they are capable of doing it. It is but to impress upon the mind of a man a fet of religious principles, and point out to him a fet of religious practices, by fuch impreffions, and then a religion is coined for that man, and for all that fhall be difcipled to him. And, As to the other queftion, viz. what kind of evidence invifible agents not divine can produce to engage mens attention to, and belief of, thofe religious impreffions that are made upon their minds; the answer to this question will not be hard nor difficult, if we admit a fuppofition which is likewise usually admitted into the schemes of moft Religionifts, name-ly, that fuch invifible agents do not only imprefs various and contrary images upon the minds of men, but also that they do otherwife operate, or use their power, upon this globe. But before I proceed to answer this question, two things must be premised, viz. first, if the actions of free beings are foreknowable in nature, (which point is admitted by moft Religionifts) then, thofe actions may be foreknowable, not only to the Deity, but also to some other invifible agents not divine. For, as knowledge is communicable; fo foreknowledge may be communicable alfo. That is, as creatures are fo formed that they can attain knowledge by the exercise of those powers which refult from their natural conftitutions; fo foreknowledge may be attainable in the fame way; I fay, this may be the cafe for any thing we know or can fhew to the contrary. However, However, this is apparent that the knowledge and fagacity which refults from the conftitutions of various animals is greatly different, as the knowledge and fagacity of a man is greatly fuperior to that of an afs. And, this may be the cafe of invifible agents not divine. And therefore, tho' men may not be able certainly to discover and foreknow the actions of each other, and other events that are dependent on fuch actions; yet it will by no means follow from thence, that fuch discovery and foreknowledge cannot refult from the natural conftitutions of any invifible agents not divine. Again, Secondly, if invifible agents not divine can, and do operate, or exercife their power on this globe, (which propofition is admitted by many Religionists,) then, there is no operation on this globe, tho' ever fo much above the natural ability or inherent power of man, but may be performed by the power of fome invifible agent not divine. I fay, this may be the cafe for any thing we know or can shew to the contrary. For, as power is communicable; fo it is equally as eafy for God to communicate one kind, or degree of power as another; at leaft it is fo for any thing we know, and to fuppofe the contrary is plainly a limitation of God's power. Befides, there are various kinds and degrees of power, which refult from the natural conftitutions of the inhabitants of this globe, and this may likewise be the cafe of invifible agents not divine. And, this accounts for Mofes's conteft with, and victory victory over, the Magicians of Egypt. The power of the invifible being, or beings who affifted Mofes, was much greater than the power of thofe invifible beings who affifted the Magicians; and thereby, Mofes, in point of miracle working, became greatly their fuperior. These points being premised, I return to the question propofed, viz. what kind of evidence invifible agents not divine can produce to engage mens attention to, and belief of those religious impreffions that are made upon their minds? And the answer to this queftion, (admitting the above fuppofitions) is short, plain, and obvious, namely, they have had, or may have had, Oracles, Prophecies, Prodigies, Miracles, &c. to anfwer these purpofes. This is the cafe fuppofing Religion to be the creature of fome invifible agent, or agents, not divine. Thus I have fhewn how the cafe will stand, whether we confider Religion as founded only on the opinions and fancies, or on the cunning and craftiness of men; or whether it has been introduced into the world by the interpofition of fome invisible agent, or agents, not divine. And, I fear, the cafe will not be much mended, if we confider it as founded only on the abfolute fovereignty and arbitrary will of God, which is the point that comes next under confideration. Abfolute fovereignty and mere will has no rule to act by, and has nothing but mere capricious humour for it's guide; and if we confider the Deity as under no other direction direction but this, then, the affair of Religion must be a most wild and extravagant thing. Then, what is conftituted religion to-day, may be turned into irreligion to-morrow; what is made to be virtue in one place, may be made to be vice in another. Then, charity may be made rewardable in one people, and cruelty rewardable in another. Then, diffimulation and fraud may be made punishable at one time, and integrity and justice punishable at another. And tho', upon this fuppofition true Religion, if the term may be admitted, is of God; yet every man would be under the utmost uncertainty what is true Religion; because he has nothing to guide him in the enquiry, nor no rule by which he can judge what Religion is of God, and what is not. As to the principles and practices of any Religion, these can no way aflift us in forming a judgment, whether any particular Religion be of God, or not. For, as upon the present fuppofition, there is no fuch thing as right and wrong in nature; fo any one thing whatever must be as agreeable to capricious humour, and as likely to be chofen by fovereign and arbitrary will as any other thing. Upon the prefent fuppofition, truth and falfhood, mercy and cruelty, honefty and difhonefty, are upon a level, one being as eligible, and as fit to be chofen or recommended as another. And, as the internal characters of any Religion cannot poffibly afford an argument in favour of it's divine original; fo neither can they poffibly afford afford any objection against it; and confequently, every man must be under the utmost uncertainty, whether the Religion he adheres to be of God, or not. And therefore, to raise an argument either for, or against the divine original of any Religion from the perfections of the Deity, would be greatly abfurd; because, upon the prefent fuppofition, there is no fuch thing as perfection or imperfection in nature. And, As to any external evidence which may be fuppofed to attend any Religion, fuch as Prophefies, Miracles, &c. thefe can afford no light in the prefent cafe. I have already obferved that as knowledge is communicable; fo foreknowledge may be communicable alfo ; and that as to power, it is equally as eafy for God to communicate one kind or degree of power, as another; I fay, this is, or may be the cafe for any thing we know or can fhew to the contrary; and confequently, there is no prophesy nor miracle which takes place among men but may be produced by the operation of fome invifible agent not divine. Now, if this may be the cafe, of which no one can prove the contrary; then, no external evidence whatever can poffibly prove any Religion to be of God; becaufe fuch evidence may be produced, not by the operation of God, but of fome other invifible agent not divine. And, were we to prefume that fuch evidences are of God, it would not help the cafe ; cause, upon the prefent fuppofition, God D be might, |