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A N

ANSWER

ΤΟ Α

PRIVATE LETTER

FROM A

STRANGER to the AUTHOR,

ON

The Subject of GOD's Foreknowledge.

An ANSWER to a PRIVATE LETTER, &C.

SIR,

I

you

Received your Letter, but whether it will be in my power to contribute any thing towards a removal of that perplexity you complain of, I cannot fay. In the cafe you refer to, you feem to me, to prefume a point, without offering a fufficient reafon to ground that prefumption upon. The point prefumed, is, that God does certainly foreknow every thing that will be; and the reafon ground it upon, is, that the want of fuch foreknowledge implies an imperfection, which, you think, cannot be the cafe with refpect to God, and therefore, you prefume as above. To which, I think, it will be fufficient to answer, that if the actions of free beings are not in the nature of the thing foreknowable; then, it cannot poffibly be an imperfection in God for him not to foreknow what is not foreknowable in nature; because fuch foreknowledge is impoffible. So that this point must first be proved, viz. that the actions of free beings are in the nature of the thing foreknowable, before the want of fuch prefcience can justly be deemed an imperfection. God is actually prefent to every thing that is, in every part of space; and, hereby, he has a

perfect

perfect knowledge or perception of every thing that is. God has been alfo actually present to every thing that has been, in every part of space, and through every point of duration that is paft; and, from hence, I think, we may justly conclude that God has likewise the most perfect remembrance of every thing that has been, through every point of duration that is past, because every thing that has exifted has been actually present to him, and perceived by him. But then, God is not actually present to any thing that will be, in any point of duration to come; and therefore, we have not the like ground for concluding that he perfectly foreknows every thing that will be, as we have for concluding that he perfectly remembers every thing that has been. So that, tho' the divine Omniprefence is a proper and a fufficient foundation to ground these propofitions upon, viz. that God certainly knows every thing that is, because he is actually prefent with it; and, that he perfectly remembers every thing that has been, because he has been actually prefent with it, and it has been actually perceived by him; yet, it does not appear, that the divine Omniprefence lays a foundation for us to conclude, with equal certainty that God perfectly foreknows every thing that will be, because he is not actually prefent to any thing that will be, in any point of duration to come.

If it should be faid, that, tho' God is not actually present to any thing that will be; yet God can certainly prejudge, or determine what he himself will do, what free agents he will

call

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