that is, it is unreasonable to expect that he fhould be without error, or without fault, because it is great odds but he will in fome inftances fall into both. And, as this is the prefent ftate of mankind; fo from hence it will follow, that when a man does his best to have his understanding rightly informed, and when, in the general courfe of his actions, he acts agreeably thereto, and in those inftances in which, through the ftrength of temptation, he has tranfgreffed the rule of his duty, he is fenfible of, and bumbled for his faults, and makes his mifcarriages a reafon to himself to be more watchful and careful of his behaviour in time to come, fuch a man must and will be accepted and approved of God, because he has, by fuch a behaviour, rendered himself the fuitable and proper object of the divine approbation and affection.

This, I fay, ought in reafon to be the cafe; and therefore, moft certainly it is fo. For, as man is fo conftituted and circumftanced as that it is ten thousand to one but he will act wrong in fome inftances; and were God to be fo extream as to mark every thing that man does amifs, and would not accept of a man's fincere repentance and reformation as a proper ground of mercy to him, for those offences which through the ftrength of temptation he has been hurried into; then, man would lie under a very great difadvantage, and existence would be fo far from being a favour and a benefit, that, on the contrary, it would be a

very

very great hardship and an injury to him; and then, it could not have been goodness and kindness, but it must have been malice and ill will which was the spring of action to God in the creation of man. And, if this were the cafe, then, man would not be dealt with in a way of justice and equity. For, if man's feet are, by his Creator, fet in fuch flippery places, as that it is ten thousand to one but he will fall; then, if he should fall, and fhould rife again by repentance and reformation, and yet should not find mercy at the hands of his Maker, which in reason and equity he ought, in this cafe, his existence would be a very great hardship, and an injury to him, and he would not be equally dealt with. And, on the other fide, he, who in the general course of his actions, acts the contrary part, must and will be dif approved of God; because, by fuch a conduct, he renders himself the fuitable and proper object of the divine reprobation. It is not a particular action, but a man's general behaviour which conftitutes his character, and denominates him to be a good or bad, a virtuous or vicious, a religious or irreligious,

man.

From what I have obferved, I think, it plainly appears, that Religion (when the term is used to exprefs the grounds of our acceptance with God) is founded in nature, and that nature or reafon affords a plain obvious rule, by which true religion may be diftinguished from that which is falfe. For, if there is a natural

and

and an effential difference in things; and if there is a rule of action refulting from that difference, which every moral agent ought in reafon to govern his behaviour by; and if God makes this rule the measure of his actions, in all inftances and cafes in which it can be a rule to him, which is most apparently the true ftate of the cafe; then, from hence it will naturally, neceffarily, and unavoidably follow that perfonal valuableness, or the governing our minds and lives by that rule of action which is founded in the reason of things, or, in other words, the acting that part in life which in reason we ought, this is true religion; this will render us truly pleafing and acceptable to God. And, on the other fide, whatever is reprefented as the grounds of our acceptance with God, befides perfonal valuableness in us, befides the being in our felves the suitable and proper objects of the divine approbation and affection, fuch things will not render us truly pleafing and acceptable to the Deity, and confequently, all fuch things are falfe religion, let them come from what quarter foever, even though Paul, or an Angel from Heaven, were to be the promulger of fuch doctrines. God: is not only infinite in all natural perfections, as he is all prefence, all knowledge, and allpower; but he is alfo infinite in all moral perfections, as his conduct, in the exercise of his knowledge and power, is, in all instances and cafes, perfectly conformed to that eternal and invariable rule of action which refults. from,

2

from, and is founded in the natural and ef fential differences in things. And, as the reafon of the thing requires, that nothing should be approved by an intelligent being, but what is in itself the proper object of fuch approbation, and it's being fuch an object should be the ground or reason of that approbation; and, on the other fide, that nothing should be difapproved by an intelligent being, but what is in itfelf the proper object of fuch reprobation, and it's being fuch an object fhould be the ground or reafon of that reprobation; I say, as the reason of the thing requires this; fo from hence we may be morally certain, that nothing but perfonal valuableness in a moral agent, can be the ground of that agent's acceptance with God; and that nothing but perfonal vilenefs in fuch an agent, can be the ground of the divine reprobation of him. So that true religion, in the present cafe, confifts in this, and in this only, viz. the acting such a part in life as in reason we ought; or, in other words, the governing our affections and actions by the law of reafon; or, at least, the coming as near to this as may reasonably be expected from us in our prefent circumftances. This, I fay, is true religion, and this only; because it is this, and this only, which renders us the proper objects of the divine approbation and affection; and therefore, it must be this, and this only, which can and will be the ground of our acceptance with God. And for as much as there is nothing

nothing in nature but personal valuablenefs in us, which can render us the proper objects of God's approbation and affection; therefore, whatever befide this is reprefented as the grounds of our acceptance with the Deity, that muft of neceffity be false religion, and cannot poffibly be otherwife. As to any inftituted means of religion, these are to be confidered as means only, and not as the end which is intended to be promoted by them. And they become means, not by being inftituted, nor yet barely by being used, but only when they are so used, as to become fubfervient to that end, viz. the making us wife and good, which conftitutes true religion, in the present cafe.

I am fenfible, that thefe are truths which will not be acceptable to many Religionists, even to many zealous and orthodox Chriftians, who are very unwilling to be convinced that virtue and happiness are fo neceffarily connec ted together, that the latter cannot be obtained without the former; that a man cannot obtain the happiness of another world, without becoming a good man in this. Alas! how many Chriftians are there who would much rather be carried fafe to heaven, by the ftrength and virtue of their Master's merits; than be obliged to follow him, in that narrow way, and through that freight gate of virtue and good works, which is the only path that leads thither. It is not the offering to God thousands of rams, nor ten thousands of rivers

of