must excite us, and it will take off part of our necessary end: and I think the objectors will confess, that if they have no certainty what God will do with them, they must have some probability and hope, before they can be sincerely devoted here to please him. If a man be but uncertain what he should make the end of his life, or what he should live for, how can he pitch upon an uncertain end? And if he waver so as to have no end, he can use no means: and if end and means be all laid by, the man lives not as a man, but as a brute. What a torment must it be to a considerate mind to be uncertain what to intend and do in all the tenor and actions of his life? Like a man going out at his door, not knowing whither, or what to do, or which way to go; either he will stand still, or move as brutes do by present sense, or a windmill or weather-cock, as he is moved. But if he pitch upon a wrong end, it may yet be worse than none; for he will but do hurt, or make work for repentance: and all the actions of his life must be formally wrong, how good soever materially, if the end of them be wrong. If I fetch them not from this end, and believe not in God as a rewarder of his servants, in a better life, what motives shall I have, which in our present difficulties, will be sufficient to cause me to live a holy, yea, or a truly honest life? All piety and honesty indeed is good, and goodness is desirable for itself: but the goodness of a means, is its aptitude for the end; and we have here abundance of impediments, competitors, diversions and temptations, and difficulties of many sorts; and all these must be overcome by him that will live in piety or honesty. Our natures, we find, are diseased, and greatly indisposed to unquestionable duties; and will they ever discharge them, and conquer all these difficulties and temptations, if the necessary motive be not believed? Duty to God and man is accidentally hard and costly to the flesh, though amiable in itself: it may cost us our estates, our liberties and lives. The world is not so happy as commonly to know good men from bad, or to encourage piety and virtue, or to forbear opposing them. Who will let go his present welfare, without some hope of better as a reward? Men use not to serve God for nought; nor that think it will be their loss to serve him. A life of sin will not be avoided upon lower ends and motives: nay, those lower ends, when alone, will be a constant sin themselves: a preferring vanity to glory, the creature to God, and a setting our heart on that which will never make us happy: and when lust and appetite incline men strongly and constantly to their several objects, what shall sufficiently restrain them, except the greater and more durable delights or motives drawn from divine things? Lust and appetite distinguish not between lawful and unlawful. We may see in the brutish politics of Benedictus Spinosa, whither the principles of infidelity tend. If sin so overspreads the earth, that the whole world is as drowned in wickedness, notwithstanding all the hopes and fears of a life to come, what would it do were there no such hopes and fears? * No mercy can be truly known and estimated, nor rightly used and improved by him that sees not its tendency to the end, and perceives not that it leads to a better life, and uses it not thereunto. God deals more bountifully with us than worldlings understand: he gives us all the mercies of this life, as helps to an immortal state of glory, and as earnests of it. Sensualists know not what a soul is, nor what soul-mercies are; and therefore not what the soul of all bodily mercies are: but take up only with the shadow. If the king would give me a lordship, and send me a horse or coach to carry me to it, and I should only ride about the fields for my pleasure, and make no other use of it, should I not undervalue and lose the principal benefit of my horse or coach? No wonder if unbelievers be unthankful, when they know not at all that part of God's mercies which is the life and real excellency of them. Alas! How should I bear with comfort the sufferings of this wretched life, without the hopes of a life with Christ? What should support and comfort me under my bodily languishings and pains, my weary hours, and my daily experience of the vanity and vexation of all things under the sun, had I not a prospect of a comfortable end of all? I that have lived in the midst of great and precious mercies, have all my life had something to do, to overcome the temptation of wishing that I had never been born, and had never overcome it, but by the belief of a blessed life hereafter. Solomon's sense of vanity and vexation, has long made all the business, wealth, honour, and pleasure of this world, as such, appear such a dream and shadow to me, that were it not for the end, I could not have much distinguished men's sleeping and their waking thoughts, nor have much more valued the waking than the sleeping part of life, but should have thought it a kind of happiness to have slept from the birth unto the death. Chil * Tractat. Theolog. Polit. dren cry when they come into the world: and I am often sorry when I