ted by the ordinary rules of language, or else there is of course no revelation made by them. An occult sense here is of course no sense at all.

Surely

Put the case now, for example, that Rev. XII. was unintelligible to those whom John addressed, and of course is so to us; then what was the object in writing Rev. xII.? Certainly not to reveal any thing to the church then, or since; for, on the ground taken, nothing is revealed. Of what use then are such predictions, (if we may apply such a misnomer to them), to the church of Christ? they can have been of no use, thus far. For what purpose then was the Apocalypse written? If we may follow the suggestions of the book, in all parts of it, it was written to encourage and console Christians in the midst of severe trials and fiery persecutions-to console them with the certain prospect of the triumphs of the church over all her enemies. But what consolation or what instruction could be derived from those parts of the book, which were intelligible neither to John himself, nor to any of his readers? None-none! What shall we say then? Has God spoken for no purpose? Or has he spoken for a particular purpose, and yet in such a way as not at all to answer that purpose? I cannot venture on such positions.

But here the subject is wont to take a new turn, which leads us to the second topic proposed for discussion.

3. PROPHECY NOT INTELLIGIBLE UNTIL IT IS FULFILLED,

There are not a few prophecies respecting which we are told, that God has a meaning which is attached to the language employed, although it has not yet been developed. When the events come to pass to which the prophecy relates, then, and not till then, shall we be able to understand the words of the prediction.

I have found this sentiment echoed and re-echoed so often among expositors of the prophecies, even by such enlightened men as Hengstenburg, and Tholuck too, that I have been forced upon an examination of its claims to our credit. It has become, with many, a kind of universal menstruum, in which all the difficulties of the prophecies are solved. When we get to the utmost limits of our knowledge respecting them, then we are warned to include all the rest within the domain of hallowed secrecy. In fact, some even lay claim to credit for piety, in such an unreserved submission, as they deem it, to the divine will. Happy do some count the lot of those, who merely wonder, in such cases, at "the ways of God which are past finding out." How comfortable moreover it is, when we can not only cover over the faults of our imperfect knowledge in a way so creditable, but also dispense with all future effort. and trouble, which would result from pursuing inquiries into the dark domains of the Scripture !

All the attention which I have bestowed on these views, so common among one class of interpreters, has never enabled me to see or feel the justice or propriety of them. Let us now suppose a case for the sake of illustration. John, we will say, has uttered many things in the Apocalypse, which will never be understood until they are fulfilled. Let it be then, that 2000 years after he has written his book those things are to be fulfilled. The first question that we naturally ask, is: To what purpose did John write those predictions? During 2000 years they have been or will be, by concession, neither more nor less than a dead letter. The church is neither admonished, nor instructed, nor comforted. Why then were they written? Was it to show that God can move in a mysterious way, and shroud himself in clouds and darkness? There is proof enough of this in every quarter of his works, without

a resort to such means. All heaven and earth bear witness that his ways are often past finding out. And would he resort, then, for the sake of making this impression, to such means as those now under consideration? The suggestion seems derogatory to his majesty and dignity. To make a revelation-and yet that revelation (so called) be entirely unintelligible? How can we conceive of his sporting with the hopes and expectations of men in such a way? To make one, moreover, which for thousands of years remains a perfect enigma to his church-is this any relief of the difficulty? To my own mind, at least, it is none at all.

But this is not the end of the matter. There is a still more serious difficulty to be met. We are told that 'the prophecy will be understood then, and only then, when the thing predicted comes to pass.' What then is the thing which comes to pass? I may surely be permitted to ask this question. What is the thing predicted? It is conceded, that by the laws of language no proper meaning has been, or can be, made out from the prophecy in question. But after 2000 years, something will take place, it is said, to which we may apply it. Apply what? If an event is compared with a prophecy, the only means of comparison possible, is, that we first assign some definite meaning to the prophecy, and then compare the event with that meaning. If this be not the case, then we merely make a comparison of a known thing with one that is unknown. How then are we to ascertain that they agree, when we confess that one of the two things compared, is (so to speak) an unknown quantity? So long as it is unknown, or treated as unknown, we can have no means of ascertaining whether there is an agreement, or not, in the case supposed.

Is not this whole matter, moreover, mere reasoning in a circle? The prophecy (an unknown something) agrees.

with the event, because the event agrees with the prophecy! Some laws of language then, after all, must first be applied to the prophecy, in order to make out any definite meaning; and if so, why could not these have been applied at a period antecedent, as well as now? It seems impossible to vindicate with success any such method of reasoning such a complete varegor noóregov as this. A prophecy, unintelligible by the laws of language, can never be a revelation; nor can there ever be any certainty among uninspired men, that it is truly and correctly understood.

It would not be proper, however, to dismiss this topic without some additional remarks, which may aid us in explaining the ground, why the principle in question has been so extensively admitted, among many interpreters whose piety and learning cannot well be called in question.

Words are the signs of things. Words, as originally employed by a writer or speaker, designate the view of things which exists in his own mind. But it must be remembered, that words, which have been formed by men whose knowledge is imperfect, (and all words are so formed), cannot, from the nature of the case in many instances, convey complete or perfect ideas or make complete representations of many things. The reason is, that there is much belonging to most objects of which men speak, which is not understood or known by them; and what is unknown they do not, and cannot, definitely describe. For example; the words God, heaven, hell, soul, etc., while they convey the definite ideas that men have concerning these respective objects, yet they do not convey to our minds any description of that which is unknown to us, but which at the same time belongs to these objects. There may be then, and in respect to most objects there are, many things appertaining, which no human language describes, or can describe; and this for the simple reason,

that language is employed to describe what we do know, or suppose ourselves to know, and not to describe that of which we have no knowledge or conception.

It does not make against this view of the subject at all, that there are many words which stand as signs of things which are for the most part unknown to us. For example; the word gravity, or the phrase power of gravity, designates a something in the earth and planets which attracts material objects toward them, while, at the same time, we pretend to no knowledge of the real nature, attributes, place, manner of existence, etc., of that something, only so far as the attraction just mentioned develops them. After all, then, the words gravity, or power of gravity, designate only so much of that something as we know, or at least suppose ourselves to know.

So in many other cases; we see developments of powers or of substances, (as we suppose them to be), which afford us but some twilight-rays to aid us in the cognizance of those substances and powers themselves. For example; electricity, magnetism, and light, are words that convey ideas to our minds which are definite to a certain extent. But beyond this they designate nothing specific. If these words are still employed by any one in order to designate a supposed something beyond our knowledge, they are, if I may so speak, like some exponents in algebra, the mere signs of a quantity unknown.

But we will suppose now, that some being who has a perfect acquaintance with the substances named, employs the same words to designate them. To these words he may affix a meaning, of course, that corresponds with the extent of his knowledge. But he cannot expect others, possessed of only an imperfect knowledge, to understand the words in all respects as he does.

We will admit now that God, if we may (with rever