hand, does the exercise of perfect wickednefs in him who has fallen, forbid the hope, that the fubject may again be renewed to repentance. Should it be objected, by the advocates for the impleaded hypothefis, that their fentiments do not admit that Chriftians will ever fall from grace; because they maintain, there are gracious covenant engagements, on God's part, that where love has once been implanted in the heart, though its exercifes be followed by thofe which are perfectly finful, it fhall again revive and spring up :-This, however, would imply no other difference between them and thofe who hold that Chriftians may fall from grace, than that the former fuppofe a certainty that the subject will be renewed to repentance; but the latter do not. The falling away in both cafes, is materially and effentially the fame, viz. a perfon's ceafing to exercise the leaft degree of love to God, and having nothing but wickedness in his heart, though he have once been brought to fpiritual lifethough he have heretofore felt the fenfation of pure, divine love. What more than this is neceffary to a real, effectual falling from in their kind, we fee not how the apoftle could fay with propriety, as ver. 19. "For the good that "I would I do not; but the evil "that I would not, that I do." We cannot be faid to do that we would not, when the whole heart is in what we do-Nor can we be faid not to do the good we would, when this good is perfectly chofen. The holy feriptures reprefent the ftruggle in Chriftians from different and oppofite principles or luftings as a warfare between enemies. And yet it is clear, there is -there can be no ftruggle or warfare of enemies, unlefs both are alive, and on the field, and exerting themselves at the fame time. To fuppofe the luftings of the fpirit, and of the flesh, in Chriftians, both perfect in kind, only exifting at different times, would really give no effentially different idea of a warfare within the Chriftian, than there was in Adam, by being first holy, then a finner. Nothing appears, on fuppofition that the moral imperfection of Chriftians confifts in the inconftancy of their holy exercifes, but that they may live perfectly free from fin, for as long a period as our first parents did-And then, too, live in the exercife of perfect wicked-grace, it may be difficult to apnefs, as long as they did, before they were renewed to holinefs. Yet the fall and recovery of our firft parents is neither an example, nor a juft reprefentation of the struggle of oppofite biaffes in the hearts of Chriftians. prehend. And if the holy fcrip. tures decide, that one, who falls from grace, can never again be renewed to repentance; they equally decide, that a Chriftian never is, at any period after his converfion, wholly without any 6. The fentiment under con- degree of the love of God in his fideration implies, both the doc-heart-never fees the time, when trine of perfection in this life, and that of falling from grace. The doctrine of perfection, as held by its advocates, implies no certainty that a fucceffion of holy exercifes fhall be continued for any particular period: Nor, on the other his feelings and exercifes are only thofe of the unregenerate finner. This is afferted on the ground, that the covenant of grace afcertains the final falvation of every one, who is brought to believe in Chrift. If it be that the phrases used in the 4th and 5th verses of the 6th Heb. are defcriptive of the Chriflian, the words immediately following fully decide that, if fuch an one fall away, he cannot be renewed again to repentance. But if the expreffions, being enlightened, tafting the heavenly gift, made partakers of the Holy Ghoft, tafling the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, are not defcriptive of the Chriftian character, and of Chriftian experience, where shall we find any in the holy fcriptures, which are? How manifeft is it, that being in darkness, and being in the light are phrafes abundantly ufed, in fcripture, to diftinguish between the ftate and character of the unregenrate and the Chriftian? Accordingly, in this fame Epiftle, chap. 10. 32. the writer addreffes the Hebrew Chriftians, as those who had been enlightened. Similar obfervations might be made on the other expreffions juft quoted. But the Apoftle'sown words feem to be decifive in the cafe. He fays, if fuch fall away, it is impoffible to renew them again unto repentance. This naturally fuppoles that thofe, who had been the fubjects of the influences and experiences before defcribed, had once been renewed unto repentance :-Had not this been the cafe, there would have been a manifeft impropriety in speaking of their being again renewed. Having once been renewed, if they fell away, they never could be renewed again. Why does not this imply, fhould the time ever come, when there is a total failure of love in the heart of a Chriftian, and this followed by exercifes of perfect, unmixed finfulness, that holy love will never again be begotten in his heart? To fay that there is a diviné eftablishment, that holy exercises fhall fucceed fuch as are wholly finful, in a heart, which has here. tofore felt the power of divine grace and love, contradicts the affertion of the Apoftle, that, if fuch an one fall away, it is impoffible to renew him to repentance. Should it be faid, that the fal ling away fpoken of by the Apof tle, does not mean a ceffation for a little, or a given time, of holy exercifes, in the heart of the Chriftian; but a final as well as a total apoftacy from Chriftianity; it may be replied, that fuch a conftruction renders the Apostle's affertion, both unmeaning and impertinent.