am awakened out of a quiet sleep, especially to the business of an unquiet day. We should be strongly tempted in our considering state, to murmur at our Creator, as dealing much harder by us than by the brutes: if we must have had all those cares, griefs, and fears, by the knowledge of what we want, and the prospect of death, and future evils, which they are exempted from, and had not withal had the hopes of a future felicity to support us. Seneca and his stoics had no better argument to silence such murmurers, who believed not a better life, than to tell them, that if this life had more evil than good, and they thought God did them wrong, they might remedy themselves by ending it when they would: but that would not cure the repinings of a nature, which found itself necessarily weary of the miseries of life, and yet afraid of dying. It is no great wonder that many thought that pre-existent souls were put into these bodies as a punishment of something done in a former life, while they foresaw not the hoped end of all our fears and sorrows. O how contemptible a thing is man!' saith the same Seneca, 'unless he lift up himself above human things.' Therefore, saith Solomon, when he had glutted himself with all temporal pleasures, I hated life, because the work that is wrought under the sun, is grievous to me: for all is vanity and vexation of spirit.' I have often thought whether an implicit belief of a future happiness, without any search into its nature, and thinking of any thing that can be said against it, or the searching, trying way, be better. On the one side, I have known many godly women that never disputed the matter, but served God comfortably to a very old age, (between 80 and 100) to have lived many years in a cheerful readiness and desire of death, and such as few learned, studious men do ever attain to in that degree; who, no doubt, had this as a divine reward of their long and faithful service of God, and trusting in him. On the other side, a studious man can hardly keep off all objections, or secure his mind against the suggestions of difficulties and doubts; and if they come in, they must be answered; seeing we give them half a victory, if we cast them off before we can answer them. A faith that is not upheld by such evidence of truth, as reason can discern and justify, is often joined with much secret doubting, which men dare not open, but do not therefore overcome: its weakness may have a weakening deficiency, as to all the graces and duties which should be strengthened by it. Who knows how soon a temptation from satan, or infidels, or our own dark hearts, may assault us, which will not, without such evidence and resolving light, be overcome? Yet many that try, reason, and dispute most, have not the strongest, or most powerful faith. My thoughts of this have had this issue. There is a great difference between that light which shows us the thing itself, and that artificial skill by which we have right notions, names, definitions, and formed arguments, and answers to objections. This artificial, logical, organical, kind of knowledge is good and useful in its kind, if right; like speech itself: but he that hath much of this, may have little of the former : unlearned persons that have little of this, may have more of the former, and may have those inward perceptions of the vanity of the promises and rewards of God, which they cannot bring forth into artificial reasonings to themselves or others; who are taught of God by the effective sort of teaching, which reaches the heart or will, as well as the understanding, and is a giving of what is taught, and a making us such as we are told we must be. Who finds not need to pray hard for this effective teaching of God, when he hath got all organical knowledge, words and arguments in themselves most apt, at his finger ends, as we say? When I can prove the truth of the word of God, and the life to come, with the most convincing, undeniable reasons, I feel need to cry and pray daily to God to increase my faith, and to give me that light which may satisfy the soul, and reach the end. Yet man being a rational creature, is not taught by mere instinct and inspiration: therefore this effective teaching of God doth ordinarily suppose a rational, objective, organical teaching and knowledge. The foresaid unlearned Christians are convinced by good evidence, that God's word is true, and his rewards are sure, though they have but a confused conception of this evidence, and cannot word it, nor reduce it to fit notions. To drive these that have fundamental evidence, unseasonably and hastily to dispute their faith, and so to puzzle them by words and artificial objections, is but to hurt them, by setting the artificial, organical, lower part, (which is the body of knowledge) against the real light and perception of the thing (which is as the soul), even as carnal men set the creatures against God, that should lead us to God; so do they by logical, artificial knowledge. But they that are prepared for such disputes, and furnished with all artificial helps, may make good use of them for defending and clear The soul is a substance: