exertion. Hence we are not only endowed with the simple powers of perception, but of reflection, deliberation, discrimination, to a great extent; and of finally determining according to the dictates of sound reason.

In all sensitive Beings, the grand desire is one and the same, to possess something Good. But in Animals of an inferior nature, this desire directs to a very few objects as the means of good; these are productive of few gratifications, and the passions excited by these desires or the incidents attending them, are also comparatively few. Animals are alone affected by things administering to their sensual wants. The desire of immediate gratification, anger at impediments, fear at some impending danger, instinctive fondness for their offspring during the early months of their existence, a silent attachment to their own species, appear to be, with some few exceptions, the total of their propensities. The sources of Good to the human species being more copious and diversified, Man being endowed with the more extensive powers of observation, comprehension, and reflection, he is subject to numerous correspondent passions and affections. He not only feels the emotions which present objects are capable of exciting, but upon reflection he can rejoice or grieve at the past; by his foresight he can hope or

fear for the future. He has a quick sense of honour or of disgrace from moral causes. He can suffer remorse where he has acted morally wrong, or be rewarded with complacency from the consciousness of his having acted right. As the superior sociability of his nature opens to him extensive sources of good or of evil, so is he exposed to all the contingent passions and affections, which the peculiarities of his connections are calculated to excite. As the passions of men are not under the irresistible impulse of Instinct, nor always under the guidance of reason, they are frequently productive of consequences to which the inferior creation are strangers.

II. If we attend to the various sources of Good to be enjoyed by man, we shall discover four distinctions and gradations. The indulgence of the animal appetites; pleasures and amusements, or slighter mental gratifications, including the enjoyment derived from the conveniences and accommodations of life; intellectual pursuits; and the cultivation of social, relative and pious affections. The gratifications of animal appetites proceed from a natural impulse, and demand neither observation, experience, nor reason to prompt to an indulgence. This is the only propensity possessed by man, in common with the brute creation;

and, in the human species, it is observed to be the most ungovernable in the most ignorant and uncultivated minds; which being strangers to every superior enjoyment, cannot be affected by any comparisons. In the pursuit of amusements, conveniences and accommodations, the mind becomes more operative; the imagination is peculiarly active, inventing or modifying things pleasant and useful, and creating fantastic scenes which may either amuse or deceive. In the pursuits of knowledge, the exercise of memory, ratiocination and judgement are the most conspicuous. By the first, facts are collected and retained; by the second inferences are drawn; by the last a decision is made. Thus we perceive that our minds are not only enriched by interesting facts, but also by the deduction of other important truths from them. In the pleasure derived from the sociability of our nature, and from our connections with other beings, the affections of the Heart are immediately concerned. It is here that the passions and affections generally manifest themselves in the strongest manner, and they are deemed the constituents of the most refined felicity.

III. It has been noticed that every voluntary action of a rational Agent, proceeds from the final determination of his own mind; that this mind

has been influenced by certain inducements, having some apparent good for their immediate exciting cause; and that unless the inclinations or desires thus generated be restrained by more powerful inducements, those first excited will become the efficient moving cause, of the determination of the Will; and thus will they acquire the character of Motives. It has also been remarked that inducements have a stronger influence when they are conformable to the principle, which has taken habitual possession of the mind, whatever be its character and tendency. It was further observed, and it can scarcely be observed too often, that the final execution of every determination of the Will, produces an immutable change respecting the grand pursuit of Well-being. The deed performed brings us forwards in a greater or less degree, towards the enjoyment of this Well-being, or places us at a more remote distance from it; and we are compelled to submit to all the consequen

ces.

These interesting facts prove that the principles of human action, may be distinguished into two Classes, primary and subordinate. The primary, grand, universal principle, ever operative in all sensitive and conscious beings, is the love and desire of some species of Good. The subordinate principles relate to the apparent means of obtaining this Good; and they direct to particular

actions, according to the idea entertained at the instant, of the efficacy of the means to produce the particular species of good desired. These subordinate principles are frequently very different in different persons. Some, for example, are actuated by a principle of benevolence, of justice, of integrity; others, by a principle of honour; others by a principle of ambition, of revenge, of sensuality, &c. Nor is the same principle uniformly active in the same person, at all times, He frequently sees the same object in different points of view. He is himself subjected by adventitious circumstances, to a versatility of mind, which may, for a period, occasion such a contrariety in his dispositions, that his predilections and aversions shall entirely change their objects; and the actions of one moment shall be opposite to the plans of the preceding. However, notwithstanding these contrarieties, he is still in the pur suit of Good; and it still remains a truth, that the prevalent influence of certain principles, constitutes the habitual character of each individual,

IV. The history which was given, upon a former occasion, of the sources of our good and evil, of the happiness we are rendered capable of enjoying, and the misery to which we are exposed, manifests that the state of well-being, in the hu