-This would be to make him fay that, one who finally falls away, and never does repent, is never renewed again to repentance that it is impoffible to renew a final impenitent to repentance. Thefe obfervations may serve to fhow, that the moral imperfection of Chriftians does not confift in the inconftancy of their holy exercifes. We may inquire, in the next place, whether it be supposeable, there fhould be two entirely diftinct and oppofite exercifes of will, in the Chriftian, at one and the fame time, the one perfedly holy, and the other totally finful; and, that this fhould conftitute the moral imperfection of Chriftians, in the prefent state. That there may be different, and even oppofite exercifes of will, in the fame perfon, at different times, is readily admitted. But that there should be exercises of will perfectly distinct from each other, and in perfect and direct oppofition the one to the other at the fame time, not only wants the evidence of experience, but is difficult even to be conceived. It i one confcioufnefs which perceives and | fection of Chriftians confifts, neifeels every thing that takes place ther in the inconftancy of their ho in one and the fame mind, wheth-ly affections, nor in affections of er it be of the intellectual or vol- a perfectly diftin& and oppofite nature untary kind. Whatever be the exercifed at the fame time; it renature or quality of affections in mains, that it must confift in morany individual, they are the affec-al imperfection in their holy exercifes tions of one and the fame will. themselves-That the most holy One confcioufnefs to every thing, affections they ever exercife, in which takes place in it, runs this life, have in them fome mixthrough the whole of each par- ture of moral evil, of fin. This ticular, diftinct mind. Two per- is the fame as to fay, that perfectly distinct and oppofite exer- fect, unmixed benevolence is neve cifes of will at the fame time, to- er felt by any one on this fide the gether with two diftinct and fep- grave. Here we may juftly ap arate perceptions of conscioufnefs peal to the experience of Chrif of them, imply two minds as en- tians; and, afk if they ever feel tirely diftinct from each other, as to themselves that they love the thofe of any two different perfons. glorious God and Saviour as much What makes two perfons, but as they ought to, and with a perfec different trains of moral exercifes, and finless love? Or, whether they Between which there is no mutual are ever confcious of this perfec confcioufnefs--mutual perception? friendship and finless love, and at It must be two minds in which are the fame time, the fame moment confound exercises at the fame time, fcious of perfe&i, unmixed enmity. and these of a nature perfectly against God? oppofite to each other, between which there is no common confcioufnefs-no mutual perception. But if there be a common consciousness, a mutual perception running through all the exercifes, which co-exift in the mind of an individual; there is no place left for fuch a diftinction between its different feelings and perceptions, as will warrant us to confider, and treat of them, as affections, both entirely oppofite, and perfeally difline from each other. There may be different qualities in the prefent exercifes of the will: But that two directly oppofite exercises of one and the fame will fhould co-exift, and thefe, too, of a perfectly different nature; and, there be no blending, no mutual perception of feelings between them; is as inconceivable. as that one mind fhould be two. If it be that the moral imper All the difficulty, it is apprehended, which attends the opinion, that the moral imperfection of Christians confifts in the morally imperfe& nature of their most holy affections, is, that it is hard to conceive there fhould be any love to God, where he is not loved in the fame perfection, as by the fpirits of juft men made perfect, i. e. with a ftrength and fervor of love, which exhaust the whole natural capacity for love. But is it at all inconceivable that, an affection, which gives the divine character and glory a preference to ourselves, and to any perfonal intereft of our own, thold, yet, have fome tincture, fome remains of selfishness in it? Is there any inconfiftency in fuppofing, that men may love God more than themselves, and yet not fo much more as they ought? Do we not often experience preferen ces, in our affections, which are, nevertheless, imperfect? Do we not often make choices, when, at the fame time, fome degree of reluctance is felt in choofing? Are there never any drawbacks upon the enjoyment of what we have chofen? And, yet, would there be, if the choice were pure and unmixed, and, in proportion to the nature of the object, exhaufted the whole ftrength of the elective faculty? When we have been angry with any one, do our affections proceed, in an. inftant, from the height of paffion, to perfect cordiality and reconciliation? Or, have we the fenfation, both of the height of paffion, and perfect reconciliation, at the fame time? Or yet further; do the height of paffion, and perfect reconciliation take place by turns, and vibrate, 'till anger totally fubfide? The experience we have in this, and in similar cafes, muft be the rule by which we judge. As to the poffibility, in the nature of things, of fuch a mix ture of affection, the following things may be observed, viz. That there