for that which is nothing, can do nothing; but it doth move, understand and will. No man will deny that this is done by something in us, and by some substance; and that substance is it which we call the soul: it is not nothing, and it is within us. As to them that say, It is the temperament of several parts united, I have elsewhere fully confuted them, and proved that it is some one part that is the agent on the rest, which all they confess that think it to be the material spirits, or fiery part: it is not bones and flesh that understand, but a purer substance, as all acknowledge. What part soever it be, it can do no more than it is able to do: a conjunction of many parts, of which no one hath the power of vitality, or volition, formally or eminently can never by contemperation do those acts: for there can be no more in the effect than is in the cause, otherwise it were no effect. ing up the truth to themselves and others; so be it they use them as a means to the due end, and in a right manner, and set them not up against, or instead of the real and effective light. But the revealed and necessary part must here be distinguished from the unrevealed and unnecessary. To study till we as clearly as may be understand the certainty of a future happiness, and wherein it consists, in the sight of God's glory, and in perfect, holy, mutual love, in union with Christ, and all the blessed, this is of great use to our holiness and peace. But when we will know more than God would have us, it doth but tend, as gazing on the sun, to make us blind, and to doubt of certainties, because we cannot be resolved of uncertainties. To trouble our heads too much in thinking how souls out of the body subsist and act, sensitively or not, by organs, or without; how far they are one, and how far still individuate, in what place they still remain, and where is their paradise or heaven; how they shall be again united to the body; whether by their own emission, as the sun-beams touch their objects here; and whether the body shall be restored, as the consumed flesh of restored sick men, or only from the old materials: a hundred of these questions are better left to the knowledge of Christ, lest we but foolishly make snares for our-ed by a sensitive soul, it would be no music or selves. Had all these been needful to us, they had been revealed. In respect to all such curiosities and needless knowledge, it is a believer's wisdom implicitly to trust his soul to Christ, and to be satisfied that he knows what we know not, and to fear that vain, vexatious knowledge, or inquisitiveness into good and evil, which is selfish, and savours of a distrust of God, and is that sin, and fruit of sin, which the learned world too little fears. The vanity of their objections, that tell us, a lute, a watch, a book, perform that by co-operation, which no one part can do, I have elsewhere manifested. Many strings indeed have many motions, and so have many effects on the ear, and imagination, which in us are sound and harmony: but all is but a percussion of the air by the strings, and were not that motion receiv melody; so that there is nothing done but what each part had power to do. But intellect and volition are not the united motions of all parts of the body, receiving their form in a nobler, intellectual nature, as the sound of the strings makes melody in man: if it were so, that receptive nature still would be as excellent as the effect imports. The watch or clock doth but move according to the action of the spring or poise; but that it moves in such an order as becomes to man a That God is the rewarder of them that dili-sign and measure of time, this is from man who gently seek him, and that holy souls shall be in orders it to that use. But there is nothing in the blessedness with Christ, these following evi-motion but what the parts have their power to dences conjoined do evince; on which my soul raises its hopes. The soul, which is an immortal spirit, must be immortally in a good or bad condition: but man's soul is an immortal spirit, and the good are not in a bad condition. Its immortality is proved thus: A spiritual, or most pure, invisible substance, naturally endowed with the power, virtue, or faculty of vital action and volition, which is not annihilated, nor destroyed by separation of parts, nor ceases or loses either its power, species, individuality or action, is an immortal spirit. But such is the soul of man, as shall be manifested by what follows. cause: that it signifies the hour of the day to us, is no action, but an object used by a rational soul as it can use the shadow of a tree or house, that yet doth nothing. So a book doth nothing at all, but is merely an objective ordination of passive signs, by which man's active intellect can understand what the writer did intend; so that here is nothing done beyond the power of the agent, nor any thing in the effect which was not in the cause, either formally or eminently. But for a company of atoms, of which no one hath sense or reason, to become sensitive and rational by mere united motion, is an effect beyond the power of the supposed cause. But as some