really exist. It scarcely seems to us ingenuous to say of one of these definitions, "In this sense a miracle is possible," when of the other it is said, "It is no miracle at all." Passing this by, however, we will direct our attention to the manner in which the first definition is reasoned upon, that being the only one that affects our views of the subject.

"To take the first definition: A miracle is not possible, as it involves a contradiction. The Infinite God must have made the most perfect laws admissible in the nature of things: it is absurd and self-contradictory to suppose the reverse. But if his laws are perfect and the nature of things unchangeable, why should he alter these laws? The change can be only for the worse. To suppose he does this, is to accuse God of caprice. If he be the ultimate cause of the phenomena of the universe, to suppose, in a given case, that he changes these phenomena, is either to make God fickle, and therefore not worthy to be relied on, or else inferior to nature, of which he is yet the cause."-P. 201.

To the question, "Why should God alter his laws?" we answer, because he may have purposes to accomplish which those laws neither were intended to accomplish nor can accomplish. There is nothing impossible or irrational in this. "We cannot"- -as Mr. Parker himself justly observes-" we cannot tell the secrets of God, nor determine à priori the modes of his manifestation;" and this we ought to be able to do, before we presume to conclude that the order of procedure revealed by nature embraces all the purposes which God designs to fulfil. Such presumption is as ridiculous as it is impious. "How can we say

to the Infinite, ‘Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther: there are no more ways wherein thy being acts'? Man is in nowise the measurer of God." (P. 202.) The only way in which it could be consistently maintained that all the divine purposes are embraced by the laws that God has made, is on the supposition that, after making those laws, he left the universe to their operation, withdrawing himself from all personal interference with it. Such, however, is not Mr. Parker's philosophy. He holds that God is "immanent" in nature, and that the whole course of events by which the universe is governed arises from his constant working; law being nothing more than the order of his procedure as it is manifested to us. In such doctrines as these there is evidently a provision made, according to which modes of action, not included in the operation of law, may be adopted by the Deity: and they plainly nullify the "self-contradiction" which a miracle is here said to involve. We freely allow that "the Infinite God must have made the most perfect laws admissible in the nature of things;" but we add, that "the nature of things" places some purposes which God may entertain, out of the province of law. There are some things whose nature requires that, if they exist at all, they should exist by means of a transgression of that usual order of operation which we understand by law. If God should deem it necessary to make a special communication of a truth, or to give a special sanction to a fact, so that such truth or fact may appear to stand toward him in a more intimate relation than truth and fact are ordinarily seen to do, then, "in the nature of things," he must vary his proceedings from their common course, however perfect that course may be for the accomplishment of the objects within its range. When Mr. Parker asks, "If God's laws

are perfect and the nature of things unchangeable, why should he alter these laws?" we also ask, How is it proved that the nature of things is unchangeable, in the sense which this case requires? A supernaturalist contends that the nature of things is not unchangeable. He believes that "God's laws are perfect" for their designed ends; but he also believes that there may be other ends, the production of which involves a change in the nature of things. To put to such an one, therefore, a question in which the unchangeableness of nature is assumed, is just to demand as the condition of the argument that the point for which he professes to contend should be given up by him. "The change," we are told, "can only be for the worse." Certainly it will be for the worse if the same purposes are to be accomplished which the perfect laws were meant to accomplish; but it will not be for the worse if other purposes are to be accomplished. In the latter case, the change may not only be for the better, but it may be absolutely necessary that it should be made. "To suppose he does this," it is added, "is to accuse God of caprice." If God departed from his fixed laws with no other design in view than that which they were established to promote, he would be guilty of caprice. But if designs which they could not establish are entertained by him, the violation of those laws, instead of being capricious on his part, will but indicate the same infinite wisdom in which they were first devised. The remaining sentence of the paragraph we are considering contains a sentiment, the examination of which may throw still farther light upon the question before us. "If he be the ultimate cause of the phenomena of the universe, to suppose, in a given case, that he changes these phenomena, is either to make God fickle, and therefore not worthy to be relied on, or else inferior to nature, of which he is yet the cause." The last charge may be triumphantly retorted. There is no inferiority to nature on the part of a Being who so far uses nature as the servant of his will, that he puts aside its ordinary regulations, and adopts new and special modes of action when it suits his purpose so to do. Nature is, in the most absolute sense of the terms, the mere instrument in the hands of such a Being. But if, on the contrary, the transgression of any law or order of nature is impossible to God-if he is bound to any course of procedure external to his own will-if his intentions are limited to certain previously fixed rules of outward manifestation-then he is "inferior to nature, of which he is the cause." He is the servant, not the master, of nature-the instrument by which activity is communicated to its plans, not the Almighty power to whose free expression its machinery is entirely obedient. Law, as we understand the matter, is the settled course of God's operation for the conducting of the ordinary affairs of his government. So far as those affairs fall under the common purposes of that government, the preservation of law is to be depended upon, as the infinite perfection of the Deity is to be depended upon. But the law which God has constituted cannot circumscribe his power; and if he has objects in view to which the settled course of nature is inadequate, he is able to effect them, even by "the transgression of all laws which he himself has made." To deny this, is as much to impugn the moral principles of his character, as it is to contradict his omnipotence.

