bodily or external worship ferve? Answer, bodily worship is intended to be fubfervient to that worship which is fpiritual or in the mind. For, tho' eating a bit of bread, and drinking a fip of wine, cannot poffibly increase the divine knowledge of us, by informing God of fomething concerning us, which before he was igno→ rant of; nor can it increase God's kindness and good-will towards us, by difpofing him to do that for us, which before he was not inclined to do; yet those actions may lead us into, and ftir up in others, a just and suitable sense of what they were intended to be the outward tokens and memorials of, and thereby give occafion to our felves and others to be fuitably affected therewith, and to act accordingly; and when this is the cafe, then those outward actions become fubfervient to true piety, and answer the end they are capable of ferving, and which they are intended to ferve. And this, I think, is the defign of all external worship, and all pofitive inftitutions, viz. to be fubfervient to inward piety, and thereby to produce in us fuitable affections and actions. For, to suppose in this cafe, that mere obedience to a pofitive law or rather institution, confidered fimply as fuch, will render us pleafing to God, is, I think, a moft grofs mifreprefentation of the Deity; because it fuppofes God will proftitute his legiflative power to answer fo needless a purpose as to obtain mere obedience from his creatures thereby; fuch a conduct may indeed be fuitable to the wantonnefs, pride, and vanity of

fome

fome human legislators; but it cannot comport with the juftice, wifdom, and goodness of the great governor of the universe; and therefore, cannot be the truth of the case.

But farther, if outward or bodily worship is only a fign or token of that piety which takes place in the mind, and if those tokens are not, in many cases, natural marks of refpect, but are arbitrarily conftituted to be fuch by the fashion and cuftom of the world; then, why may not God interpofe and appoint those outward figns of inward piety if he pleases? Anfwer, God may do fo if he please, for any thing I know, or for any reafon I can give to the contrary, if the circumftances of things render fuch an interpofition proper and useful to man. But if the circumftances of things do not require fuch an interpofition; then, as it would be ufelefs, fo it is not likely to be the cafe, because it is not to be expected that God will thus interpose to answer no good purpose to mankind. By the circumftances of things I mean, when the fashion of the world has constituted fuch actions to be marks of inward piety as are in themselves natural marks of the contrary; that is, when thofe actions naturally tend to raise in the mind of the actor and the fpectators, not a juft and worthy sense of God, but a falfe and unworthy fenfe of him, and in that refpect are rather marks of impiety than piety: I fay, when this is the cafe; then, as there is a reafon refulting from the circumfances of things for fuch an interpofition, viz..

the

the reforming the forementioned abuse; fo God may, if he please, kindly interpofe and appoint what actions fhall be the tokens of inward piety, to answer that purpose. But then, where thofe circumftances are wanting, it is not likely that he will do fo.

From what I have observed, I think it appears, that Religion (when the term is used to exprefs devotion, worship, &c.) is founded in nature or reason; and from thence likewife appears what it is that nature points out to men with respect to it. Here is likewise a plain rule by which a man may judge of himself whether he be truly religious, or not; or, in other words, whether he be truly pious, or not. If a man, upon all proper occafions, awakens in himself a juft and worthy fenfe of God, and if he is fuitably affected therewith, and if he, when the circumstances of things require it, expresses that inward fenfe by fuch outward acts as are not improper in themselves, and which the fashion and custom of the world or which God has constituted to be the figns and tokens of it; then, he may very justly conclude of himself that he is a truly religious or pious man. But, if a man lives as it were without God in the world, that is, if God is not at all in his thoughts, or if he from neceffity is forced to think of God, (which will fometimes be the cafe, as when the circumstances of things will make the sense of a Deity prefent to a man's mind) or if he should voluntarily think of God, but is not suitably affected therewith;

then,

then, he cannot, with any propriety, confider himself as a religious or pious man, even tho' he should frequently ufe thofe actions that are made to be the outward figns and tokens of it; because he is wanting in that wherein true piety confifts. This is the ftate of the cafe independent of any revelation or promulged law; and when confidered in the abstract nature and reason of things.

I now proceed to enquire fecondly, whether Religion (when the term is ufed to exprefs that which is the ground of our acceptance with God) is likewife founded in nature. And here the way seems plain and obvious. For, if there be a natural and an effential difference in things, and if one thing or action be really better or preferable to another in nature, and if there is a rule of action refulting from that difference which every moral agent ought in reason to govern his actions by, and if Almighty God makes this rule the measure of his actions in his dealings with his creatures, in all inftances and cafes in which it can be a rule to him, which are moftly felf-evident truths; then from hence it will unavoidably follow, that whoever makes this rule the measure of his affections and actions, muft, by this, render himself approvable and acceptable to God, as he hereby renders himself the suitable and proper object of God's approbation and affection." And whoever viciously and wickedly greatly departs from this rule, and perfifts in it, fuch an one must be unacceptable and disapprovable

to

to his Maker, as he hereby renders himself the Juitable and proper object of the divine diflike and refentment. This, I fay, is most apparently the true state of the cafe, For, as God is the most perfect intelligence, if I may fo fpeak; fo he muft, if he acts confiftent with himself, approve of every intelligent being who acts conformable to that principle of intelligence that is planted in him; and God must likewise disapprove of every intelligent being who acts greatly contrary to that intelligent principle. And there-, fore, when a man acts fuch a part in life as in. reafon he ought, he will of course be accepted and approved of. God, it being morally im-: poffible that it fhould be otherwise. When a man makes the law of nature the rule and meafure of his affections and actions, he then acts that very part in life which his Creator defigned he fhould act, and hereby he answers the end and purpose of his creation; and therefore, we may with as much juftness and propriety doubt of the existence of a God, as doubt whether fuch a being will be acceptable to him. And, on the other fide, if a man's conduct is the reverse of this, then, we are affured, from the reason of the thing, that fuch a man will be reprobated or difapproved by his Maker. This is the state of the cafe, independent of any promulged law, and when confidered in the abftract nature and reason of things.

I am fenfible, God may, if he please, give a revelation to mankind. That is, it is no way repugnant to our natural notions of a Deity to I fuppofe