think so lowly of our noblest acts, as to think that contempered, agitated atoms can perform them, that have no natural intellect or sensitive virtue or power in themselves, so others think so highly of them, as to take them to be the acts only of God, or some universal soul, in the body of man; and so that there is no life, sense, or reason in the world, but God himself or such an universal soul; and so that either every man is God, as to his soul, or that it is the body only that is to be called man, as distinct from God. But this is the self-ensnaring and self-perplexing temerity of busy, bold and arrogant heads, that know not their own capacity and measure. On the like reasons they must at last come, with others, to say, that all passive matter also is God, and that God is the universe, consisting of an active soul and passive body. As if God were no cause, and could make nothing, or nothing with life, or sense, or reason. But why depart we from things certain, by such presumptions as these? Is it not certain that there are lower creatures in the world than men or angels? Is it not certain that one man is not another? Is it not certain that some men are in torment of body and mind? And will it be a comfort to a man in such torment to tell him that he is God, or that he is part of a universal soul? Would not a man on the rack, or in the stone, or other misery, say, 'call me by what name you please, that eases not my pain: if I be a part of God, or a universal soul, I am sure I am a tormented, miserable part! And if you could make me believe that God hath some parts which are not serpents, devils, or wicked or tormented men, you must give me other senses, and perceptive powers, before it will comfort me, to hear that I am not such a part. If God had wicked and tormented parts on earth, why may he not have such, and I be one of them, hereafter? and if I be a holy and happy part of God, or of a universal soul on earth, why may not I hope to be such hereafter?' We deny not but that God is the continued first cause of all being whatsoever; and that the branches and fruit depend not as effects so much on the causality of the stock and roots, as the creature doth on God; and that it is an impious conceit to think that the world, or any part of it, is a Being independent, and separated totally from God, or subsisting without his continued causation. But cannot God cause as a creator, by making that which is not himself? This yields the self-deceiver no other honour or happiness but what equally belongs to a devil, to a fly or to a worm! As man's soul is a substance, so is it a substance distinguished formally from all inferior substances, by an innate, power, virtue, or faculty, of vital action, intellect, and free-will: for we find all these acts performed by it, as motion, light, and heat are by the fire or sun. If any should think that these actions are like those of a musician, compounded of the agents, the several principal and organical parts; could he prove it, no more would follow but that the lower powers, the sensitive or spirits, are to the higher as a passive organ, receiving its operations; and that the intellectual soul hath the power of causing intellection and volition by its action on the inferior parts, as a man can cause such motions of his lute, as shall be melody, not to it, but to himself; and consequently, that as music is but a lower operation of man, whose proper acts of intellection and volition are above it, so intellection and volition in the body are not the noblest acts of the soul, but are performed by an eminent power, which can do greater things. If this could be proved, what would it tend to the unbeliever's ends, or to the disadvantage of our hopes and comforts. That man's soul at death is not annihilated, even the Atomists and Epicureans will grant, who think that no atom in the universe is annihilated: and we that see not only the sun and heavens continued, but every grain of matter, and that compounds are changed by dissolution of parts, and rarefaction, or migration, &c. and not by annihilation,-have no reason to dream that God will annihilate one soul (though he can do it if he please, yea, and annihilate all the world :) it is a thing beyond a rational expectation. A destruction by the dissolution of the parts of the soul, we need not fear. For, either an intellectual spirit is divisible, or not; if not, we need not fear it if it be, either it is a thing that nature tends to, or not: but that nature doth not tend to it, is evident. There is naturally so strange and strong an inclination to unity, and averseness to separation in all things, that even earth and stones, that have no other natural motion, have yet an aggregative motion in their gravitation: but if you will separate the parts from the rest, it must be by force. Water is yet more averse to partition without force, and more inclined to union than earth, and air than water, and fire than air, so he that will cut a sun-beam into pieces, and make many of one, must be an extraordinary agent. Surely spirits, even intellectual spirits, will be no less averse to partition, and