When we have convinced ourselves of the possibility of miraculous

There are

interposition, we naturally turn to inquire into its uses. some of Mr. Parker's sentiments on this head which we wish to examine. The following passage will first occupy our attention:

"For the religious consciousness of man, a knowledge of two great truths is indispensable; namely, a knowledge of the existence of the Infinite God, and of the duty we owe to Him; for a knowledge of these two is implied in all religious teaching and life. Now one of two things must be admitted, and a third is not possible-either man can discover these two things by the light of nature, or he cannot. If the latter be the case, then is man the most hopeless of all beings. Revelation of these truths is confined to a few; it is indispensably necessary to all. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is generally admitted by the supernaturalists in New England-though in spite of their philosophy-that these two things can be discovered by the light of nature. Then if the two main points-the premises which involve the whole of Morals and Religion-lie within the reach of man's natural powers, how is a miracle or the tradition of a miracle necessary to reveal the minor doctrines involved in the universal truth? Does not the faculty to discern the greater include the faculty to discern the less? What covers an acre will cover a yard. Where, then, is the use of the miraculous interposition ?"-P. 158.

We think the last question might be satisfactorily answered, though the truth of all the previous statements were allowed. If we could discover by the light of nature both the existence of God, and the duty we owe to him; and if all the minor doctrines dependent upon these main points could be discovered by the same light, there might still be use in miraculous interposition. Such interposition would afford a confirmation to the truths already discovered, which might add to the clearness of their proof; and it would confer a direct authority upon them, which might practically increase their obligation. The discovery by the light of nature may be dim and uncertain; and that which is discovered may be wanting in the force of its appeal to our sense of religious responsibility. Miraculous interposition may meet both of these difficulties. It may make the truth it sanctions plainer to the understanding, and by the immediate connection with God which it establishes, it may give it greater power upon the heart. Nor does it appear to us, that, when the supreme importance of religion to human interests is taken into the account, there is any thing improbable in the employment of such an agency for such purposes as these. We judge the contrary to be the case. But though this question as to the use of miraculous interposition may thus be answered in consistency with Mr. Parker's own statement of the case to which it applies, a more satisfactory answer to it can be given by correcting certain parts of that statement. "If," it is asked, "if the two main points-the premises which involve the whole of Morals and Religion-lie within the reach of man's natural powers, how is a miracle or the tradition of a miracle necessary to reveal the minor doctrines involved in the universal truth? Does not the faculty to discern the greater include the faculty to discern the less? What covers an acre will cover a yard." It would be easy to substitute for this figure, another more applicable to the case which would suggest a different result from the one here pointed out. It is true that what covers an acre will cover a yard; but it is not true, that the same light or the same power of vision which enables us to discover the outline of a distant prospect, will enable us to discover the detail of objects it contains. There are

