reproved, he sheds tears, begs pardon, promises better things, but never becomes angry.1

§ 473. These three cases agree in this common feature, that, if their own story were true, they must have committed the deed — supposing that fact to have been proved — in a state of unconsciousness not immediately connected with a fit, either before or after. It is supported only by their own statements, which, under the circumstances, are not to be implicitly received. No such condition had been previously observed in Fyler or Bethel, but Winnemore stated that he once rowed about in a boat on the river several hours without being conscious of the fact, having been told of it by those who saw him. The same objection lies against this story. No writer on epilepsy speaks of any such feature of the disease as the kind of unconsciousness alleged to have occurred in these cases. It may have been overlooked, and, considering the manner in which the disease has been observed, as already alluded to, § 471, this would not be very surprising. Certainly this loss of consciousness is not so very far removed from the psychological impairments ordinarily attributed to epilepsy, as to render its occurrence highly improbable. These cases furnish a warrant for special investigation of the point, and should render us still more cautious how we estimate the legal responsibility of epileptics.

CHAPTER XIX.

SUICIDE.

§ 474. At the present day, the subject of suicide is deprived of much of the medico-legal importance which it once possessed. Still, however, as questions occasionally come up, in which dispositions of property are made to depend on the judicial views that are formed respecting its relations to mental derangement, it is highly proper that mistakes should not be committed from a want of correct notions of its nature. With all the light on the subject which the researches of modern inquirers have elicited, many, probably, are yet unable to answer understandingly the question so often started, whether suicide is always or ever the result of insanity. It may be proper, therefore, to lay before the reader the present state of our knowledge on this subject, in order that he may have the materials for forming correct and well-grounded opinions respecting it.

§ 475. To the healthy and well-balanced mind, suicide appears so strange and unaccountable a phenomenon, that many distinguished writers have inconsiderately regarded it as, in all cases, the effect of mental derangement; while, by many others, it has, with still less reason, been viewed as always, except in connection with manifest insanity, the act of a sound, rational mind. Neither of these views can be supported by an impartial consideration of all the facts, and the truth probably lies between the two extremes. Suicides may be divided into two classes, founded upon the different causes or circumstances by which they are actuated. The first includes those who have deliberately committed the act from the force of moral motives alone; the second, those who have been affected with some pathological condition of the brain, excited or not by moral motives.

§ 476. If it be considered, that life is not the only, nor perhaps the best, gift we have received from the Author of our being, it ought not to appear strange that men should sometimes be willing to relinquish it for the sake of securing a good, or avoiding an evil. We know well enough that life is not so dear that it will not bo readily sacrificed when all that makes it worth retaining is taken away. The intrepid Roman chose rather to fall on his own sword, than survive the liberties of his country or live an ignominious life; and reverses of fortune, which hurl men from the pinnacles of wealth or power; or the certain prospect of infamy and the world's scorn, are no very inadequate motives for terminating one's existence. In these cases, the person, no doubt, may act from error of judgment, and thus be guilty of foolish and stupid conduct, but we have no right to confound such error with unsoundness of mind. Inasmuch as the prospect before him may be such that it will appear to his mind more painful to live than to die, it is not to be wondered at, if, for want of courage to bear up against the ills that threaten to overwhelm him, and battle it to the last, he should prefer the latter; for, after all, the choice might indicate less folly than that which often characterizes the conduct of men. True, the motive may seem sometimes totally inadequate to lead to such a determination, though in reality it may be the only and sufficient motive; and this, probably, must always continue to be one of the mysterious facts in our constitution, that the termination of our existence, from which we instinctively shrink with feelings of horror, should so often be voluntarily hastened from the most trivial and insignificant motives. No doubt the mind is moved to its profoundest depths, but the same may be affirmed of all cases where crime is committed under the excitement of strong passions, and therefore, is in itself, no proof of insanity. It cannot be denied, however, that the cases are comparatively few in regard to which it would be safe to affirm, that the excitement of the organic action of the brain and nervous* system, which accompanies this perturbation of mind, had not transcended the limits of health, and passed into real pathological irritation. Among these few we can have no hesitation in placing the case of the pair of youths, noticed by Mrs. Trollopc, who, after dining sumptuously at a fashionable restaurant at the expense of their entertainer, went to their lodgings, and suffocated themselves together in the same bed ;1 or that of suicidal clubs, the members of which bind themselves to die by their own hands within an appointed time. Men, who, with cultivated intellects and refined passions, entertain only the meanest conceptions of the great moral purposes of life, may be ready to terminate their existence the moment it ceases to impart its usual zest to sensual gratification. Here, self-destruction is obviously not the effect of physical disease, but of moral depravity. But how are we to account for those instances of juvenile suicide so often recorded, where the dreadful propensity is excited by the most trivial causes? Burrows speaks of a girl, but little over ten years of age, who, on being reproved for some trifling indiscretion, cried and sobbed bitterly, went upstairs and hung herself, in a pair of cotton braces; and of another, eleven years old, who drowned herself for fear of simple correction.2 A French journal has lately reported the case of a boy, twelve years old, who hung himself by fastening his handkerchief to a nail in the wall, and passing a loop of it around his neck, for no other reason than because he had been shut up in his room and allowed only dry bread, as a punishment for breaking his father's watch. Another case is related of a boy, eleven years old, who killed himself because reproved by his father; and several more of a similar description are also recorded.3 In these cases, the moral causes seem altogether inadequate to excite the suicidal propensity, without first producing some serious physical disturbance, for here are none of those motives for self-destruction which have just been mentioned as influencing the adult mind. Few are aware how large a proportion of the suicides are committed by children. A few years ago the public registers of France showed, that of the 25,760 suicides committed within a period of ten years, 192, or 1 in 134, were by children under sixteen. Of 20 cases observed by one writer, 1 was under five, and 2 under nine. The registers of Great Britain show a proportion but little smaller.1

§ 477. That suicide is often committed under the impulse of mental derangement, even when mental derangement would not otherwise have been suspected, is a doctrine that was long since taught by some medical writers, and has been confirmed beyond the shadow of a doubt, by the researches of recent inquirers. The propensity to suicide connected with an obviously melancholy disposition is now universally recognized as a form of monomania, for its symptoms are plainly indicative of cerebral derangement. These patients labor under a constant melancholy, conjuring up the darkest prospects, and presaging nothing but evil fortune. They have been guilty of some sin, real or imaginary, which they believe to be of the most heinous nature, and thenceforth there is no more happiness nor comfort in the world for them. They imagine their friends are constantly watching their movements and engaged in machinations against them, or silently neglecting and despising them: at one time, morose and taciturn; at another, uttering the most bitter complaints, weeping and traversing the room, as if in extreme mental anguish. If their thoughts take a religious turn, they imagine they have committed the unpardonable sin, that their prayers are rejected, that the Saviour turns away his face from their sight, and that the miseries of the damned are

1 Durand-Fardell. Etude* fur le filicide cbes let enfant. Ann. Mid. Psy. Jan. 1866.