The above principles naturally present them selves to a thinking mind, and all laws are founded upon them; as will appear in the following chap ter. CHAP. II. CONCERNING THE LAWS OF MORAL SECT. 1. GENERAL VIEW OF THE SUBJECT; DIFFERENCE BE- HAVING thus inquired into the opinions and feelings of mankind, upon the subject of Virtue and Vice, we shall now proceed to examine upon what principles they are founded. With the approbation or censure, arising from a perception of merit or demerit, are intimately connected our ideas of Duty and Obligation; of a something which ought, or ought not, to be done. Obligation properly signifies being bound to perform particular actions, or to avoid something prohibited. Duty respects that species of obligation which is due to another; and implies a conformity to his injunctions, or his interests. Thus, if there were not some kind of obligation, there could be no right of requisition from an other, nor place for censure. Proper conduct would simply produce its advantages without approbation; omissions and aggressions might be lamented, but no one could be blamed. Obligation relates to some principle, or principles, which are considered as laws that are to be obeyed; according to which certain actions are to be performed, certain dispositions to be cherished, and others to be avoided. In common and familiar usage, the word has various applications; some of which are more pertinent than others. It may simply imply what is necessary to be done, in order to obtain a certain end. Thus, we say," the man who is obliged to earn his own bread will be obliged to work." Sometimes it expresses a due sense of propriety, in conforming to certain received and approved principles. Thus, we say, "I was obliged to act as I did from a principle of honour, a sense of shame, or of gratitude." It frequently respects obedience or conformity to the commands of another; in which connexion it assumes the character of duty. In all these instances it is admitted, that something must be done, either as necessary to obtain a particular end, or not to violate some respected principle, or to avoid the ill consequences of disobe dience. All human laws are obligatory upon the subject; that is, he is bound as a member of the society to which he belongs, to act conformably to its injunctions, and rules. The laws by which it becomes obligatory to practise virtue, and desist from vice, are denominated moral laws, or laws of moral obligation. These now demand our at tention: The propriety of this denomination will appear, from what has been remarked, in our Introduction to the work before us*. It was observed, that under morals, were originally comprehended, habits, manners, customs, without an immediate re ference to virtue. The term was afterwards applied to virtuous conduct;-and with peculiar propriety; for if manners and habits had a certain degree of influence, in the minuter concerns of social intercourse, when these mores, manners, and habits, assumed a virtuous character, they became still more important to society since it is upon the practice of all the moral virtues, that the welfare, and even the existence, of society depends. In each acceptance of the word mores, both as customs and morals, the term is of a relative nature it respects our commerce with the world; the manner in which we conduct ourselves VOL. III. See Ethical Treatise, Part I. K towards others, or are treated by them; and it belongs to all our social acts. But in these senses the word is not applicable to an individual, considered as in an isolated state. If his actions had no influence on society, he might be prudent or imprudent, but not moral or immoral, according to the spirit of the term. Suppose that he made the laws of heaven the rule of his conduct, obedience would be an act of religion, and not of morality. Gratitude, patience, submission, resignation, would constitute him a pious, not a moral man, according to the appropriate signification of the word. These considerations induced us to make the distinctions inserted in our Preliminary Observations *. It must, however, be observed, that in a state of society, personal virtues and vices, have always an immediate, or remote influence, of a social or relative nature; in consequence of which, every private vice partakes of an immorality, and every private virtue has a moral effect. It is, for example, scarcely possible for an intemperate or an indolent man, to injure himself alone; and, as the phrase is, to be "nobody's enemy but his own." For should he not have dependents to suffer by his vices, his example may prove injurious. As contentment, patience, resignation, * See Introduction to the Second Volume. |