inclined to keep their unity, than fire or a sun-beam is ; so that naturally it is not | and cease their acts, though they lose not their a thing to be feared, that it should fall into powers. pieces. He that will say, that the God of nature will change and overcome the nature that he hath made, must give us good proofs of it, or it is not to be feared. If he should do it as a punishment, we must find such a punishment somewhat threatened, either in his natural or supernatural law, which we do not, and therefore need not fear it. But if it were to be feared, that souls were partible, and would be broken into parts, this would be no destruction of them, either as to their substance, powers, form or actions, but only a breaking of one soul into many: for being not compounded of heterogeneous parts, but as simple elements of homogeneous only, as every atom of earth is earth, and every drop of water in the sea is water, and every particle of air and fire is air and fire, and have all the properties of earth, water, air and fire; so would it be with every particle of an intellectual spirit. But who can see cause to dream of such a partition never threatened by God. That souls lose not their formal powers or virtues, we have great reason to conceive; because they are their natural essence, not as mixed, but simple substances: though some imagine that the passive elements may by attenuation be transmuted one into another, yet we see that earth is still earth, water is water, and air is air; and their conceit hath no proof: were it proved, it would but prove that none of these are a first or proper element. But what should an intellectual spirit be changed into; how should it lose its formal power? Not by nature; for its nature hath nothing that tends to deterioration, or decay, or self-destruction? The sun doth not decay by its wonderful motion, light and heat: why should spirits? Not by God's destroying them, or changing their nature; for, though all things are in constant motion or revolution, he continues the natures of the simple beings, and shows us, that he delights in a constancy of operations, insomuch that hence Aristotle thought the world eternal. God hath made no law that threatens to do it as a penalty. Therefore to dream that intellectual spirits shall be turned into other things, and lose their essential, formal powers, which specify them, is without and against all sober reason. Let them first but prove that the sun loses motion, light and heat, and is turned into air, or water, or earth. Such changes are beyond a rational fear. former. But this is more unreasonable than the For it must be remembered that it is not a mere obedient, passive power that we speak of; but an active power consisting in as great an inclination to act, as passive natures have to forbear actions. So that if such a nature act not, it must be because its natural inclination is hindered by a stronger: who shall hinder it? God would not continue an active power, force and inclination in nature, and forcibly hinder the operation of that nature which he himself continues, unless penalty for some special cause, which he never gave us any notice of by any threatening, but the contrary. Objects will not be wanting, for all the world will be still at hand, and God above all. It is therefore an unreasonable conceit to think that God will continue an active, vital, intellectual nature, form, power, force, inclination, in a noble substance, which shall use none of these for many hundred or thousand years, and so continue them in vain. It is rather to be thought that some action is their constant state, without which the cessation of their very form would be inferred. But all that can be said with reason is, that separated souls, and souls hereafter in spiritual bodies, will have actions of another mode, and very different from these that we now perceive in flesh. Be it so. They will yet be radically of the same kind, and they will be formally or eminently such as we now call vitality, intellect and volition; and they will be no lower or less excellent, if not far more; and then what the difference will be, Christ knows whom I trust, and in season I shall know. But to talk of a dead life, and an inactive activity, or a sleeping soul, is fitter for a sleeping than a waking man. It is true that diseases or hurts do now hinder the soul's intellectual perceptions in the body, and in infancy and sleep they are imperfect. Which proves indeed that the acts commonly called intellectual and volition, have now something in them also of sensation, and that sensitive operations are diversified by the organs of the several senses. And that bare intellect and volition without any sensation is now scarcely to be observed in us, though the soul may have such acts intrinsically, and in its profundity. For it is now so united to this body, that it acts on it, as our form; and indeed the acts observed by us cannot be denied to be such as are specified or modified at least by the agents, and the recipients, and sub-agents' parts But some men dream that souls shall sleep, united. But as the sun would certainly do the |