Sometimes they are the "negligent and thoughtless;" sometimes, the "partial and prejudiced;" sometimes, "the obstinate and infidel." The end is-" to make them examine the religion of the state, so that they may embrace the truth;"-" to persuade them to weigh matters impartially, to bring them from under the power of passion, that they may act according to reason and sound judgment;" or at least" to induce them to ask, whether the religion for which they undergo such inconveniences is indeed true;" and thus" to transfer them out of the power of darkness into the kingdom of God.""

To minds not thoroughly saturated with the maxims and spirit of the gospel, this system of charitable persecution may probably seem recommended by strong, and apparently no immoral motives of policy; while, in truth, it is at bottom rotten and corrupted, as indeed all systems must be that are founded on any, even the minutest, degree of positive injustice. To the scheme itself, as thus stated, it is intended to urge only three objections :-1. It is impracticable. 2. It is unrighteous. 3. It is injurious to those high and holy interests which it professes to promote.

1. It is impracticable to punish dissenters only because they are prejudiced and thoughtless in neglecting to examine impartially the religion of the state: for besides that the churchman is as likely to be prejudiced

in favour of its emoluments and honours, it is clearly impossible for any but the Omniscient God to know with what amount of prejudice and inconsideration each man is chargeable. Further, men are punished whether they consider or no. That question is never asked them. If they conform, they are rewarded, not for consideration but for conformity; if they do not conform, they are punished, not for inconsideration but for dissent.

Nor can the object of this indirect punishment be stated in any terms that may represent it less impracticable and contradictory. “Is it to induce man to submit to instruction and to give a fair hearing to arguments that might at length enlighten and convince them?" Dissenters profess to have discharged this duty, and unless their plea can be disproved, it is absurd to punish them for neglecting it. "Is it to persuade them to weigh the matter impartially ?" Why, then, put hopes of preferment and respectability on the one side, with punishment and proscription on the other? "Is it to make men think as they ought of the importance of salvation ?" Possibly so; but why not apply this sovereign remedy to the nominal members of the church? It is at best somewhat suspicious that she should give all the hellebore of her garden to her neighbour's children, while she thinks

it imprudent to give it to her own.

"Is it that men

should not leave their religion to others or to their own passions, that these punishments are inflicted ?" What, then, is self-interest, ambition, fear? Are they the elements of the "dry light" so needful for intellectual vision? If not, why teach us to yield to the impulse of one passion, lest we should follow the guidance of another? The fear of suffering sends up vapours around the eye of reason as thick and noxious as the love of consistency, as obstinacy, or firmness, and is therefore to the full as injurious to the perception of truth: and if these penalties be inflicted on such as "leave their religion to others," or follow only the guidance of passion, why are they free who leave it to the priest, or the bishop, or the church? Or, is it to "make them listen to those who know they are mistaken, and who are desirous of shewing them the right way?" If so, then will each sect and each creed claim, in succession, state patronage and state power. Or, is it, lastly, to "compel men to consider the controversy between the magistrate and themselves till they be persuaded of the truth of his creed?" If so, how then, in the estimate of the episcopalian Christian, must the controversy be decided between the quaker and the presbyterian, the Mahammadan and the Jew? All are wrong! So that till falsehood have the attributes of truth, or till men may be convinced against evidence, the appeal is to

force and physical strength. The argument we hold perfectly conclusive: establishments would stigmatize and punish dissenters because they are thoughtless and prejudiced. Punishment, it is universally admitted, should never be inflicted except for crimes perpetrated and proven, and never denounced except against crimes capable of proof, nor then unless punishment be a public duty, and fitted to prevent the repetition of them; but it is impossible that men can be proved guilty of thoughtlessness or prejudice, unless not to think impartially and not to be of the national faith are one; and even if they be proved guilty, it is by no means clear that by fear of punishment and hopes of reward all prejudice will be removed. The case is, then, that dissenters are punished for what is no crime-prejudice and inconsideration; or if a crime, for what no man can prove; or if it can be proved, for what no punishment can cure or prevent. What theory of punishment justifies from the charge, not of injustice only, but of madness, such treatment ?*

Different writers on establishments have attempted to get rid of this charge of punishing dissenters for their conscientious belief, by asserting, that such punishment is never more than is requisite for the safety and continuance of the system. This is Burke's plea, and substantially it is Warburton's. The latter denies that establishments inflict punishment, and maintains that they only impose necessary restrictions. What they do inflict is not penal, but only defensive. The answer to these pleas is obvious; for, in fact, they

2. This scheme of punishment is obviously unrighteous. Men are punished because not of the national church; and they are not of the national church because not convinced. But not to admit what is not believed is clearly no fault, and therefore to punish it as such is to violate the commonest principles of justice and reason. Besides, not to profess what is disbelieved is a Christian duty; so that men are punished, professedly for not considering, but really for doing as God had enjoined them.

3. It is injurious; because more likely to be adopted on behalf of error than of truth; because when on the side of truth its palpable injustice is more likely to give men an aversion to the religion that sanctions it than to win them to its side; and lastly, because when successful, it is little likely to make them its hearty supporters. Hypocrisy, atheism, and formal Christianity have ever been the natural offspring of this unpropitious union of state and church.*

amount only to this: such pains and restrictions are absolutely essential to an establishment, and therefore they cannot be withdrawn so long as the establishment is upheld,—a statement true, certainly, but without even the shadow of a reason for an establishment itself. It is because such defensive restrictions are essential to establishments that we seek to remove them. It is useless to reform the system; it must be abolished, or men still suffer-call their suffering punishment, or restraint, or what you will-for their conscientious faith. -See the Alliance between Church and State, book iii. chap. 3.

*The author has ventured to repeat a few of the arguments