SER M. people in any age or place; for though

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we, and the bulk of mankind, know nothing of them from our own fenfes, this can never be confidered as any experience against them, any more than our never having feen a particular appearance. in nature, can be called an experiment, that it never did exift; fo that to infer from this, because we have never seen or known any facts contrary to the usual course, that there can be no fuch thing, is to reafon weakly, and from a narrow imagination. For as we do not know all the methods that God may have prefcribed to himself in his government of rea fonable beings, so we cannot tell how far miracles may be useful and proper. If God does not act by neceffity in the me thods of his providence, but as a free and benevolent being, they feem to be poffible, and may have been experienced by. others. For it cannot reasonably be imagined, that nature muft go always on with such a steady and determined direction, that in no cafe. the misery, or happiness of rational creatures is to be regarded; this were to give us an uncomfortable notion of the Deity; nor can men in fome circumstances, be of fa fmall

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fmall importance, that a little change of SER M. the ordinary course of things, for an inconfiderable space of time, to promote their happiness, fhould not be effected. For instance, if the raifing of a dead body to life, and the curing of a disease by a word, and the like, could be of the utmost consequence to ascertain a system of moral truths, to fecure our eternal welfare, why may not fuch a deviation from the usual methods of nature be allowed on fuch an extraordinary occafion? This seems more agreeable to the goodness of God, than that the methods of his providence in the material world fhould be pofitively unalterable. What fhould we fay of the benevolence of a Prince, who would not go a little out of the ordinary way of his government, to fave thousands of his fubjects from miferies? Would not fuch an inflexible and horrid fcheme of governing be rather terrible, than amiable? And therefore, as there have been men who affirmed, that they had experience of those extraordinary facts, their testimony can only be difproved, by shewing the abfurdity of the facts, or the weakness of their evidence.

SERM.

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It seems moreover to be plain, that every fact, however extraordinary, that supposes no abfurdity or contradiction, may be proved by teftimony. For this is the foundation of all hiftory, both of nature, and mankind, and upon it depends far, the greatest part of our knowledge.

In the material and animal world, there are many things that we could never have conjectured, if the repeated experience of certain perfons did not abundantly prove them; and we are obliged and glad to depend upon their evidence, for moft furprising things, that do not come within our own knowledge, or of those we converfe with. Some natural events feem to be as miracles to the inhabitants of diftant regions of the earth, and could never have been believed, if they had not been well attefted. Our experience of nature is fo very confined, that in many cafes, the natural events would feem to us, as impoffible, as the effects of cold in congealing water into ice did to the Indian, who rejected the evidence of an European traveller with fcorn, because it was, feemingly, inconfiftent with his own experience. But he reasoned wrong,

for

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for his obfervations were too narrow and SER M. fcanty to have made fuch a positive conclufion; he ought to have fufpended his judgment, till he was better fatisfied of the veracity of the relator.

From which this feems to be evident, that as we are so incompetent judges of what may be done in the natural world, we must be much more fo in what relates to the government of God, over his reafonable and free creatures. And as in the one cafe, we allow, and are convinced by common testimony, fo we may in the other, be fatisfied with fome higher degrees of it; for every poffible event may be proved by it. Extraordinary facts may justly require fome strong and unusual attestation, but furely fome degree or other of it, will satisfy any honest and reafonable mind..

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It is true, it may be faid, that as Miracles are events contrary to our experience, there arises from thence a strong prefumption against them; because we ufually reafon about the probability of facts from experience. And indeed, this is often fufficient to determine our judgment. But furely it will never follow from this, that no proof can be fufficient

to

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SER M. to take off this prefumption. For there may be evidence given from teftimony with fuch circumstances, that it may be abfurd to reject it. The number of obfervers may be fo increased, and the circumstances so heightened, as to make us as certain of a fact contrary to our common experience, as if we faw it with our eyes.

Suppofe a number of perfons, of a moral and ferious character, were to attest a miracle worthy of God, and calculated for the happiness of mankind, and were willing to fuffer death to maintain their teftimony, it seems more reasonable to believe them than to truft to our own experience, that can fhew no real abfurdity, or palpable contradiction, in fuch a wonderful

event.

It appears easier in this cafe to give credit to them, than to imagine that men could offer fuch violence to all the feelings of human nature, merely to impofe upon us, especially in a great number of perfons combined together, And it may be faid farther, that if fuch a wonderful event, contrary to all our obfervation, is brought to confirm a doctrine which is the foundation of all our hopes hereafter, and delivers us from

eternal