power to make laws for the fociety's good, and to answer the purposes of civil affociation, just as the circumftances and the reason of things fhall require. And, Here it is to be obferved, that natural legiflature or authority is not the natural offspring of power, but of paternity. God does not become a governor to the intelligent and moral world by his being poffeffed with Almighty power, but by his being a common parent to his creatures. For, as he called them into being without their confent; fo reafon requires that he should take care of their well being, which it is the business of government to fecure, and it is this which conftitutes him our guardian or governor. God's being poffeffed with great and uncontroulable power enables him to play the tyrant over us, (were he difpofed to use his power to fo vile a purpose) but it does not invest him with a right to be our guardian or governor, that being the refult of his relation to us. And, this is the cafe of parents with respect to their children, their authority over them is not the natural offspring of power, but it naturally arifes from that natural relation they stand in to them. And, indeed, in a fecundary and lefs proper fenfe, this is the cafe in civil fociety, where legislative power is lodged in truft. For, as in fuch focieties one is by nature upon an equality, (there being not any one who has a natural right of dominion over his fellow-creatures,) and, as law and government are neceffary to the well F. every being being of fociety, feeing the end of civil affociation cannot be obtained nor fecured without it; fo this makes it neceffary and reafonable that legislative and governing power should be lodged in truft, in the hands of fome perfon, or perfons, to be exercised for the fociety's welfare; and the perfons with whom this truft is lodged are by this conftituted, not the natural, but the step-parents of the people, and guardians of their happiness; and by this they are invefted with a right, not natural, but derived, a right derived from the people to make fuch laws as are for the fociety's good, and to answer the purposes of civil association. And, As legislature itself is founded in reafon; fo the reafon of things is the rule and measure of it. That is, thofe upon whom legislative power naturally devolves, or to whom it is committed in truft by others, are not at liberty to make what laws they pleafe, but they are directed, limited, and bounded in the exercife of that power, by the grounds and reasons, and by the ends and purposes upon which legiflature itself is founded, viz. the publick or general good of those who are fubjected to their jurifdiction: fo that law, ftrictly speaking, or that law which is in reafon obliging, is nothing more than that rule of action exemplified, which is founded in the reafon of things; and duty is not the effect or refult, but it is the foundation of law. That is, an action does not become our duty because it is commanded; manded; but it is commanded becaufe it was our duty antecedent to the command. And confequently, a thing or action does not become fit, or unfit, by it's being commanded, or forbidden; but it is commanded, or forbidden because it was fit, or unfit, when confidered abstractedly from, and antecedent to the promulgation of that law; and which antecedent fitness, or unfitness, was the ground and reafon of fuch law. This, I fay, is, or at leaft, ought always to be the cafe. It is true, the word law, in it's common acceptation, fignifies the will of a fuperior: but then, this fuppofes that the will of the fuperior is not lawless will, (if I may fo fpeak,) or a will which is exerted without rule, or reafon, but a will which is directed by reason, a will which commands nothing to be done, but what was fit should be done, antecedent to the command, and which prohibits nothing but what was fit fhould be avoided, antecedent to the prohibition I fay, this is fuppofed to be the will of the fuperior or law-giver, for otherwise legiflature would be an unnatural and a monftrous thing. And, When legislative power is rightly employed, in making laws to answer the true ends of government; then, it is in itself right; and then, it constitutes a legal or juft authority. But when it is employed to answer other and contrary purposes, then, it is in itself wrong, and then, it degenerates into tyranny. When legislative power is employed in making bad F 2 laws, ་ laws, or laws which will serve a bad purpose; this is manifeftly wrong, and therefore, it cannot be deemed juft authority, but properly comes under the denomination of tyranny. Or when it is employed idlely and triflingly, by commanding or forbidding actions which are perfectly indifferent, and which serve only to exemplify the commanding power of the lawgiver, and to extort fubmiffion from the fubject; this is plainly a prostitution of legislative power; this is what the ends of law and government will not excufe or juftify; and therefore, this cannot justly be deemed legal authority, but properly comes under the denomination of tyranny, tho' in a much lower, and in a much less hurtful degree than in the former cafe. The cafe is the fame whether legislative power be confidered as lodged in a human or in the divine hand; it being equally. as unfit that God should act wrong in his legiflative capacity, as it is that any of his creatures fhould do fo. There is indeed this difference, if God should misapply his legislative power, he is above controul or correction; whereas if men abuse their truft, they are liable to be controuled in, and be punished for that abuse. I am fenfible, it is commonly urged in this cafe, that God, as he is the great governor of the universe, has a right, or it is fit that he fhould, in fome inftances, command for com-, manding fake, that thereby he might make tryal of our obedience. But alas! our obedience is is fufficiently tryed by the many and strong temptations with which we are furrounded on every fide, without this expedient; and therefore, this expedient is not neceffary to answer that end. Befides, this expedient cannot anfwer any good purpose to us, but may answer many bad ones. It cannot raise in us a juft and worthy fenfe of God, but may raise in us a mean and unworthy sense of him; viz. as one who acts the part of an arbitrary and a tyrannical governor. It cannot excite in us the affection of love to God, but may excite in us a flavish fear and dread of him. It cannot increase our virtue, but may greatly increase our guilt, if our difobedience is to be confidered as fuch. And fuppofing we yield obedience to fuch commands, that obedience, to fay the most, would be only yielding to the humour and unreasonable will of a law-giver, whom it would be wrong to contend with, or difoblige. And obedience, furely, in fuch cafes, cannot render a perfon equally valuable with him who obeys a moral law from a much nobler principle. And, to admit the fuppofition that the Deity would go fo far out of his way, (if I may fo fpeak,) and would act fo contrary to his general character as a wife and good governor, by commanding as aforefaid, is, (I think,) little less than blafphemy, as it is blafting the moral character of the great governor of the universe. But then, it is to be remembered, that when I fay God will not act arbitrarily, my meaning is that he will not act thus |
