defence of beasts, who cannot keep themselves harmless, but by doing a greater mischief: a tooth or a claw, a horn or a heel, these defend the beast, who, that he may not receive a, wound, defends himself so, that he will kill his enemy. And yet this, amongst evil men, is called prudent.'

It is not by this discourse intended, that we may not take securities of him against future mischiefs, if we can do it without doing him a mischief; but under the colour of securing ourselves for the future, we must not be revenged for what is past; neither must our revenge in small matters be used at all as an instrument of our security. If we can be secured without his affliction, we must take that way to be secured; but if, by revenges, and direct inflictions of evil, or procurations of punishment, we attempt it, we are not charitable. And this is the perfect meaning of our blessed Saviour: "If thine enemy take thy cloak, let him take thy coat also: and if he strike thee on thy right cheek, turn thy left to him;" and let him strike thee again. These words are not to be understood literally and precisely; not so as to forbid all securities or avoiding of future evils; for Christ himself did not so, when an evil servant smote him; and St. Paul did not so, when the high priest commanded him to be smitten on the face; they neither of them received it silently, nor turned the other cheek. And what, if he that smote one cheek, will smite no more? or will smite the same? How if we are not able to bear a second blow? Or how if the offering the other cheek provoke thy enemy to scorn thee, and tempt or provoke him to strike thee,-who intended no such second blow? And were it not evidently better to withdraw from him that smites, or to sweeten him with gentle language? It is, therefore, certain, these words are to be understood in the sense of prudence, equity, and charity; that is, when you are injured, you may use all that is for your innocent defence, and unmingled guards; you may, without all peradventure, pray him to be quiet; you may give him reasons and arguments to let you alone; you may give good words, you may give blessing for cursing, that is certainly permitted; or you may run away, you may flee from city to city; or you may complain to him; you may reprove him, and expostulate the injury with him, as Christ did, and as did St. Paul. But what is then meant by

turning the other cheek?' Our blessed Saviour, using an idiotism of his own language, and a phrase used by the prophet in the prediction of Christ's meekness and passion, She turned his cheeks to the nippers,' means, that' we must 'not resist with doing violence or affliction to him that smites;' any innocent guard, but nothing violent; any thing that is harmless, but nothing vexatious; but rather than do another evil, suffer another and this evidently demonstrates, that the preventing of every injury is no sufficient warrant to legitimate the bringing of our enemy to be punished at law for what is past. The sum is this:

No man is forbidden to lock his doors, to bar his windows, or to run from evil, or to divert it, or to reprove it. But, 1. In this question we speak of evil already done, and against revenges, not against defences; for that which is done, cannot be undone; and, therefore, revenge is foolish and malicious but that which is not done, may be prevented by all arts of gentleness and innocence; and, therefore, defences are prudent, and they are lawful. 2. We speak here of little dangers and tolerable evils; and a man must not go to law, because the musician" keeps false time with his foot: it is not for a small matter that a man must disquiet his brother; he must rather suffer two, than do one evil.

4. But if the evil we fear, be intolerable, and yet certain, or very probable to happen, we may appeal to the law for sanctuary or defence, though this appeal do procure affliction to our enemy: always provided, that this evil be not directly intended, nor desired secretly, nor delighted in when it happens, and be made as little as it can, prosecuted with as easy circumstances, without vexatious measures, but not without necessity.

For in all intercourses with our enemy, there are but two things to be considered by us; how we may do him good, how we may keep ourselves from evil. The latter, the law of charity, and collateral duties, do permit or enjoin respectively; but of the former our blessed Saviour hath made special provision. For when our blessed Lord commanded us first to reprove secretly our offending brother, and then before witness, if there be need; the reason he gives, is only

το Διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ποδὶ πρὸς τὴν λύραν ἁμαρτίαν.

that we may bring him to repentance; that you may gain him, by rescuing his soul from guiltiness, and his actions from injuriousness. If this course will not prevail, then tell it to the church; complain of him publicly, bring him before the Christian judicatories: but still that he may repent; for if he repents, he must be thy brother still, loved as dearly, treated as friendly, caressed as sweetly, handled as tenderly, conversed with as obligingly. But if none of all this will prevail for his good, then look you only to the other part of the permission; that is, that you be secured from his evil; you have done all that you are tied to do for his repentance in this method, but you have not yet done all that you are tied to do in charity: for still you must afford him all those kindnesses, which Christ requires of thee for thy enemy; that is, to pray for him, and to love him. But you may secure yourself by all means, which his violence and your case hath made necessary.

