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It is, therefore, very surprising that any SERM should ever have thought of denying a Distinction, which is fo manifeftly founded in Nature, and the Truth of which is fo univerfally attested by the Confciences of Mankind, which yet it is certain feveral, both in ancient and late Times, have, with great Boldness and Confidence, and with fome Art and Subtilty, attempted to do. The like Conduct, with respect to the Objects of the external Senses; the denying the Dif ference between Light and Darkness; the confounding all the various Kinds, and Degrees of Colours, Sounds, Taites, and Smells, would be an Argument of the moft extravagant Madness; and the acting upon fuch a Scheme muft unavoidably plunge a Man in Destruction. The denying a Diftinction among moral Objects, is really as flagrant Abfurdity, and as extravagant Folly, as the denying a Distinction among material and fenfible Things themselves; the one is as contradictory to the inward Convictions and Feelings of Men, as the other is to the Notices and Informations conveyed to them by their outward Organs; and the acting without a Regard to the Difference of moral Good and Evil, Virtue and Vice, must as certainly bring upon the B 2

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SERM. Soul Ruin and Death, as the indifcriminate I. Use of all fenfible Things would draw Deftruction upon the Body. Very justly, therefore, does the Prophet denounce Woe to the Men, who act a Part fo perverfe and unnatural! Wo unto them that call Evil Good, and Good Evil; that put Darkness for Light, and Light for Darkness; that put Bitter for Sweet, and Sweet for Bitter. In difcourfing farther from which Words, I fhall, First, Shew that there is a natural fixed Difference between moral Good and Evil, fufficiently clear and manifeft to the moral Judgment and Confcience of every Man. Secondly, Inquire from whence an Attempt to confound the Notions of moral Good and Evil, and to obliterate the Impreffions of Virtue and Vice in the Mind, can proceed. Thirdly, Confider the terrible Effects which this Attempt must have on the Minds and Happinefs of Men. Laftly, Conclude with fome useful Inftructions and Inferences from the whole.

I. I fhall fhew that there is a natural fixed Difference between moral Good and Evil, fufficiently clear and evident to the moral Judgment and Confcience of every Man. But before I proceed to establish

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this Difference, it will be proper briefly to SER M. confider what is to be understood by the Words, moral Good and Evil.

Good and Evil are chiefly of two Kinds, natural and moral. All thofe Things are naturally good, which afford us agreeable Perceptions, which gratify any of the Senfes or Powers of receiving Pleasure in us, and contribute, either immediately, or remotely, to our Happiness. And on the other hand, all those Things are naturally evil, which excite in us painful Senfations or Ideas, and are either directly, or indirectly, Sources of Mifery to us. Concerning the Difference between Good and Evil of this Clafs, there is no Difpute. Moral Good and Evil are to be found only in the Difpofitions and Actions of rational Agents, and not in all of these for some of them partake of neither, but are, in a moral Computation, altogether indifferent in their Nature. Affections and Actions of Mankind, to which Good or Evil of the moral Kind can be ascribed, are principally those of Them which terminate upon other intelligent Beings, and are expreffive either of Respect and Love, or of Contumacy and Ill-will to Them; or are actually productive of Happinefs

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SERM. nefs or Mifery to Them *. The intelligent Beings, to whom we are related, and towards whom we are to exercife our Affections, are chiefly God, the eternal Source of Reason and all Perfection, the infinitely wife, holy, good, and powerful Maker and Governor of all Things; and Mankind, made after the Image of God, with whom we are closely and infeparably connected, and to whom we have constant Opportunities of being useful. Now whenever we reflect either upon our own Tempers and Difpofitions, or thofe of Others, and the Actions which flow from them, with reference either to God or Man, we always find something amiable and agreeable, and that gains our Efteem and Love ; or fomething deformed and difagreeable, and which raifes our Averfion. The Difpofitions of Reverence, Love, Gratitude, and Submiffion towards the fupreme Being,

have

Befides Affections of this Sort, it is certain, that a Defire of our own Improvement in Virtue, or of our Attainment to the true Dignity and Perfection of our Nature, appears to us to have a great deal of moral Worth and Beauty; and the Neglect of it, of Evil and Deformity. But as the Lovelinefs, or Deformity of thefe Things, does not generally ftrike Men fo ftrongly and immediately, as the Goodnefs of Piety and Charity, and the Evil of their Contraries, I inftance here chiefly in the Difpofitions of Piety and Humanity, and their Oppofites; and it is fufficient to the Purpofe of this Difcourfe, to prove a Difference between them.

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have ever a lovely Appearance, and are SERM. neceffarily approved by us. On the contrary, a Temper of Profaneness, a Mind utterly inattentive to, and quite unaffected by the clear Inftances of Wisdom, Power, Goodness, and Righteousness, appearing in the Conftitution and Government of the Universe, and acting in Contradiction to the apparent Ends of the divine Administration, is a horrid and odious Object, and neceffarily gives Offence and Diftafte to us. The Exercife of Justice, Truth, Friendship, and Kindness to our Neighbours, a fixed Difpofition and Endeavour to promote, by all Means in our Power, the universal Happiness of Mankind, are Things very beautiful and engaging, which we cannot but admire and love. And on the other Side, Injustice, Falsehood, Treachery, and Cruelty in our Dealings with Men; a Neglect of the Interest of Society, and a facrificing of the publick Welfare to our private Views, are Things extremely base and shocking, and which must unavoidably be abhorred

by us. The Eye of the Mind, our Faculty of moral Discernment, as eafily perceives a Fairness and Excellence in fome of these Qualities and Actions, and a Foulness and Baseness in their Oppofites, as the bodily