Law of God ftands as to fuch a particular Matter which Authority hath obliged him to; as having neither means to come to the knowledge of it; or if he had, the Circumftances of his Condition not requiring that he fhould fo accurately inform himself about it: In fuch a Cafe as this, I fay, a Man cannot formally be faid to be guilty of Sin in obeying his Lawful Superiours, though the Inftance in which he obeys fhould happen to contradict fome Law of God. For the Law of God here is as no Law to him, that is, it doth not oblige him, because he neither knows it, nor is bound to know it. And where there is no Law, there is no Transgreffion.

And then further this is alfo to be remembered, that when we own that a Man may be guilty of Sin as well in obeying his Superiour, when he only doubts of the Lawfulness of the Action commanded, as when he is Perfwaded that the Action is unlawful: I fay, this we are to remember, that whenever this Cafe happens, the Man's Sin doth not lie in his obeying his Superiours with a Doubting Confcience (which is commonly run away with :) For the Man would as certainly Sin, if in this Cafe he did the Action with a Perfwafion that it was Lawful; as he doth in doing it with a Doubt, whether it be Lawful or no. But the Sin lies here; viz. in doing an Action which God's Law hath forVOL. II. Bb

bid;

1

bid; and which the Man would have known to be an ill Action, if he had been fo honeft, and fo careful in minding his Duty as he should have been. It is his Acting contrary to a Law of God, that here makes the matter of the Sin; and it is his vicious criminal Ignorance of that Law which gives the Form to it. But as for the obeying his Superiors, whether with a Doubt or without one, that is no part or ingredient of the Sin at all.

Fifthly, We add this further, That whatever Power or Right we give to our Superiours, for the over-ruling a Private Doubt; it is not to be extended fo far as either to deftroy the Truth, or to fuperfede the Use of those Rules I have before laid down in order to the directing a Man's proceeding in the Cafe of a Double Doubt. For this Cafe of obeying the Com mands of our Superiors, when we doubt of the Lawfulness of them, being a Double Doubt as properly as any other, those Rules are here to take place as much as in any other Inftance.

And therefore where-ever a Man's Doubts are in this Cafe very unequal: That is to fay, he apprehends himself in much greater danger of Sinning if he obey his Superiors in this particular Inftance, than if he obey them not; as having abun dantly more Reason to believe that their Commands are Unlawful, than that they

are

are Lawful In that Cafe we cannot fay, he is obliged to obey, but fhould rather difoley, fuppofing all other Confiderations be equal: For no Man is bound to obey his Superiors any farther than they command Lawful Things. And therefore if it be two to one more Probable that their Command is Unlawful than that it is Lawful, it is likewife more Probable that a Man in this Inftance is not to obey them. And a greater Probability, cæteris paribus, is always to be chofen before a lefs, according to onr First Rule...

But then, though the Authortity of our Superiours alone will not in this Cafe be of force enough to retrieve the Ballance which is fo far inclined the other way, and to turn it on its own fide; yet there may be, and very ufually are, fuch other Arguments drawn from the Confideration of the greater Sin, and the more dreadful Confequences, of difobeying in this Inftance, than of obeying; as will to any reafonable Man out-weigh all the Probabilities on the other fide (fo long as they are not fo great as to create a Perswasion) and make it reasonable for the Man rather to do the Action, how ftrong foever his Doubts be of the Unlawfulness of it (fo long as they are but Doubts ) than to omit it after Lawful Authority hath enjoyned it. But however this happen; it is always to be born in mind, as before, that if it fhould Bb 2 prove

:

prove that our Superiours do command nothing in the particular Inftances, but what they Larefully may do: It will not juftifie any Man's difobedience, to fay, that he apprehended it was more dangerous o' more finful to obey them, than to difobey them For our Miftakes and falfe Reasonings, will not take off from the Obligation that is upon us to obey our Lawful Superiours in their Lawful Commands; unless, as I have often faid, we can fatisfie our felves, that in those Inftances we neither were bound, nor had fufficient means to underftand better.

And now having thus cleared our way, by removing from our Question thofe Things that are Foreign to it, and which indeed, by being ufually blended with it, have made it more Intricate than otherwife it would be; we are pretty well prepared to propofe our Point.

In the Sixth place then. Excluding (as we have done) out of our Cafe all those Things and Circumftances we have been fpeaking of, with none of which we have here to do; the Plain Queftion before us is this:

Whether in the Cafe of a pure Doubt about the Lawfulness or Unlawfulness of an Action, where the Probabilities are on both fides pretty equal, and where likewife the Man concerned hath done all that he was obliged to do for the fatifying himself: Whether,

Whether, I fay, in this Cafe the Command of a Lawful Superiour ought not fo far to over-ballance the Doubt, as not only to make it reasonable for the Man to do that of which he doubteth; but also to oblige him fo to do?

We hold the Affirmative of this Question; and I now come to give the Reasons why we fo hold, which is the Second Thing to be done under this Head.

II. Our Propofition is this, That if Lawful Authority do Command us to do a Thing, which as on the one hand we cannot fay it is Lawful; fo on the other hand, we cannot fay it is Unlawful; but our Judgment remains suspended, as having equal, or near equal Arguments on both fides: In fuch a Cafe as this, though if we were left to our own Choice, we fhould generally forbear the Action for the Reasons I before gave; yet being Commanded by our Superiours, who by the Law of God have Authority over us; it is not only reasonable, but our Duty to do it,

For First of all, even in point of Humility and Modefty, though there was no other Conderation; one would think that a Subject owes as much deference to the Judgment and Discretion of his Superiours as this comes to,

So much Influence as this, even a Confeffor or a Private Friend hath over our Confciences. In a Cafe where we are alBb 3 together