But this, I say, is in case the evil be intolerable, or that to avoid it be a matter of duty, or charity to those to whom you are obliged. Though my old friend, and my new enemy, Carbo, do me little spites, and kill my deer, or shoot pigeons, or trespass upon my grass, I must not be avenged on him at the law, or right myself by afflicting him, but strive for the rewards of patience, and labour for the fruits of my charity, and, for the rest, use all the guards of prudence that I can: yet if he takes away my children's portions, or fires my houses, or exposes me or mine to beggary or destitution, I must do that duty which my charity to my children, and my justice does oblige me: I may defend my children's right, though that defence exposes him to evil that does the evil. I may not let Carbo alone, and suffer my children to be undone. I must provide for my own according to their condition and states of life; if this provision be but necessary or competent, according to prudent, modest, and wise accounts, and be not a contention for excesses and extravagancies of wealth. He that goes to law for another, hath greater warrant than he that does it for himself; for it is more likely to be charity in that case, and revenge in my own; and, certainly, in the disputes of charity, our children are to be preferred before our enemies.

In short, if the vexation that is brought by the suit of

law upon an injurious person, be not revenge, and if the defence be necessary, or greatly charitable, and if the injury be intolerable or greatly afflictive, in all these cases, Christ hath left us to the liberties of nature, and reason, and the laws.

5. No man must, in his own case, prosecute his enemy to death or capital punishment. The reasons are, because no man's temporal evil, his injury, his disgrace, his money, and his wound, are not the competent value for the life of a man; and when, beyond this, there is no evil that we can do, it can, in no sense, consist with charity that goes so far. He that prosecutes his enemy to death, forgives nothing, forbears nothing of that injury; he means no good to his enemy, desires not his amendment, is not careful of his repentance, is not ambitious to gain a brother, to secure the interest of a soul for God, to get himself the rewards of charity; and it is a sad thing to make thy adversary pay the utmost farthing, even whilst he is in the way; and to send him, to make his accounts to God, reeking in his sins, and his crimes broad blown about his ears. There are not many cases, in which it can consist with the spirit of Christianity, for the laws themselves to put a criminal hastily to death", Whatsoever is necessary, that is lawful; and of the necessities of the public, public persons are to judge: only they are to judge according to the analogy and gentleness of the Christian laws, by a Christian spirit, and to take care of souls, as well as of bodies and estates. If the criminal can be amended, as oftentimes he can; it is much better for a commonwealth, that a good citizen be made, than that he be taken away while he is evil. Strabo P tells of some nations dwelling about Caucasus, that never put their greatest malefactors to death: and Diodorus says, that "Sabacon, a pious and good king of Egypt, changed capital punishment into a slavery, and profitable works, and that with excellent success; because it brought more profit to the public, and

-

» See Rule of Conscience, book iii. chap. 2. pag. 114.

• Nemo dubitavit, quin, si nocentes mutari in bonam mentem aliquo, modo possint, sicut posse interdum conceditur, salvos eos esse magis è republicâ sit, quam puniri.—Quintil.

• Μηδένα ἀποκτείνειν τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων τὰ μέγιστα.

Epist. 160. Alicui utili operi eorum integra membra deserviant.

brought the criminal to repentance and a good mind." Greek emperors did so;' and St. Austin

Balsamo says,

advises it as most fitting to be done.

But if this, in some case, be better in the public itself, it is necessary in the private, and it is necessary in our present inquiry, in order to charity preparatory to the holy communion and, in the council of Eliberis, there is a canon, "If any Christian accuse another at the law, and prosecute him to banishment or death, let him not be admitted to the communion, no, not so much as in the article of death." For he whose malice passed unto the death of his brother, must not, in his death, receive the communion of the faithful, and the seal of the charities of God. But this was severe and it is to be understood only to be so, unless when we are commanded to prosecute a criminal, by the interest of necessary justice, and public charity, and the command of the laws; but, in other cases, he that hath done so, let him repent greatly, and long, and at last communicate that is the best expedient.

QUESTION VII.

Whether the Laws of Forgiveness, and the Charities of the Communion, oblige the injured Person to forgive the adulterous Husband or Wife, if they do repent?

There are two cases, in which it is so far from being necessary, that it is not lawful to do some things of kindness, which, in all other cases, are indeed true charity, and highly significative of a soul truly merciful, and worthy

to communicate.

1. When to retain the adulterous person is scandalous; as in the primitive church it was esteemed so in clergymen: then such persons, though they be penitent, must not be suffered to cohabit; they must be pardoned to all purposes, which are not made unlawful by accident, and to all purposes which may minister unto their repentance and salvation: but charity must not be done to a single person, with offence to the church; and a criminal must not receive advantage by the prejudice of the holy and the innocent.

* See Rule of Conscience, book i, chap. 5, rule 8.-Concil. Eliber.