Page images
PDF
EPUB

not be required of men, as may be of angels; the capacity of understanding being so much inferior. So men cannot be required to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no opportunity to see, or hear of, or come to the knowledge of, in ahy way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the Muman understanding. But the insufficiency of motives will not excuse; unless their being insufficient arises not from the moral state of the Will or inclination itself, but from the state of the natural understanding. The great kindness and genefosity of another may be à motivè insufficient to excite gratitude in the person, that receives the kindness, through his vilë and ungrateful temper: In this case, the insufficiency of the motive arises from the state of the Will or inclination of heart, and does not at all excuse. But if this generosity is not sufficient to excite gratitude, being unknown, there being ho means of information adequate to the state and measure of the person's faculties, this insufficiency is attended with a nátural Inability which entirely excuses.

2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which do not consist in the immanent acts or state of the Will itself, but are supposed to be required as effects of the Will; I say, in such supposed effects of the Will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understand ing that Inability, and that only excuses, which consists in want of connexion between them and the Will. If the Will fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, accord ing to the laws of nature, to bé connected with his volition, the man is perfectly excus; he has a natural Inability to the thing required. For the Will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by Command; and other things only indirectly, as connected with the Will. If, therefore, there be a full compliance of Will, the person has done his duty; and if other things do not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not owing to him.

3. Both these kinds of natural Inability that have been mentioned, and so all Inability that excuses, may be resolved into one thing, namely, want of natural capacity or strength; VOL. Va

2 A

either capacity of understanding, or external strength. For when there are external defects and obstacles, they would be no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations of understanding and strength.

Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability, may properly be the matter of precept or command, then they may also of invitation and counsel. Commands and invitations come very much to the same thing; the difference is only circumstantial: Commands are as much a manifestation of the Will of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much testimonies of expectation of compliance. The difference between them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand. The main difference between command and invitation consists in the enforcement of the Will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his kindness, the goodness which his Will arises from: In the former it is his authority. But whatever be the ground of the Will of him that speaks, or the enforcement of what he says, yet, seeing neither his Will nor expectation is any more testified in the one case than the other; therefore a person's being known to be morally unable to do the thing to which he is directed by Invitation, is no more an evidence of insincerity in him that directs in manifesting either a Will, or expectation which he has not, than his be ing known to be morally unable to do what he is directed to by command. So that all this grand objection of Arminians against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in Christ, or to perform other spiritual gospel duties, from the sincerity of God's counsels and invitations, must be without force.

SECTION V.

That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the Nonperformance of Things in themselves good, particularly considered.

IT is what is much insisted on by many, that some men, though they are not able to perform spiritual duties, such as repentance of sin, love of God, a cordial acceptance of Christ as exhibited and offered in the gospel, &c. yet they may sincerely desire and endeavor these things; and therefore must be excused; it being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things, which they sincerely desire and endeavor to do, but cannot do.

Concerning this matter, the following things may be ob

served.

1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake and gross ab surdity; even that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection, &c. consisting in the exercise of the Will itself, or in the disposition and inclination of the heart; and yet not be able to perform or exert them. This is absurd, because it is absurd to suppose that a man should directly, properly and sincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the same time is contrary to his inclination: For that is to suppose him not to be inclined to that, to which he is inclined. If a man, in the state and acts of his Will and inclination, does properly and directly fall in with those duties, he therein performs them: For the duties themselves consist in that very thing; they consist in the state and acts of the Will being so formed and directed. If the soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain proposed act of Will or choice, the soul therein makes that choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in with a proposed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to move in that direction.

2. That which is called a desire and willingness for those inward duties, in such as do not perform them, has repect to these duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly represented as a willingness for them; not only because (as was observed before) it respects those good volitions only in a distant view, and with respect to future time; but also because evermore, not these things themselves, but something else, that is alien and foreign, is the object that terminates these volitions and desires.

A drunkard, who continues in his drunkenness, being under the power of a love, and violent appetite to strong drink, and without any love to virtue; but being also extremely covetous and close, and very much exercised and grieved at the diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may, in a sort desire the virtue of temperance; and though his pres ent Will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wish he had a heart to forbear future acts of intemperence, and forsake his excesses, through an unwillingness to part with his money: But still he goes on with his drunkenness; his wishes and endeavors are insufficient and ineffectual: Such a man has no proper, direct, sincere willingness to forsake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it: For he acts voluntarily in continuing to drink to excess: His desire is very improperly called a willingness to be temperate; it is no true desire of that virtue; for it is not that virtue, than terminates his wishes; nor have they any direct respect to it. It is only the saving his money, and avoiding poverty, that terminates and exhausts the whole strength of his desire. The virtue of temperance is regarded only very indirectly and improperly, even as, a, necessary means, of gratifying the vice of covetousness.

So a man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the contrary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste of the things of religion, and enmity against them; yet being of a family, that from one generation to another, have most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary consumption; and so having little hope of living long; and having been in

structed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ, and gra titude for his death and sufferings, in order to his salvation from eternal misery; if under these circumstances be should, through fear of eternal torments, wish he had such a disposi tion: But his profane and carnal heart remaining, he contin ues still in his habitual distaste of, and enmity to God and religion, and wholly without any exercise of that love and gratis tude, (as doubtless the very devils themselves, notwithstand, ing all the devilishness of their temper, would wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell :) In this case, there is no sincere willingness to love Christ and choose him as his chief good: These holy dispositions and exercis es are not at all the direct object of the Will: they truly share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul; but all is terminated on deliverence from torment: And these graces and pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced consent, are looked upon as undesirable; as when a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors, to save his life.....From these things it appears,

3. That this indirect willingness which has been spoken of, is not that exercise of the Will which the command requires; but is entirely a different one; being a volition of a different nature, and terminated altogether on different objects; wholly falling short of that virtue of Will, which the command has respect to.

4. This other volition, which has only some indirect conoern with the duty required, cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself, which is commanded; being not the thing which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly des titute of the virtue which the command seeks.

Further to illustrate this matter.....If a child has a most excellent father, that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has every way, in the highest degree merited his love and dutiful regard, being withal very wealthy; but the son is of so vile a disposition, that he inveterately, hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to poverty and abject circumstances, through his father's

« PreviousContinue »