must be from ri, and therefore we must conclude that ri is also evil." This conclusion would follow were ri the source of ki, and were ki essentially evil, but neither position is in accordance with Shushi's teaching. He thus explains the origin of evil :-Ri is the law of all the virtues, the essence of benevolence and righteousness. Wherever ki forms there ri rests in its midst. But ki exists in two forms, as we have seen, and from these all things are developed with the distinction of fine and coarse. Certain portions and forms of ki are perfectly recipient of ri aud there is virtue and goodness. Other portions and forms of ki imperfectly receive ri and there is sin and evil. 26 Ri is not evil, for where it is in its perfection is goodness and virtue; its obscuration alone is evil. Nor is ki essentially evil, though it many obscure the ri as the morning mist obscures the sun. Ri is changeless and it is of ri that the superior man writes when he calls man's nature “ good.” Ki is changeful and it is not fitting that he should write of it. 27 As ki ever changes ri cannot be always evenly received. Evil is thus of necessity, as always in pantheistic systems. 28 Ki exists everywhere and always in its two-fold form, so that In and Yö, motion and rest, the fine and the coarse, being associated together, there is only a question of preponderance.29 In the meanest man good is not wholly absent, and in the best man an element of evil 欲求迭正氣可鴟之等不及看 其故 相偏氣通成不同則而論 一絪至蒙 所道更理語可惡遺非君 隔氣之塞異齊也氣氣萬 remains. Only the ideal ri is perfectly good.30 And as condensation continues the "Way" (ri) disappears from among men; the world returns to chaos, and the process begins again.81 the " Jinsai and Sorai charge the Tei-shu school with making ‘Way "nothing but speculative philosophy, and the contemplation of ri. This is so far true that philosophical knowledge is represented as essential to virtue, in agreement with Plato. But it is not taught that knowledge terminates in itself. It leads to action and its end is a virtuous life.82 As natura naturans and natura naturata are both ki; as ki is both matter and force, both soul and body; as by its varying degrees of condensation there may be ki within ki and ki visible and invisible, Shushi's own language is not always clear and there is room for differing interpretations. However, the theory is fairly consistent, though, as in all the philosophy of the Far East, clear definition is wanting. It may be questioned whether Shushi was always clear as to his own meaning. Ri is more difficult of explanation than ki, for it never condenses nor changes. It is forever one and yet each particular thing has its own. When the difficulty is forced upon him Shushi takes refuge in illustration and says:As the moon is one and yet is seen in every stream, so is the ri; an illustration which shows how far he was from solving his problem. 81 起 極會又言得亦獨之善固靜異相陰 得以不能相無者而爲 無全 復 獨有善而無惡其爲學、 % 陰陽之氣相勝而不能 善惡之分 若以善惡 固 並 立而 無先後之序、 異乎此蓋以氣言則動 善相 先無氣 氣惡勝 之而 本動則能 80 The Kogaku school is right in its criticism of the quotation of the Classics in support of the Tei-Shu ontology. Kyusō praises the philosophers of the Sō dynasty for discovering that which was not taught by the Sages, but still cannot resist the temptation to quote Classical authority for the discomfiture of his opponents. His success is perhaps equal to that of most men who quote ancient proof texts in support of modern theory.83 The polemic of the Kogaku school in general furnishes another illustration of the ordinary method of philosophical controversy in the past in the Far East. The Okina Mondo, the Heki-ja-sho-gen and Kyuso's writings, offer further illustrations. On the whole they justify Faber's severe comment on Shushi's own criticism of Buddhism and Taoism --"But the polemics seldom or never enter thoroughly into the doctrines which are really brought forward by their opponents, but instead, they caricature them so that their monstrosity is easily proved. In this way Mencius treated Meti, and it seems as if this method is especially adapted to the Chinese mind." 34 The Kogaku school succeeded in shaking the faith of many in the Tei-Shu doctrine, but did not substitute any clear and defined system in its place. As constructive philosophers they do not appear worthy of a place with Shushi and Ōyōmei. The judgment of the orthodox scholars upon their teaching was perhaps not wholly undeserved. In conclusion it may be noted that the Tei-Shu philosophy still retains sufficient vitality in Japan to lead Dr. Inoue Tetsujiro, Professor of Philosophy in the Imperial University, in the current number of the Transactions of the Philosophical Society, to devote an article to the exposure of the absurdities of its teaching as to Natural Philosophy. 83 Pp. 47-49 above. 84 The Doctrines of Confucius, p. 33. REMARK BY PROFESSOR INOUE. Dr. Inoue, Professor of Philosophy in the Imperial University, expressed himself as much gratified with the exposition of Japanese philosophy given by Mr. Haga and offered the following criticisms. Mr. Haga had mentioned the names of most of the Japanese philosophers who dissented from the Tei-Shu school, but he had forgotten to add a very famous writer, Kaibara Yekken (RI) who was the contemporary of Jinsai and Sorai. Among the numerous books written by Yekken, there is only one which claims especial attention from a philosophical point of view: his Taigiroku (), which means Great Doubt," so called because he explains in the book why he doubts the philosophical doctrine of Tei-Shu. In one place Yekken says: Ri and ki are surely one thing, but Shushi takes them for two different things. I am therefore embarrassed, and I cannot follow him." Yekken was without doubt a monist, because he thought that ki alone is the fundamental principle of the world. But he had adopted his main idea from a celebrated Chinese writer, Rasei-an (✯), in the Ming dynasty. 66 On the other hand Mr. Haga, he thought, might well omit some writers, for example Shiwonoya and Yasui, who had done nothing in the sphere of philosophy. Moreover it would have been advisable to trace the connexion between the Japanese philosophers, whom he mentioned, and the Chinese philosophers from whom they borrowed their fundamental ideas. Most of the Japanese philosophers had adopted the views of some Chinese philosopher or other. Jinsai, for example, got some of his philosophical principles from Goteikan () in the Ming dynasty, who wrote a book entitled Kissai-manroku (#K). Sorai got his principal idea from Junshi. Junshi considers human nature as originally bad, and Sorai adopts this view implicitly, although he does not express it openly. Junshi considers rei (ceremony) as highly important, and rei has almost the same position as moral order in his philosophy. The views of Sorai approach very near to this, because he thinks that rei (ceremony) and gaku (music) are the moral principles of the sages. Sorai has also adopted some views of the savant Yōshōan (). In the case of Ōshio it would also be better to show in what points he is indebted to the philosophy of Ōyōmei, and whether or not any of his views at all were his own. * Dr. Inoue thought that Dr. Knox had shown a surprising acquaintance with Chinese and Japanese philosophy. He agreed with Dr. Knox that Shushi had never believed in anything like a Creator in the same sense as Europeans generally understand the term. The philosophy of Shushi was on the whole materialistic. The ri of Shushi just referred to could be held, he thought, as the reality in opposition. to ki, just as the "thing-in-itself" of Kant, although ki is not the manifestation of the ri. As regards the periodical change of the world, Shōkōsetsu () in the Sung dynasty had maintained that the world must undergo a radical change in every 129,600 years and become chaos once more, but after the same length of time it would be set in order again, so that the world would change in an eternal round like day and night. The Mukyoku mentioned by Dr. Knox comes first in the T'ao-te-king of Laotz. In the well known letter of Rikushōzan to Shushi we find that this point is well noticed. * Ōshio Introduction, note 35, above. |