army trop à gauche; for the point of concentration of the most distant corps was Liége, on the Meuse, upwards of fifty miles, as the crow flies, from Fleurus. The Prussian army was divided into four corps, each a complete army in itself, being composed of four brigades of infantry, with a due proportion of cavalry and artillery. The 1st, commanded by General von Ziethen, stood on the right; the 2nd, under General Pirch, in the right centre; the 3rd, under General von Thielemann, on the left centre, thrown forward over the Meuse; and the 4th, under Count Bülow, on the left. The point of concentration for the 4th corps was Liége, and the brigades of the corps were posted chiefly on the north and west of head-quarters. The 3rd corps occupied the country between the Meuse and the Ourte, having its head-quarters at Ciney, midway between the two rivers, and one brigade at Huy, on the Meuse. The outposts were extended southward towards the frontier as far as Rochefort and Dinant. The 2nd corps had its headquarters at Namur; its brigades occupied the road from that place towards Louvain, but one brigade was at Huy. The outposts were on the left bank of the Meuse, the most advanced being at Sossoye, communicating on its left with Thielemann, and on its right with Ziethen. The 1st corps occupied the line of the Sambre from Thuin on the right bank to Moustier sur Sambre on the left. The head-quarters were at Charleroi. One brigade was in and around Fontaine l'Evêque, a second at Marchienne au Pont, a third at Fleurus, and the fourth in Moustier sur Sambre. The cavalry and reserve artillery were in Sombref and Gembloux. The outposts followed the Sambre from Lobbes and Thuin to Charleroi, and thence extended through Gerpinnes across the angle formed by the Sambre and Meuse towards Sossoye. Thus the Prussian right overlapped the British left, for Ziethen's detachments were posted close to Binche in communication with the Dutch-Belgian divisions cantoned on the Haine. Ziethen occupied, therefore, both sides of the road from Charleroi to Brussels, covering the British posts at Frasne, Quatre Bras, and Genappe on that road. Blucher had his head-quarters at Liége, and it is admitted that, orders being promptly obeyed, the whole Prussian army might have been collected in twenty-four hours, either at Ciney, Fleurus, Namur, or Liége. Wellington himself admits that he could not have assembled his army so quickly, but he contends that the objects he had in view, the nature of the country he had to protect, tiguous in its whole extent to the French frontier, and traversed in all parts by excellent paved roads leading from some one or other of the French fortresses, required a system of occupation quite different from that adopted" by the Prussian generals. 66 con Every one can judge for himself the force of the Duke's remark. The Prussians, in truth, were less exposed than the British, and their communications were less easily assailed. They were supported on both flanks-by the British on their right, and by the allied armies assembling on their left; while the British force formed the extreme right flank of the great armies of the coalition, and might have been assailed at various points by the whole weight of the French army. Except in so far as they serve to exercise the ingenuity of the critic these discussions are sterile. The Allies in Belgium were not cantoned by chance: it was their duty to preserve intact certain great political and military interests, and they were posted systematically that they might cope with any contingency. The arrangements adopted were so good that they were able to meet and frustrate an enemy, free to choose his own time and mode of attack. They, therefore, answered their purpose. § 3. Preparations and Projects. Practically, from the very first moment the Allies were obliged to be on their guard. Wellington was no sooner established in Belgium than he took measures to induce the Prussian general to draw towards Brussels and take up quarters between Charleroi and Huy, in order that, if need were, the two armies should be in a position to assemble "in front" of the capital of Belgium. The Prince of Orange and General Kleist had talked of concentrating at Tirlemont; but Wellington, from the very first, insisted that Brussels ought not to be abandoned. The Allied Armies in the Low Countries, he said, covered the assembly of the troops of the Allied Powers. The former were bound, at this stage, to act on the defensive, because they had to wait for a plan of operations and a signal to attack from the sovereigns at Vienna. Although at that early period there were French forces of unknown magnitude assembled behind the screen of French fortresses, Wellington felt the utmost confidence in his ability to defeat them should they avail themselves of the initiative and attack. To facilitate communication with the Prussians, and promote his views, he sent Sir Henry Hardinge to their head-quarters. While adopting a defensive system Wellington did not overlook the chances of immediate offensive warfare. He calculated that the Allies could enter France on the 1st of May with 270,000 men: his own troops, the Prussians, and the AustroBavarians; and he estimated that at this period Napoleon would not have more than 180,000 disposable for service in the field. His reason for suggesting instant war was that by adopting this course the Allies would anticipate "the plans and measures of Buonaparte." 'His power now rests," he contended, "upon no foundation but the army,” a statement often disputed then and since, but one which events proved to be sagacious and well founded. But Napoleon's energy rendered the plan of Wellington abortive. His despotic action worked more swiftly and decisively than the vast unwieldy machine opposed to him; and Wellington found reason, two days after he devised his scheme of invasion, to reverse his opinion, and declare that circumstances no longer rendered it advisable to attempt its execution. The circumstances referred to were the capitulation of the Duke of Angoulême, the organization of the grenadier battalions of the National Guard, and the call for soldiers recently discharged, 100,000 of whom, Wellington calculated, would join the French army. These measures brought the forces of the Allies and Napoleon too nearly on a numerical equality to make invasion prudent. Wellington had a wise respect for the abilities of Napoleon, and the habit of not underrating his adversary proved as useful to him as the contrary habit proved injurious to Napoleon. The 1st of May arrived and with it false reports of the march of the Imperial Guard, and of the intention of Bonaparte to visit the frontier. Yet uncertain of their value, Wellington issued the first orders directing a concentration of the cantonments of the troops. Informing the Earl of Uxbridge of this order, he said that "all dispositions were so made that the whole army could be collected in one short movement, with the Prussians on his left." The line of operations which he deemed it probable that the French would select was either between the Lys and Scheldt, or between the Scheldt and Sambre, or by both, and for each contingency he was prepared. This order alone shows that Wellington was never for one moment in a position where he could be surprised, providing he obtained from the outposts prompt informa E tion of the enemy's movements. He had personally inspected the whole line of defence from Ostend to Mons, and his military study of Belgium in 1814 had made him familiar not only with its strong, but its weak places. He was therefore "ready to move in every direction," and his ally, Blucher, had taken the same precaution, on his side. The very situation in which they were placed rendered caution, vigilance, and good arrangements necessary; for, up to the moment when Napoleon attacked, the Allies were compelled to remain on the defensive, close to a frontier over which their patrols could not pass, behind which an enemy might suddenly collect at any point, from which he might strike an equally sudden blow. They were, on the 14th of June, performing the duty described by Wellington on the 5th of April-covering the assembly of armies on the Rhine, protecting large political interests in Belgium, maintaining and securing their communications with England and Germany, and waiting for the signal from Vienna to break through the barrier into France. Generals in such a situation would be madmen if they slumbered at their posts; and assuredly neither Wellington nor Blucher shut their eyes or ears. Both obtained tolerably accurate intelligence, but manifestly not so precise as that which could have been gathered up had their patrols hovered close upon the enemy's cantonments. "In the situation," wrote Wellington to the Prince of Orange, on the 11th of May, "in which we are placed at present, neither at peace nor at war, unable on that account to patrol up to the enemy and ascertain his position by view, or to act offensively upon any part of his line, it is difficult, if not impossible, to combine an operation, because there are no data on which to found any combination. All we can do is put our troops in such a situation as, in case of sudden attack by the enemy, to render it easy to assemble, |