call into being, and what will be the conftitutions, difpofitions, and tempers of fuch agents; and, that this is a proper and a fufficient foundation in nature for God perfectly to foreknow, or infallibly prejudge, (which comes to the fame) what every agent will chufe to do, in every point of duration to come. Answer, first, this is begging the question, because the particular conftitution, difpofition, and temper of a perfon, may refult from the temperance or intemperance of his parent, or from other like causes; which caufes were the produce of the parent's free election or choice. So that here the point is prefumed, or taken for granted, which is in difpute, and ought to be proved. Again, I anfwer fecondly, admitting what is here prefumed, but not proved, viz. that God does foreknow what will be the particular conftitution, difpofition, and temper of every free being that will exift, it will not follow from hence that he can infallibly prejudge what every free being will chufe to do, in every point of duration to come. I fay, that this confequence does not neceffarily follow. For, tho' the particular conftitution, difpofition, and temper of each individual, may afford, or introduce particular motives or excitements to action; yet feeing the will is not neceffarily determined by those motives, but may and does chufe to act in oppofition, fometimes to one motive, and fometimes to another, and thus, in turn, in oppofition to them all, which occafions that mixture of good and bad, of wife and foolish actions, of which moft, if not all, mens chaX racters

racters are compounded; therefore, a foreknowledge or prejudgment of the particular conftitution, &c. does not appear to be a fufficient foundation in nature, for fuch prefcience as is here fuppofed. So that, I think, it is not very clear and plain that we have wherewith in nature or reafon to ground, with certainty, this propofition upon, viz. that God does perfectly foreknow, or infallibly prejudge what every free being will chufe to do, in every point of duration to come.

But admitting that God does foreknow, or prejudge as aforefaid, if our actions have no dependance upon the divine prefcience, as, most certainly, they have not; then, our liberty cannot poffibly be affected by it, (which yet you feem to think it is) prefcience and liberty being as confiftent as any two things in nature can be. You add, for what God foreknows will be, cannot but be. Answer, if by [cannot but be] you mean no more than [will be] then, it is true, tho' it answers no purpose; because it amounts to no more than this, viz, what will be, will be. But if by [cannot but be] you mean [it must be from an abfolute neceffity in the nature of things] then, in this sense, it is not true. Let it be admitted, that God perfectly foreknows, or infallibly prejudges that there will be a future judgment; in this cafe, a future judgment will be fo far from being the refult of any abfolute neceffity in the nature of things, that, on the contrary, it will refult wholly from God's free election or choice. So that, tho' God certainly foreknows there

will

will be a judgment to come; yet there may not be a judgment to come, with regard to any abfolute neceffity in the nature of things for fuch a judgment, becaufe a judgment to come, will not refult from fuch neceflity, but from the free determination of the Deity, as I have already observed.

But farther, admitting that God does foreknow, or infallibly prejudge every thing that will be, and, confequently, foreknows that. fome free beings will abuse their liberty, to their own hurt; yet, I think, this should not have been a reason to him, as a just, wise, and good being, to have with-held his hand from giving being to them, which yet, you seem to think, it ought to have done. Suppofe five perfons in a boat upon the water to be in fuch danger, as that without your interpofition they must all perish; and fuppofing it to be in your power to fave them, but that you could not fave fome, without faving them all; and fuppofing you foreknew, or could infallibly prejudge, that two of the five would abuse your kindness to their greater hurt, fo that, upon the whole, it would be better for them to perish in the waters, than to have life lengthened out to them in this cafe, the queftions would be, what you ought in reafon to do, under fuch circumftances, or what a juft, wife, and good being must do, to act fuitably to fuch a character; whether he must fave them all, or let them all perish. If you fave them all, this would be acting a kind and a good part by them, as it would fave their lives, and put it into X 2 their

their power to improve the kindness to their greater future good. And, whereas two of the five would, upon the whole, be sufferers; yet that would not be the effect, of your kindness, but the produce of their own free election or choice. This would be the ftate of the cafe, fuppofing you faved them all. If you suffered them all to perish, then indeed, it would, in the event, prove a negative good to two of them, as by it they would be prevented from bringing upon themselves a future greater evil, which otherwise would be their cafe. But then, this would be acting a most unkind and cruel part by the other three, who would not only lose their lives, but would alfo be barred the enjoyment of fuch future greater good, as otherwise they would have procured to themselves. This is the state of the cafe, fuppofing you fuffered them all to perish. In the former of these cafes, there is no injuftice done, nor unkindness shewed to any; whereas in the latter cafe, your conduct, to fay the leaft, would be greatly unkind to three of the five, who, I think, ought not in reafon to be barred your goodness, because two of the company would abuse it to their greater hurt.

This, I think, may very justly be applied to the conduct of the Deity, in the creation, and government of the intelligent and moral world. God has called into being a multitude of agents, who are the fubjects of moral government, on purpose that they might attain to happiness; but has left it to their option whether that end fhould be obtained by them, or not. And, tho' he fore

foreknew, or prejudged that some of those agents, (the number of which I hope will be greatly fhort of two in five) would abuse his kindness to their much greater hurt; yet, furely, that ought not in reason to have barred his goodness to the whole, by with-holding his hand from giving being to them; seeing that would have been a very great hardship and an injury to all those who will answer the true ends of being to themselves. And as to the others, who will, in the event, and upon the whole, be fufferers by existing, the blame will reft wholly upon themselves, because their misery will be wholly of their own procuring. As to the duration of that punishment which will be inflicted on wicked men in another world, and which you seem to startle at; all, I think, that can with any certainty be determined concerning it is only this, viz. that whatever conclufions men may draw from the lofty and figurative language of the New Teftament in this refpect; yet we are sure that the judge of all the earth will do right, and therefore, there cannot poffibly be any reafonable ground of complaint.

If the foregoing reflexions prove fuccessful, by removing the perplexity you complain of, my end is anfwered, who am, Sir, your's to ferve,

Sarum, Auguft 7,

1739.

THOMAS CHUBB.

FINI S.