might, confiftent with his own character as an abfolute and arbitrary governour of the world, deceive us himself, as well as leave us in the hands of other deceivers. So that admitting Religion to be founded only on the arbitrary will of God, it would be the most uncertain and precarious thing in the world. And suppofing we could come to a certainty with refpect to it; yet it could afford no folid grounds of peace, comfort, or fafety, to mankind; becaufe arbitrary will may jet afide all promifes and engagements, and annex the feverest pains and penalties even to the stricteft duty and obedience. And :

Tho', upon the present fuppofition, there is no fuch thing as right and wrong, as true and falfe Religion in nature; yet as a fenfe of right and wrong is fo deeply rooted in the minds of moft men that it becomes a kind of first principle to them; fo it will influence their affections and actions, it will greatly perplex and diftrefs their minds, and will lay a foundation for endlefs difputes and controverfies in matters of religion.

Thus, I have taken a view of the cafe fuppofing Religion to have no foundation in nature, but to be founded only on the opinions and fancies, or on the cunning and craftiness of men; or else to be the creature of some invifible agent, or agents, not divine; or else to be founded only on the abfolute fovereignty and arbitrary will of God; thefe being, I think, all the poffible ways in, and by which

I

religion

religion could have been introduced into the world, fuppofing it to have no foundation in nature. I come now to the question before mentioned, viz. whether Religion has any folid foundation in nature; that is, whether there be in reality a right and wrong, a true and falfe Religion in nature; and confequently, whether there be any certain obvious principles in nature or reafon by which a man may diftinguish thefe, and form a proper judgment in the prefent cafe, and which an honest upright man may fafely and fecurely stay his mind

upon.

I have already obferved that the word Religion is fometimes used in a restrained sense, and is made to fignify all those acts of piety and devotion by which men pay either their publick or their private acknowledgments to God. And, that the word Religion is alfo fometimes used in a more extensive sense, and is made to fignify, either all those things by which men, as men, propofe to obtain the divine favour; or else all thofe things by which men, as finners, propose to obtain God's mercy and the happiness of another world. And according to this the enquiry is threefold, viz. First, whether piety has any foundation in nature, and what it is that nature points out to men with respect to it. Secondly, whether the grounds of mens acceptance with God is alfo founded in nature. Thirdly and laftly, when men by their mifbehaviour have rendered themselves greatly D 2 difpleafing

difpleafing to the Deity; then, whether there is any thing in nature which can render them the proper objects of God's mercy and kindness, and confequently, will be the ground of the divine mercy to them.

And, that I may be both clear and full upon this question, I will first fhew that there is a natural and an effential difference in things, and that one thing or action is really better or preferable to another in nature; fecondly, that there is a rule of action refulting from that difference, which every moral agent ought in reafon to govern his behaviour by; and thirdly, that God makes this rule the measure of his actions in all his dealings with his creatures. From which it will follow that fome actions are in their own nature juftly approvable, and others juftly condemnable; that fome actions render the performing agent the fuitable and proper object of approbation and affection, and that other actions render the agent the proper object of diflike and refentment; that man, in the nature of the thing, is an accountable creature; and that there is in nature a just foundation for a future judgment and retribution. And, then, I will apply this to the point in question. And, here I fhall have little elfe to do than to tranfcribe what I have already written upon the fubject, that being full to my purpose.

First,

*First, I am to fhew that there is a natural and an effential difference in things; by which I mean, first, that there is not an univerfal fameness in nature, but that things and actions are really diftinct and different from each other. That is to fay, pleasure and pain, two and four, right and wrong, kind and unkind, are not the fame thing; but those different terms are used to express, and do convey to the mind ideas which are really distinct and different in nature. Pleafure is not the fame thing as pain, two is not the fame as four, right is not the fame as wrong, kind is not the fame as unkind, and the like. Again, when I say there is a natural and an effential difference in things, I mean fecondly, that there is not an univerfal indifference in nature, but that things and actions are really one better or preferable to another. That is to fay, pleasure is in nature, (when confidered ab, stractedly from all other confiderations,) better than pain; right is better than wrong; kind is better than unkind; and the like. And our difcerning faculties do as naturally and as evidently perceive the difference betwixt thefe, with refpect to their preferableness one to another, as those faculties do difcern their differ ing one from another. That is, we do as naturally and as evidently perceive that pleasure is better than pain, as that pleasure is not pain; we do as naturally and evidently perceive that doing

See my Difcourfe intitled, The Sufficiency of Reafon

in Matters of Religion farther confidered.

doing right is better or preferable to doing wrong, as we perceive that right is not the fame thing as wrong; that to do right is commendable and worthy of a rational being, and therefore, ought in reafon to determine his choice in it's favour; and to do wrong is dif reputable and unworthy of a rational being, and therefore, his choice ought always in reafon to be determined against it; and the like. And,

Tho' our reasoning faculty is abfolutely neceffary for the difcovering the natural and effential difference in things, or to enable us to perceive it; yet this faculty does not make or conftitute that difference. Things and actions are really diftinct from, and one preferable to another, when confidered abstractedly from, and independent of any power in us; and our difcerning faculty does only enable us to 'perceive, but does not conftitute that difference. So that the difference in things does not refult from, nor depend upon, any particular conftitution of the mind, but is founded in nature, and therefore will appear the fame to all minds, in which a capacity of discernment refides, tho' differently conftituted. Two and four are really diftinct and different in nature, and this difference muft and will appear the Jame to every mind in which a capacity of difcernment refides, tho' differently constituted, Thus again, pleafure is in nature better and preferable to pain, and this difference must and will appear the fame to every mind, (however