meet it? He has stated that, on the 2nd of April, when Wellington was hastening from Vienna to the Low Countries, he might have occupied Brussels. No doubt such an exploit was possible, but a little reflection showed him that it would not be wise. For he admits that to achieve possession of the capital of Belgium he must have taken the regular troops out of the garrisons, and have confided the care of the strong places to the local National Guards. It was precisely these local troops whom he could not trust, for there were numerous partisans of the Bourbons in Picardy and Flanders. Moreover, Napoleon had loudly declared that peace with the world was his most ardent desire, and at the moment no doubt it was. France, too, desired peace, and thus the Emperor dared not invade Belgium in April; first, because he had not the means; next, because he would have too roughly, and abruptly, and flagrantly, set at nought the professions he deemed it expedient to parade before a wearied nation when he reascended the throne. Nor was this all; he thought that, by delaying hostilities, he might break up the coalition; and, by assuming the airs of an injured man, and presenting himself in the character of vindicator of national independence, he hoped, at least, to furnish arguments to his friends in the British Parliament. By his intrigues he aspired to shake the resolution of Austria and to detach Russia; by his hypocritical moderation he hoped to embarrass the British Government, perhaps help to bring their opponents into office. Then delay would afford him invaluable time to make those preparations which we have already described.

Hence he deferred hostilities. But his illusions were soon dispelled. The conduct of the Allies, and the vast scale of their counter-preparations compelled him to admit that his open appeals and secret intrigues had failed. On

the other side of the frontier the armed hosts were increasing as fast as the men could march. In a few weeks the signal would be given, and these hosts, overstepping the frontiers, would converge in dense columns upon Paris. It was plain to him that he was isolated in Europe, with nothing to depend on but himself and his army.

Then came the questions, should he act on the defensive, abandoning Flanders, Picardy, Artois, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Burgundy, and Dauphiny, and basing himself upon Paris and Lyons, (which by the end of July he thought would be completely fortified,) wage a vigorous and defensive war; or should he forestall the Allies by striking at Wellington and Blucher before the Austrians and Russians were ready to march? Napoleon himself has set forth, with great minuteness, the advantages of the first course. He estimates that the Allies could not have appeared before Paris and Lyons until the middle of August; that by this time their force would have been reduced to 450,000 men on the Seine and 100,000 before Lyons; that his own troops of every description would have increased, and would continue to increase every day; and that independently of the garrison of the intrenched camp of Paris (116,000 men), he would have had 240,000 choice troops, wherewith to manœuvre on both banks of the Seine and the Marne. Napoleon dared not adopt this plan, which seemed to present so many chances of ultimate success. Had he at that moment commanded the unhesitating devotion of France, as he commanded the absolute devotion of the army, it might have been practicable. But the popular feeling would have been turned against him, and even his immense influence over the army would have been weakened, had he abandoned the frontier departments. His relations with Europe were under political interdict; his relations with the constitutional and repub

lican factions were so strained that he was compelled to escape from them by having recourse to action.

Hence he determined to wind up his political affairs in Paris, and adopting the second plan, to fall upon the nearest corps of the Allies. This he held to be more conformable to the genius of the nation, and the spirit and principle of the war; for France is neither like Russia nor Spain. On the supposition that the Allies could not begin hostilities until the 15th of July, he determined to begin on the 15th of June. He hoped to collect 140,000 men in Flanders; to defeat the Anglo-Belgic and Prussian armies; raise the Belgian people and recruit the French from the Belgian army; and then, reinforced by the 5th corps (Rapp's) and by supplies of men from the depôts, to meet the Austrians and Russians and fight them in Dumouriez's old battle-field, Champagne. He regarded it as a probable result, that the defeat of Wellington would entail the fall of the British Government, which would be replaced, he thought, by the friends of peace; if so, this single event, he said, would terminate the war. It will be seen how full of errors were the premises on which Napoleon built up this prospect of success. He had friends in Belgium, but not more than Louis XVIII. had in French Flanders, nay, in Paris, and very few of the Bonapartists were in the Belgian Army; while it is now abundantly clear that the British nation was never, during the whole course of the struggle, so unanimously and so heartily in favour of prosecuting the war against Napoleon. The picture which the Emperor has drawn of himself as the Liberator of Nations stands out in rude contrast to the fact that the nations were sending every adult male they could spare to strike down and secure the self-styled liberator himself.

Napoleon, determined to begin the war without delay, had next to choose his line of operations. He knew from

his spies how widely the Allies were spread over the Low Countries. He was aware that the two armies had two distinct and divergent bases, and were commanded by two generals differing materially in character. His only chance of success lay in swift marches and crushing victories. To win these victories he must defeat his foes in detail, and though his aggregate force was weaker than their aggregate force, yet he must contrive to be always the stronger at the point of contact. Therefore, he argued, that he must neither attack between the Moselle and the Meuse, because that course would allow Wellington to join Blucher without molestation; nor must he attack between the Sambre and Scheldt, because in that case Blucher would be able to effect a junction with Wellington. Nor, and for similar reasons, did he deem it prudent to descend the Meuse and attack Namur. The fact that the Allies would require the longest time to concentrate on their inner flanks did not escape him. He, therefore, determined to attack between the Sambre and Meuse. He calculated that if he struck at the centre of the two armies he should be able to wedge himself in between them, crushing any divisions which attempted to obstruct his progress, and having won a position of vantage he imagined that it would be in his power to manœuvre with rapidity from side to side, and defeat each army in succession. With unbounded con-fidence, nourished by the recollection of 1814, he determined to fling himself into the midst of his foes, and by risking, with consummate daring if not consummate skill, the highest stake he had upon the first throw, he hoped to win the favour of fortune and lessen the chances against ultimate success by disabling his two most redoubtable adversaries. It was in this frame of mind that he resolved. on immediate war, and devised the brilliant scheme where-by he intended to bring victory back to the eagles.

N

CHAPTER IV.

THE INVASION OF BELGIUM.

§ 1. Concentration of the French Army.

APOLEON'S first operation was a masterpiece. He rapidly concentrated, between the Sambre and the Meuse, nearly 130,000 men, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th corps d'armée, commanded respectively by D'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, and Lobau, of the Imperial Guard, and of four corps of reserve cavalry.

At the beginning of June the corps of D'Erlon, Reille, and Vandamme were in cantonments on the northern frontier between Lille near the Scheldt and Mézières on the Meuse, the connecting links being Rocroi, Avesnes, Maubeuge, and Valenciennes. Every road on the frontier was strictly and closely guarded, and every precaution was taken to prevent Wellington and Blucher from obtaining correct information. Yet early in June both were pretty well aware what posts were occupied by each corps, by whom they were commanded, and their probable strength. In rear of these three corps stood Lobau at Laon, where Soult, temporarily in command of the whole, had his headquarters. The four corps of cavalry, commanded by Pajol, Excelmans, Kellerman, and Milhaud, about to be placed under the orders of Marshal Grouchy, were cantoned between Laon and Avesnes. The artillery park was