is no exercife of will without an object-That the objects toward which the will is exercifed-the ideas, are often, even generally complex. That the mind is fufceptible of complex ideas, i. e. of a number and variety of fimple ideas, at one and the fame time, is fufficiently evinced by experience. Several ideas, and thofe of different kinds, coexift in the mind, and are perceived at once without any fucceffion. It is the province of the will to feel and act toward the objects prefented to the mind by the underftanding. If differing objects are prefented at one and the fame time, the affection toward thefe objects must be, either of a mixed | nature according to the different qualities of the general object pre-fented to it; or, there must be as many fucceffive affections toward the general object, as there are different qualities in it. If there be not as great a mixture of per ception in the affection toward the complex object presented, as there is of different qualities in the object itself, it will follow, either that there must be as many fucceffive affections as there are different qualities in the object; or, there must be fome qualities in the object perceived by the underftanding, toward which the mind does not act at all, or feel any manner of affection. But if we admit that there are some objects exifting in the understanding, toward which no affection of the. will is exercifed, we fhall neither know where to stop, nor how many objects are prefented, toward which the moral part in us never acts. The objects presented by the understanding, are of the nature of motives to action. And why any motives to action should be prefented to the moral faculty, toward which the will never acts, either one way or the other, we are not able to comprehend. To fuppofe there are as many different acts of will in fucceffion to each other, as there are different fimple ideas in a complex object exifting at one and the fame time in the understanding, will imply, either that the will never acts toward fome of the objects prefented by the understanding, or that the fucceffion of acts of the will are much, yea very much more rapid, than the fucceffion of ideas in the understanding. But why this fhould be fo, we know not; nor do we derive any evi dence, from experience, of the fact. But if this be really the cafe, there muft either be two very different measures of time, or time is not conftituted by the fuc. ceffion of mental ideas and perceptions. If time be conftituted by the fucceffion of intellectual ideas, it will of courfe follow, that all the exercises there are of affection toward an object now exifting in the understanding, however complex, and of whatever different qualities, are fimultaneous; and, confequently, not fucceffive. Should we fuppofe the fucceffions of affection to be more rapid than thofe of intellectual ideas, time must be measured very differently by one train of thefe fucceffions, from that of the other; or, the will muft never act toward fome of the objects prefented by the underftanding. It remains, therefore, if the ideas exifting in the understanding are ever complex, if the objects prefented to the faculty of the will be of different qualities, that they are felt, and the will acts towards them all at once, and without fucceffive acts and exercifes. And if this be fo, the affection muft of neceffity be of a mixed nature, according as the feveral fimples prefented to it in the complex object, are fuited to the tafte, or otherwise. This, it is apprehended is agreeable to conftant, daily experience. We often have objects prefented, which pleafe on fome accounts, and not on others. Yea, we rarely, if ever, find an object, which we choose with so perfect a relish and approbation of the will, as to be fenfible of no drawbacks upon the affection, from fome quality in the object, or in the relation or terms on which it must be chofen, not altogether relifhed. That fome idea of the fupreme God may co-exist with ideas of our own perfonal intereft, is evident from the fenfible oppofition of heart many times felt to the character and government of God. And if affections may confift of different feelings, in proportion to the different qualities of the object prefented to the mind, as has been already shown; it is manifeft, there is no natural inconfiftency in fuppofing the heart to confent to the fupremacy of God, without a perfect willingnefs, at the fame time, to come fo low, and be fo low as is fuitable for the finner. What difficulty can there be in the fuppofition, that the holy God fhould be truly loved, and yet the affection not perfectly relish that high fupremacy of the Deity, which with infinite reafon he claims; and, that per fect felf-abasement, which he re. quires of the finner? If ideas of the glorious God may co-exift with thofe of our own perfonal intereft, there can be no abfurdity in fuppofing that, without perfect difinterestedness, the heart fhould prefer the glory of God. If thefe obfervations be juft, it may appear, that the moral imperfection of Chriftians confifts, not in the inconftancy of their holy exercifes-nor yet, in the exercife of affections of a perfedly dif tinet and oppofite nature at the fame time-but in the moral, finful imperfection of the best affections ever found in them on this fide the grave. FOR THE CONNECTICUT EVANGELICAL MAGAZINE. A brief account of the revival of religion now prevailing in YaleCollege, New-Haven, communi cated to the Editors by one of the Inftru&iors of the College. |