nevolence enjoys abundantly in the very act of obedience to its dictates. Meditation upon these laws of morality, which secure and diffuse so much good, and which have such distinguished marks of excellence, gives infinitely more delight to the contemplative mind, trained to virtue, than can be enjoyed by the investigation of obscure, partial, accommodating laws of human beings; which are not always wise or good, and under the best regulations, have a tendency to prejudice one class of individuals, in order to benefit another. When to these we add the sanctions of religion, respecting either rewards or punishments, they are acknowledged to exceed either in encoufagements or terrors, every promulgation, merely human, beyond the power of imagination to conceive.

SECT. III.

COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE MOTIVES ENUMERATED, RESPECTING THEIR DEGREES OF INFLUENCE

UPON MORAL CONDUCT.

Although each of the above motives or incitements to action be good in itself, and be approved by every man, yet there is a considerable difference in their respective degrees of power and extent of application, when they are considered as motives to the practice of virtue. They are not equally subservient to its cause, in every state and situation, wherein the moral agent may be placed. We shall therefore endeavour to investigate, with all the precision in our power, the respective merits and defects of each; and ascertain their peculiar characteristics; that we may learn which of the inducements is most to be depended upon, in our expectations of the steady; uniform practice of every virtue, and the extensive diffusion of the beneficial influence of virtue, among mankind. We shall follow the order observed in

the preceding section.

VOL. III.

N

Self-Interest.

It is a happy constitution of our nature, that interest and duty should be able to unite; and that while we are actually promoting the welfare of others, we may be gainers by the success, and even by the attempt. But self-interest does not always influence the mind in this manner. It is not a motive to virtue alone. It is, of all the principles of action, the most general. It excites to every kind of exertion which respects ourselves; whether it refer to the gratification of the natural appetites; indulgence of the passions; solicitude about the necessaries, comforts, elegancies of life. It prompts to the pursuit of pleasure, wealth, power. It is operative in all our expectations from others, and greatly influences our conduct towards them. Self-interest, imperfectly understood, is obvious in every vicious affection; in every malignant and self-tormenting passion; and in every nefarious action. To be influential, therefore, as a motive to virtuous actions, presupposes a due preparation in the mind of the agent. An enlarged perception, and a well disciplined heart are essentially requisite. No small degree of penetration is necessary to be able to keep this in

terest in view, in the midst of those sacrifices which virtue may demand; to be convinced, that by submitting to a present loss, we shall be remunerated by future gain; and that we shall ultimately augment our happiness, by opposing the strongest propensities of the heart. Self-restraint, when the passions are strong, and the objects of the immediate gratification are before us, will not be the first disposition suggested to the mind, by the principle of self-interest; but it will demand the clearest perceptions, the fullest conviction, and the firmest resolution, not to prefer the present good, which courts our affections, to the prospect of good in reversion. We cannot expect such motives to act powerfully and uniformly, upon the minds of those whose passions are strong, whose judgments are weak, and whose habits are inveterate. Thus, notwithstanding it be admitted as an indubitable truth, that virtuous dispositions and habits are the most conducive to permanent well-being, yet it is a truth concealed from the ignorant and vicious: a depraved mind is not easily convinced, that the subjugation of the propensities, which are considered as the prime sources of enjoyment, is essential to its welfare. Nor will it be able to comprehend, that a renun ciation of personal enjoyments, and a preference

given to the interests of others, is the securest road to personal well-being.

Conformity to Reason.

The obligation to act according to the dictates of reason, certainly extends itself through every stage of our existence, from the first dawn of reason, to the dissolution of our intellectual faculties, It is a contradiction in terms to assert, that a being endowed with rationality, is permitted to act irrationally in a single instance. To be governed by reason is the grand prerogative of human beings. This faculty was given to direct every part of our conduct; to influence our choice; plan our pursuits; remove our embarrassments; superintend our pleasures; and to convince us of the superior importance of virtue. But the reasoning powers of every man are not, like instinct, perfect and unering. The power is implanted, but the exercise is our own work; and it is a progressive work. It has been shewn, in another place *, that we are compelled to travel through perception, attention, inquiry, &c. &c. before we can arrive at a just discernment and a wise decision. If it be a fact, that man is born in ignorance, and that the appe

* See Vol. II. Intellectual Powers.