man species, depends principally upon the feelings of the Mind. Corporeal indulgences are not only transient, but they are comparatively few. The most numerous, as well as the most exalted and durable pleasures are mental. The delicate enjoyments derived from the cultivation of the arts, distinguished by the appellation of Taste, though they acknowledge the organs of sense to partake of the gratification, as they are the introductory media, yet they are deservedly considered as the pleasures of the Mind. The slighter amusements which recreate the frame; the pursuit of knowledge; the calm pleasures of contentment, satisfaction, complacency; the invigorations of hope and joy; the delightful affection of love, in all its ramifications; all the social and relative affections, whether conjugal, parental, filial, or friendly; as also esteem, veneration, gratitude, admiration; and the expansive pleasures of benevolence, are all of them mental. Most of our painful sensations have also a similar character, The pangs of hatred, with all its modifications; the irritations of anger, envy, and peevish discontent; the corrosions of malice; the oppressions of sorrow, grief, and melancholy; the horrors of fear, despair, and remorse; and the various ramifications of displacency, are passions and affections of the Mind.

These obvious facts show the high importance of regulating the passions and affections of the mind, and possessing that habitual frame of disposition, which is favourable to all those pleasing impressions of which it is susceptible, and which place it at the most remote distance from mental misery. The pleasures of sense, when most innocent, are still of a very transient nature. They are only to be enjoyed periodically; and if we possess no other resources, the mind sinks into a dull vacuity, into a listless inactive stupor, during the intermediate space. Nor can we conceive it to be engaged in any other occupation, than in seeking fresh occasions to stimulate new desires, that the transient pleasure of gratification may again be enjoyed. If these gratifications be illegitimate, such as reason condemns, such as expose to mischievous consequences, this intermediate space is filled up with fearful apprehensions, with contrition, remorse, and self condemnation, as often as the mind is compelled to reflect; and it is only aroused from a state of stupor, by a sense of the keenest misery.

Hence the necessity of that mental Discipline, which Moralists in every age have judged to be so essential to human happiness; and by which alone every disorderly, tormenting and injurious passion and affection may be subdued, and those

affections be cherished, which implant peace, contentment, satisfaction within, and diffuse their beneficial effects all around.

V. Mental discipline, implies, that we possess an accurate discernment of that which is most productive of permanent Well-being, to ourselves and others; habitual dispositions to act in a correspondent manner; and firmness of mind to resist every seductive inducement of a contrary tendency. By the former we escape the evils, from which minds, the best disposed, could not otherways be secure; by the others we resist the dangerous impressions made upon us by sensible objects, and subdue that inordinate self-love, which is inconsistent with personal happiness, and so fatal to the happiness of others. It is the regulation of our propensities, and the cultivation of right dispositions, that can alone ensure a permanency in right conduct, or render the practice of that which our reason most approves, a source of permanent pleasure to the agent. Abstract ideas of what is right and proper, are not sufficient to secure happiness. A theoretical conviction of the beneficial tendency of some actions, and the pernicious consequences of others, will not be an effectual counterpoise to the strong impulse of desire, and the impetuosity of those disorderly

passions, which may be excited by improper objects; nor will they reclaim the Base and Sordid from the disgraceful influence of inordinate Selflove. The proper office of examination, inquiry, and ratiocination, is, strictly speaking, confined to the production of a just discernment, and an accurate discrimination. But when these are obtained, we may still view the most important truths in the light of abstract facts, or of propositions in which we take no pleasure, nor seem to possess any interest. It is by feeling their importance, that a predilection is formed. When proper Desires are excited, rational inducements operate as they ought; and these will rise into Motives, if they be not effectually opposed by other inducements and desires of a contrary tendency. The gratification of every desire is, at the instant, pleasing, though the issue should prove fatal. It is therefore of the first importance that our desires should uniformly lead to that which is productive of Good, without any admixture of evil. It is alone by the permanent influence of right affec tions, that an uniformity can be expected; because these alone will be permanently operative. In cases of high importance, the first impulse of conviction will sometimes excite a strong desire for correspondent action. But the Passions are always transient. Their immediate stimulus may

have a sufficient force to impel the mind from its usual track, for a short period, but it will not induce a constant and steady pace in the new path. When the passion subsides, the strong efforts will also subside. Unless it be succeeded by its correspondent affections, former habits will regain the ascendency. The permanency of right affections is necessary, to introduce right habits, and right habits are synonymous with confirmation in goodWere any one to do that which is in itself right with reluctance and permanent self-denial, he might benefit others, and he might avert some great and impending evil from himself, but he could not be in a state of self-enjoyment. The discharge of his duty would be felt as an irksome task. Compulsive acts of justice belong to slaves, and not to free men; and compulsive generosity, compassion, and benevolence, are contradictions in terms.

ness.

VI. In order to ensure right conduct, those considerations or inducements must be prevalent, which are deservedly considered as a proper counterpoise, to the propensities of a contrary character. For the strongest inducement will become the Motive of every particular action; and where there are various inducements of a contrary tendency, each of them possessing a certain degree