. Why? Because some pain has an ulterior object, which is the production of good. Hunger, for example, is attended with pain, but this pain is not evil, because it has an ulterior object. Its design is not to inflict suffering, but to preserve life by inducing the animal to take food. In proportion,

therefore, as life is a good to the animal, the pain which excites him to use the means of preserving it is a good.

Now all pain which has not this ulterior object, being pure and simple pain, pain and nothing else, is evil. But misery inflicted through endless ages cannot possibly accomplish this ulterior object, since there is no period in which it can effect it; such misery must be evil, therefore, in the highest possible degree.

It will avail nothing, to say that the object of the infliction of endless misery is not pain, but the satisfaction of immutable justice. This does not in the least affect the argument; for the position is, that that attribute, whatever it may be called, is evil, which inflicts misery upon a being, without doing and without designing to do any thing else to him. To that being it is pure, positive, absolute evil. Whatever makes a being more miserable than happy, the whole of his existence considered, is to him positive evil. A good being must cause to every creature an excess of pleasure above pain, for he is good to it only in proportion as he does so. But, according to the doctrine of endless punishment, God does not cause to the great majority of his creatures an excess of pleasure above pain; for he deprives them, through the whole of their future existence, of every pleasurable sensation, and inflicts upon them the most unremitted and intolerable anguish.

It is usual to represent the future punishment of the wicked in the following manner: suppose a large mountain, composed of the minutest grains of sand; suppose one of these grains to be removed once in a million of years--the length of time which would elapse before the removal of the last of these grains infinitely surpasses our power of conception. Yet this period, immeasurable as it is, is not endless, and therefore can convey to the mind but a faint idea of the duration of the torments of the wicked. We must suppose the globe itself to be composed of grains of sand-nay, all the planets of our system, and all the stars which we behold in the heavens; we must suppose the particles which