DISQUISITION THE FIRST. On the Nature of that Conduct which is most conducive ΤΟ PERSONAL AND SOCIAL HAPPINESS, OR The Reverse. DISQUISITION I. On Conduct as it Influences personal and social Well-being. IT was observed in our introductory Treatise,*. when we were considering the causes which create a diversity in our affections, that a great latitude of choice, both with respect to the object and the means, is permitted within the limits of strict propriety. In our progress from the ignorance of infancy to manhood, and from rude uncivilized nature, to the refinements of polished life, infinitely various are the objects soliciting our attention, at every stage; and various are the incidental causes, which influence our choice. Many of these are within the precincts of the strictest propriety. It is also very evident that a diversity in *See Phil: T. P. ii. C. ii. For the enumeration of particu lars. our opinions and predilections to a certain degree, is, in many cases, a source of much good. As the various classes of animals are made capable of enjoying a great diversity of good, in consequence of their being endowed with particular instincts, correspondent to the species of food destined for their sustenance, thus in the human race, in whom are combined diversities of powers which separately characterize the inferior animals, do we observe a beneficial diversity of tastes and dispositions, arising from peculiarity of temperament, modes of education, habits, national customs, &c. by which the attachments of Individuals to particular objects, become an immediate source of pleasure to themselves, and of utility to others. By this happy constitution of things, each one is able to enjoy his own particular object, with fewer encroachments upon the tastes and preferences of his neighbour. Pursuits and experiments are thus diversified to a great extent, and by means of these we become more intimately acquainted with the nature, qualities, and influences of an infinite variety of objects, to the great augmentation of the general Good. But there are some actions, dispositions and propensities, concerning which, no one enjoys a discretionary power; some, which are in their very |