INTRODUCTION.

IN

the preceding disquisitions our attention has been directed to human nature, as engaged in the pursuit of Good; and we contemplated the uses of the passions and affections, as connected with this grand object: We stated the pernicious aberrations to which they are exposed, with the causes of these aberrations: We analysed those various intellectual powers, whose office it is to instruct and guide us in the important inquiry after Well-being: We investigated also the nature and extent of that Good, which human Beings are capable of enjoying, and of which some portion or other is the object of incessant desire.

The terms Good, for the object of our desire, and Well-being, to express the desirable state, have been adopted in preference to any others, because they appear to be the most appropriate. The first denotes the apparent character of the

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object pursued, and the last comprehends ease, pleasure, felicity. When Epicurus maintained that the whole of man consists in the enjoyment of pleasure, it was originally understood, that he intended to express the enjoyment of all Good; but the prominent idea presented to the mind being that of sensual pleasure, disreputable associations have been connected with the term, and the greatest Sensualists are now placed in the foremost rank of his genuine disciples. As we possess, or occasionally enjoy, much good which is not entitled to the character of happiness or of felicity, neither of these terms can be deemed generic; for they do not apply to all our pleasurable sensations or states, which are in themselves desirable; that great blessing Contentment, would, for example be excluded. Well-being comprehends the whole. It is not improper when applied to the innocent gratifications of Sense; it admits of occasional pleasures, derived from amusements and incidental exhilarations of the animal spirits; it is peculiarly adapted to that composed and habitual state, in which we acknowledge existence to be a valuable blessing; it embraces the pleasures and satisfactions derived from the love of knowledge; and it reaches to those more exalted sensations which constitute the highest state of well-being, Felicity.

Hitherto we have chiefly considered man, as an interested being, perpetually eager in his search after some apparent Good; and our attention has been directed to his desires, and his capacities relative to this object. According to the plan proposed we are now to make the Conduct and Dispositions of rational agents, and whatever may respect these, the chief subjects of our inquiry. We shall attempt to trace the line of conduct which it is necessary to pursue, the dispositions it is necessary to cultivate, and the particular inducements by which moral agents ought invariably to be influenced, in their search after those portions of Good, which from the constitution of their nature, and the situation in which they are placed, they are rendered capable of attaining.

But before we enter fully into the subject, we shall make some preliminary observations, as introductory to our plan. These will principally be deduced from the investigations which have already been made, and they will constitute the basis of our subsequent disquisitions.

I. By Conduct we understand an effort to possess some particular object, or to apply certain means in order to obtain certain ends; and by right Conduct, we express such exertions as have the

approbation of our reason respecting the object, the motive, and the means. The object must be important or interesting; the motives pure and respectable; the means lawful and properly adapted to the purpose. Whatever is contrary to reason cannot lead to permanent Good; if the motive be dishonest or dishonorable, the agent acts upon a principle by which he stands self-condemned; and ignorance of the proper means cannot ensure a salutary issue. It was to prevent wrong action and its train of pernicious consequences, that human nature is endowed with those intellectual powers which have the acquisition of truth for their object; and with those cautionary powers of doubt, hesitation, and deliberation, which detain the mind from acting, until clearer evidence shall indicate the right path.

It is observable that the word Conduct, is most pertinently, if not exclusively, applied to the actions of beings who are endowed with reason and understanding. It is not usual to speak of the conduct of Animals governed entirely by instinct: Of these we say that "they acted in a particular manner," not that they conducted themselves in that manner. This distinction seems to be founded upon the discretionary power with which rational Beings are entrusted, in union with the immense diversity of objects upon which this

power is exercised. Altho' the Instincts of Animals be as diversified as their various species, yet in most of their pursuits they act instinctively; that is, by invariable propensities, or by an uncontrouled impulse of the senses, and of the passions immediately excited by them. Notwithstanding the diversities correspondent to the specific nature of Animals, they are all influenced by three objects alone, in their search after Good to themselves; the procuring of sustenance; the escaping from danger; and the propagation of their species. As different animals are destined to such different kinds of Good, and to escape from various kinds of danger, there is a correspondent diversity both in their conformation and instincts; but these diversities still relate to the above objects. In these respects the Whale does not differ from the Oyster, the Reptile from the Elephant, nor the Tyger from the Lamb. In the human species, these desires, are by common consent, placed in the lowest class. It is expected that the superior faculties of men, be employed about objects, that are deemed more exalted and refined:-There is a much larger range for human conduct :-Our pursuits are still more diversified :-Our conduct is more the result of a preference, and this preference is expected to be the result of some mental

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