SECT. II.

ON MORAL SANCTIONS, OR THE INDUCEMENTS TO PRACTICE VIRTUE.

THE institution oflaws nécessarily implies, that the proposed end cannot be secured without them; and it also implies, that dispositions and habits of a contrary tendency, are to be opposed and subdued; which as necessarily requires some degree of coercion. But where physical coercion cannot be employed; where there are minds existing that have wills of their own; where obedience cannot be obtained, without giving a pliability to this will, bending or inclining it towards the desired object, the sole power of a legislator consists in placing certain inducements before the Subject, by which his will may be influenced to obey; the subject still retaining the power to disobey, if he choose to suffer the consequences of disobedi ence. These inducements are expected to act upon some principle, inherent in human nature; by exciting some particular desires, or favouring some particular disposition, which, if it existed before, might be too feeble to ensure a regular conformity. These are called legal sanctions, and

from their influence it is expected, that those rules and regulations should be observed, which are to produce the benefit proposed by instituting the law.

The sanction of all human laws, applies to the immediate interest of the Subject. It announces a something which is to operate upon his state of existence; rendering that more or less happy; or, in other words, it excites in the obedient the expectation of some recompense, and threatens the disobedient with chastisement. Thus human sanctions solely operate upon the passions of hope and fear. Nor do they expect that subjects in general should be influenced by any other motives. The recompense consists either of some pecuniary reward, increase of property, or accumulation of wealth; and these relate to the augmentation of such means of good, as may be employed, by the recipient at his option: Or it holds forth some honourable mark of distinction, by which the meritorious individual is elevated above the multitude; and exhibited as peculiarly worthy of their esteem and applause; this applies to the social principle of our nature, which is delighted with tokens of complacency from our associates: Or by a promotion to dignity and power; which not only are honourable distinctions, but give a permanent authority and influence in society, highly

gratifying to the ambitious. The punishments are mulcts and fines; corporal sufferings; privation of liberty; public marks of disgrace, by which the enjoyment of life is greatly diminished, or destroyed; and finally, by the extinction of life itself. Such are the modes by which human institutions and human legislators, attempt to subdue every reluctance to obey their mandates, or determine the will to a conformity to their precepts.

The various duties of morality, are of greater extent than any of those injunctions rendered obligatory, by human legislation. They are not confined to a few objects, but they relate to every purpose which interests individuals or societies in every state, and in every stage of their existence. They are obligatory upon the whole human race, in the characters of conscious intelligent agents; as searchers after well-being; and associated with others, who are incessantly engaged in the same pursuit: and they are expected to extend their influence to another state of existence, when all sublunary associations and governments shall be for ever abolished.

These important peculiarities suggest to us the very interesting questions, what are the inducements laid before all mankind, which ought to operate as motives, determining the will to practice every virtue, and discharge every moral duty? What

principles within us are favourable to the practice of virtue, and are violated by disobedience? and what will be the consequences resulting from these opposite modes of conduct?

The continuation of our moral history may perhaps throw considerable light upon these questions. We shall therefore first enquire, what do human beings expect from each other as rational and moral agents? What do they consider as the proper motives of action in general; a conformity or nonconformity to which, constitutes, in their opinion, various degrees of merit or de merit; and entitles the agent to approbation or censure? and how far are these applicable to mo ral conduct in particular?

We shall in the next place, take a comparative view of the various inducements, admitted to be legitimate motives to the practice of virtue, and examine which of these is most promising of efficacy; most correspondent with the nature, desires and expectations of men; the best security against the seductions of vice; and most conducive to personal well-being; in the discharge of those duties which have the general welfare for their object? The admitted induce ments or legitimate motives to action, possess the following characters:

They are such as are most consistent with the best interests of the agent.

Such as are becoming a rational being.

Such as are adapted to the social nature of man.

Such as are most interesting to a cultivated mind.

Such as are enjoined by a superior who has a claim to obedience, and whose injunctions cannot, or ought not to be resisted.

I. SELF-INTÉRÉST.

The desire of well-being is natural to every being that exists. To seek personal good, and avoid misery therefore, will be universally admitted to be a proper motive of action. We never reprehend the utmost efforts of well directed self-love. We never censure until the claims of others are invaded, or there is an indication of cold neglect respecting them. In such cases we feel a satisfaction at the disappointment of the