many instances in which the faculty to discern the greater does not practically include the faculty to discern the less. What are the facts in the instance before us? Men not only may possess, but have possessed, an idea of Deity, without being able to discover whether that Deity was one or more; and they have had a sense of religious duty, without being able to discover the conditions under which that duty ought to be performed. It has not been found that these "minor doctrines" have necessarily resulted in the course of human investigation from the universal truth implanted in the heart of every man; and yet "minor" as they may be, the relation of that truth to the happiness of mankind most intimately depends upon them. It is according to a man's conviction of the importance of such doctrines, whether or not he believes that miraculous interposition in their favour is of use; and we can only say for ourselves, that no means seem to us too expensive in order to make them known and understood. The unity, and the paternal character of the Deity, the Christian law of love, and its doctrine of immortality, are among the things to the proper or influential knowledge of which this interposition is, in our view of the matter, necessary; and entertaining that view, we see ample use for such interposition even as to doctrines which may, in one sense, be said to be involved in the universal truths of the being of God, and the obligation of religious obedience. We are, still farther, not able fully to assent to Mr. Parker's statement as to man's relation to what he calls 66 the two main points" of Morals and Religion. “One of two things," says he, "must be admitted, and a third is not possibleeither man can discover these two things by the light of nature, or he cannot." Now we submit that the question is not fairly put in the form of this alternative. Before we accept such an alternative, we must decide what is meant by the word discover, as applied to man's religious knowledge. Knowledge of the existence of God, and the duty we owe to him, may be partial or complete, exact or erroneous; and we should reply to a question as to the possibility of discovering such knowledge, just as we understood it to relate to one or the other of these views of the subject. Then, again, if we accepted this alternative as it is here offered, and allowed that man could-whatever sense might be fixed upon the word discover-discover these two things, we should not be disposed to extend our allowance beyond the bare possibility which the alternative states. That man, in any general or satisfactory sense, does make the discovery, we could not allow. Leaving the alternative, therefore, as it is laid down, it does not by any means follow, that miraculous interposition is unnecessary even with regard to these two cardinal points of religious teaching and life. It may be necessary to bring home to the mass of mankind, that which, though possibly within the range of natural investigation, there is no probability of their attaining to by means of such investigation alone: and it may be necessary to correct the errors and perfect the deficiencies attaching to the best views of this subject which man is naturally capable of acquiring. Nor is it true that, this being the case, "man is the most hopeless of all beings." Our theory, no less than Mr. Parker's, implies that God has not left himself without witness in any human instance; that, whether with or without revelation, every man is enabled to commend himself to his Maker by a faithful use of

the instrumentalities with which he is favoured; and that he will be dealt with, justly and mercifully, according to what he has received, and not according to what he has not. If, as Mr. Parker asserts, "revelation of these truths is indispensably necessary to all," that necessity has not been fulfilled on his principles to a greater extent than it has been on ours. Ignorance, error and perversion have, in all periods of history, attached to the religious conceptions of man. The light of nature has been unable actually to make known other than a very defective exhibition of the subject. That which is professedly a supernatural light has, even by Mr. Parker's acknowledgment, done more than any thing besides toward the manifestation of religious truth. We desire to uphold all that is true and good in nature, while we indulge in a brighter hope than any which nature itself can originate. It is in its bearing upon that hope that we contend for the use of miraculous agency.

There is another passage relating to the question we are now considering, upon which we have a farther remark or two to offer. It is as follows:

"If the truth of these doctrines rest on the personal authority of Jesus, it was not a duty to observe them before he spoke; for he being the cause or indispensable occasion of the duty, to make the cause precede the effect is an absurdity too great for modern divines. Besides, if it depends on Jesus, it is not eternally true; a religious doctrine that was not true and binding yesterday, may become a lie again by to-morrow: if not eternally true, it is no truth at all; absolute truth is the same always and every where. Personal authority adds nothing to a mathematical demonstration; can it more to a moral intuition? Can authority alter the relation of things? A voice speaking from heaven, and working more wonders than Æsop and the saints, or Moses and the Sibyl relate, cannot make it our duty to hate God or man; no such voice can add any new obligation to the law Ġod wrote in us."-P. 198.

Now it is not contended, in the case of Christianity, that its doctrines rest on "the personal authority of Jesus." The authority pleaded for is that of God, manifested through the mission of Jesus. Nor do we hold that any display of authority could "alter the relation of things." It could not make falsehood, truth, nor turn wrong into right. We do not, moreover, acknowledge the least sympathy with the position that there is no other authority connected with the truths of the Gospel than that which its supernatural character supplies. All argument directed against these points is quite beside the real question in dispute. Putting such things, then, out of our way, we would just fix attention upon the sentence, "Authority adds nothing to a mathematical demonstration; can it more to a moral intuition ?" We say in reply, that morality by its very nature is a matter of authority. Mr. Parker himself describes it as "an everlasting reality which rests on the ground of all truth, the public and eternal authority of unchanging God." Whatever, therefore, connects divine authority with moral truth, fulfils the purposes to which that truth is adapted. Mathematical demonstration requires no such authority to be connected with it, because it has nothing to do with our sense of responsibility. In the question before us, two things are confounded which, as to the very point of authority, are evidently distinct from each other. When this confusion is removed from the subject, it is immediately seen, that though divine authority adds nothing to