is not just to conclude that they have a different origin; for, in so far as they are true, they must be, either directly or indirectly, derived from it, since there is no reason to believe that they could have been formed by any mind which had not been illumined by this divine light.

OF THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE FINAL RESTORATION OF ALL MANKIND TO PURITY AND HAPPINESS, DISTINCT FROM THAT AFFORDED BY THE EXPRESS DECLARATIONS OF SCRIPTURE.

THE evidence in favor of the doctrine of Universal Restoration, distinct from that afforded by the express declarations of scripture, may be arranged under three heads, namely that which is deducible from the perfections of God, from the nature of man, and from the nature and design of punishment.

It is proper to say, that the arguments adduced under each of these particulars are distinct from those afforded by the express declarations of scripture; because, how much soever they may really depend upon the light of revelation, (and for the reason already assigned they may depend upon it in a very great degree,) yet they are framed without any direct reference to it, and seem in general to be derived from the nature of things. Reasoning of this kind is peculiarly satisfactory; and, if the positive declarations of scripture can be shown to coincide with it, to include it, and to be founded upon it, it must produce a conviction as strong as can be effected by any thing which is not an object of sense, or which cannot be proved upon the principles of geometry.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL RESTORATION, DERIVED FROM THE PERFECTIONS OF GOD.

SECTION I.

OF THE GOODNESS OF GOD.

WERE it assumed, that he who gave us existence, and bestowed upon us all things richly to enjoy, is a Being of infinite goodness, it would be only taking for granted what all Christians, and even all theists, allow. It may be proper, however, to state briefly the evidence of the perfect benignity of the Universal Parent.

Because the phenomena of nature cannot be accounted for without the supposition of a self-existent Being, the original cause of all things, we conclude that such a Being exists, and that, since he is the cause of all other things and beings, he must be independent of them. Because he who could create such a world as this must be able to do any thing which is not in itself a contradiction, we infer that his power is without limits. Because the exhibitions of wisdom, in every part of nature with which we are acquainted, surpass all assignable limits, and because we cannot, but conceive, that the intelligence which is displayed in the constitution of the world is adequate to the performance of any thing which is in its own nature possible, we conclude also, that his wisdom is infinite. From these principles, his goodness follows as a necessary consequence.

For the Original Cause of all things, being absolutely independent, being infinite in power and wisdom, must be

good, since evil is the result of want, weakness, or error. But he who is infinite in power can have no want; neither can he have any weakness; and he who created all things, and gave them the relations they possess, cannot but know them perfectly, and therefore must be incapable of error.

That evil can arise from no other sources than those which have been mentioned, will appear evident, from considering the origin of any form of it with which we are acquainted. Whence, for example, arise envy, malice, hatred, injustice? Envy is the malicious coveting of a good possessed by another; something is desired. which cannot be attained. He, then, who has it in his power to obtain all good, must be incapable of envy. Injustice is the withholding of a good, real or supposed, from another whose right it is; he who has it in his power to obtain all good, must therefore be incapable of injustice. And the same may be said of every description of moral evil whatever.

If an intelligent Being perceive perfectly the true relation of all things to each other, so as to be incapable of mistake, and if at the same time he have the whole of possibility in his power, he must, in the nature of things, be incapable of evil; because he cannot commit evil through ignorance, and there can be nothing to induce him to act with an evil design. This, then, is exactly the idea which we form of the Supreme Intelligence.

If this deduction of the goodness of God, from the other essential attributes of his nature, be just, it will be confirmed by the appearances of his works. What he has done will satisfy us that we are right in our conception of what he is.

In endeavoring to ascertain from his works, whether or not the Deity be benevolent, we must conduct our investigation in the same manner as when we endeavor to discover his other perfections; because, in the objects around us, we perceive so many marks of design, such various and exquisite contrivance, we conclude that their Author is intelligent. In like manner, if it appear that this design is good design, that this contrivance minis

ters not only to convenience, but to enjoyment, it will follow that its Author is good.

Now there are two facts, of the certainty of which no one who examines the state of the animal creation can doubt, which place the goodness of the Creator beyond all question. The first is, that pleasure is imparted to animal sensations, when no cause can be assigned for it but the gratification of the animal; the second is, that there is more happiness than misery in the world.*

The first, if it can be clearly proved, affords a conviction, the certainty of which cannot be exceeded by any kind of evidence whatever-not even by that which we derive from geometry or from sense. The determination to create an animal supposes a determination to endow it with all the faculties which are necessary to its existence. These faculties, therefore, however multiplied, beautiful, or exquisite, cannot prove the goodness of the Creator; because, being necessary to the existence of the animal, they must have formed a part of any design to create, whether good or malevolent. But if these faculties be so constituted, that they not only give existence, but make that existence happy-if in general they cannot be exercised without affording enjoyment as well as life, then there is not only design, but good design. Then it is evident, that the Creator not only meant to give existence, but to make that existence a blessing.

With all the animal functions, then, this is the case. They all minister to enjoyment, while they sustain the mysterious principle of life. There is not a single exception. There is not one animal function, the common and natural exercise of which is painful. There is not one whose natural exercise is not productive of pleasure.† Whence could this possibly happen, but from the goodness of the Creator?

*Each of these positions has been stated and illustrated, with admirable force and beauty, by Paley, in his Natural Theology.

+ Indeed, the very application of the term natural is a decisive proof of the goodness of the Deity. When the functions of an animal are so exercised, as to afford it vigor, ease, and enjoyment, we say it is in a natural state.

He who is infinite in power might have so constituted an animal, as to make the exercise of every function which is necessary to its existence productive of exquisite suffering; and had his nature been malignant, and his design in creation been to gratify a malignant disposition, he would certainly have done so. Constituted as animals at present are, it is necessary to the continuance of their life, that they should eat. The act of eating might have been made productive of exquisite misery, and the animal have been infallibly impelled to it, by making the pain of hunger still greater than that of eating. Here, then, was an opportunity of diffusing over the whole animal creation a source of continual torment. But, instead of this, the act is made pleasurable, and thus becomes the source of continual gratification. How can this be accounted for, but upon the supposition, that he who had the diffusion of both equally in his power, and who chose to diffuse happiness rather than misery, is good?

Constituted as animals at present are, and placed amidst such objects as those which surround them, it was necessary that they should have the senses of sight and of touch. Now the eye might have been so constructed, as to receive from every object the same kind of impression as is felt when it is cast upon any thing that is monstrous. The sense of touch might have been so formed, as to impart, upon the contact of every object, a sensation similar to that which is felt when the surface of the body is pierced with thorns; and, as the body must always be in contact with some external object, this torment might have been experienced during every moment of existence. Why, then, is not this the case? Why, on the contrary, do we continually receive the most exquisite gratification from all our senses? It can be resolved into nothing but the pure benignity of the Creator.

This annexation of pleasure to the exercise of animal functions, when that pleasure is not at all necessary to animal existence, is a decisive proof of the goodness of the Deity; for it is to produce happiness without doing