DISQUISITION II. On Moral Conduct. THE disposition of every one to pursue his own interests, supersedes the necessity of recommending the practice of all the personal virtues as a du ty, where a conviction is implanted that such a conduct is the only road to happiness: nor would the term be applicable; as duty and obligation, are, strictly speaking, relative ideas. The eagerness with which we seize all the means of Good, when we know of what they consist, and where they are to be found, annihilates the idea of an obligation, in a moral sense of the word. But the case is very different respecting the practice of the social virtues. As self-interest is not here the professed object in view, but the interests of others, it is necessary to introduce some efficient principle or principles, with which the ideas of duty and obligation are intimately connected; and without which, every man would think himself at liberty to act as he pleases. An opposition of interests frequently presents itself in the universal pursuit after the means of Good; and excepting some other law of conduct were operative, than that of personal welfare, universal anarchy would take place, to the subversion of social intercourse, with all its blessings. To prevent these horrors, human nature is endowed with certain principles, which meet with the approbation of all; and to which it has been invariably expected, that intelligent creatures should conform. To these we shall now direct our notice. This subject has deeply engaged the attention of moralists:-The foundation of Virtue,—what are the proper motives for the practice of Virtue ;the nature of moral obligation, or the principle which constitutes any particular act an indispensible duty, or stamps criminality upon its opposite; are questions which have given rise to much controversy in the philosophical world; and this sufficiently manifests that the subject is surrounded with difficulties. Since the work before the reader, is solely intended for practical uses, the author is studious to avoid whatever has the appearance of being theoretical and speculative. A simple statement of facts is more congruous to the mo ral history of the human mind, which he is attempting to give; and he leaves it to others to draw whatever inferences they may deem legitimate. Yet he is not without hopes, that these moral researches, which assume a direction rather unusual, will spread many important truths before the philosophical reader, to which the partial and contracted nature of controversy, may have rendered him too inattentive; and that some difficulties will of themselves be resolved, by a more comprehensive statement of facts, than controversy is disposed to admit. In the following Disquisition, we shall endeavour to trace the origin of the opinions maintained, by mankind in general, on the subject of virtue and morality: such as relate to the specific nature of virtue and vice ;-the pleasant or unpleasant impressions which the perception of virtuous and vicious conduct, uniformly make upon the human mind ;-the conceptions formed of merit and demerit,—and of moral obligation. We shall also search after those principles which are uniformly permitted to influence human conduct; and the relation they may have to the practice of virtue. We shall next examine which of these |