ing the Prussians in his own front more numerous than he expected, Napoleon sent the formal orders through Soult for Ney to fall upon the Prussian right as soon as he had beaten Wellington. If it were to be admitted that Laurent or Labédoyère, who carried the first despatch, meeting or overtaking the 1st corps en route to Frasne, took upon himself, as the best interpreter of Napoleon's order, to direct it at once upon St. Amand, all the statements are reconciled. For, on that supposition, D'Erlon would have marched in obedience to what he believed to be a direct order from Napoleon. Hearing that the 1st corps had arrived, although in a quarter where it was unlooked for, Napoleon would have inferred from its presence on the field, that Ney had been successful without it, and would hastily conclude that D'Erlon would act forthwith on the Prussian right. Ney, having Soult's actual words, would be surprised at the conduct of the staff officer, and putting the true construction on the written order, would see the error committed by that officer and endeavour instantly to repair it by recalling the first corps. D'Erlon, receiving no orders from the aide-de-camp sent by Napoleon to communicate with him on the field, would naturally obey the mandate of Ney, his immediate superior, retrace his steps, and hasten back to Frasne.1

In this conjectural explanation Ney is exonerated from the blame Napoleon showers upon him, and D'Erlon appears in the light of a weak man overcome by a sense of responsibility, and attracted hither and thither by the influence of his two superiors. Napoleon, even in the

1 Prince Edouard de la Tour d'Auvergne, whose object in writing an account of the Campaign is to answer Charras and Quinet, and excuse while he exalts Napoleon, has put forward the most fantastic theory on this subject, for the purpose of throwing all the blame upon D'Erlon. It is an ingenious attempt, but will not bear a close examination.

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opinion of Jomini, his admirer, is held to have committed a manifest fault," in neglecting to send a positive order to D'Erlon-who," by the happy error of an aide-de-camp," had arrived so opportunely-to march at once upon Bry. But the primary error at the bottom of all was that earlier one committed by Napoleon, when he formed such a contemptuous estimate of the activity and resources of Wellington.

THE

CHAPTER VII.

THE RETREAT OF THE 17TH OF JUNE.

§ 1. Wellington's Activity.

HE silence of the night of the 16th at Quatre Bras was only broken by the tramp of the British cavalry, as they rode into the rear of the position by the Nivelles road. Wellington slept at Genappe, where he had his headquarters, and at daybreak on the 17th he rose and galloped off to Quatre Bras. After inspecting the outposts he took instant measures to ascertain the exact line of retreat of the Prussians, whose defeat, but not the extent of whose defeat, had been communicated to him during the preceding night, and also to find out the intentions of the French Emperor.

Napoleon, at the close of the battle of Ligny, had retired to Fleurus. As we have described already, he made no pursuit whatever, but left his army to bivouac on the ground it had so dearly won. Here, amid the heaps of killed and wounded, the hardy warriors of France reposed, and when the day dawned the Prussian army had disappeared, no Frenchman knew exactly whither. The rearguards of Ziethen were, indeed, still close at hand, and Thielemann's lengthened column had only just filed off upon the cross-road leading to Gembloux; but, excepting a few horsemen here and there, and the dead and wounded

on the ground, nothing was seen of the Prussian army. The Prussians were far on the road to Wavre before the French battalions were astir, and, ere Napoleon made any movement, the whole of the Prussian army, except the rear half of Thielemann's corps, was united at Wavre. Within an hour of daybreak Captain Charles Wood, who had patrolled along the Namur road, reported to the Duke the retreat of the Prussians, and Colonel Gordon, with Grey's troop of the 10th Hussars, during the night, communicated with General Ziethen, then on his way to Wavre. At this time not a single French patrol had crossed the Namur road; a proof in itself, if any were needed, of the limited success of Napoleon's action on the 16th. In fact, on the evening of that day he held, in relation to Blucher, a position similar to that Wellington held in relation to Ney-he occupied the field of battle; and on the morning of the 17th the difference was this,-Blucher had retreated in the night, whereas Ney remained close to the battlefield, and Wellington held the ground he had won from his adversary. But while in the morning Napoleon thought of devoting the day to the refreshment of his army, at an early hour Wellington, amply instructed of the movements of the Prussians, and in direct communication with them, had resolved to retreat upon Mont St. Jean. The reason for these different determinations was, that Napoleon, as he had done throughout the campaign, acted upon conjecture, while his rival would not move a corporal's guard until he had certain information. We shall see that Napoleon spent the morning in doubt and hesitation; and that his inactivity was caused by the astonishing ignorance in which he allowed himself to conduct his affairs. He persistently violated his own maxim, that war is not a conjectural art.

§ 2. Napoleon at Fleurus and Ligny.

Napoleon was still at Fleurus at eight o'clock on the 17th. No general reconnaissance along the front had been ordered; but a division of cavalry, and one of infantry, with a brigade of dragoons in support, the whole commanded by Pajol, had been sent down the main road towards Namur, because, apparently, it had been "conjectured" that the Prussians would retire to Liége. The conjecture was confirmed into belief when Napoleon learned that Pajol had captured a Prussian battery near Mazy. About the same time, Count Flahault rejoined Napoleon from Ney's head-quarters at Frasne, and related the issue of the fight at Quatre Bras, the first intelligence of that battle which the French Emperor had received. Yet eleven hours had elapsed since the last gun was fired, and Frasne is only nine miles from Fleurus. Colonel Charras justly remarks that the carelessness is equal on both sides; for Ney had not been informed of the issue of the battle of Ligny, and he only obtained the information from a despatch which Napoleon then directed Soult to transmit to Frasne.

In this despatch Napoleon describes the defeat of the Prussians as a rout, and states that Pajol was pursuing them on the road to Namur and Liége. That being so, it was impossible that Wellington could act in Ney's front. If, however, he did, the Emperor, marching along the main road, would fall upon Wellington's left rear, while Ney assailed him in front. Napoleon then formally orders Ney to take up the position of Quatre Bras, "if only occupied by a rear-guard;" if otherwise occupied, Ney was to give the Emperor instant and detailed information, so that he might act. Ney is informed that "the whole day would be required to terminate this operation, complete the

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