on the basis of this report Wellington concentrated his divisions.

66

The next error is a very curious one. Wellington had ordered Alten to march upon Nivelles, provided certain news were received of the attack of the French on the inner flanks of the Allies. Charras interprets this qualification to apply to Chassé and Perponcher, as well as to Alten, and says that Wellington no longer followed out the plan agreed to between himself and Blucher, but desired to withdraw the few troops he had upon the Brussels and Charleroi road, even in case the attack were directed" against the Prussian right and the British left. This is a misunderstanding of the terms of the order of movement, and especially of the qualification which applied solely to Alten. But the criticism goes further. Wellington ordered the Dutch-Belgian divisions to assemble at Nivelles on the faith of the meagre information of the attack on Thuin. We have shown that the common belief among the superior officers at Brussels, on the evening of the 15th, was that Napoleon would come on by Binche. But at Nivelles and Braine le Comte the staff had more certain and fuller information by five or six o'clock, and when Perponcher disobeyed the order to concentrate upon Nivelles, and carried his second brigade to reinforce Prince Bernhard at Quatre Bras, he did certainly what Wellington would have done had he been at Nivelles or Braine le Comte. General Constant de Rebecque, chief of the staff to the Prince of Orange, deserves credit for directing, at an early hour, the assembly of the brigades of Chassé and Perponcher; but even at two o'clock he did not venture to place more than one brigade at Quatre Bras, the brigade already there. He detained one brigade at Nivelles; he placed Chassé's whole division at its place of assembly, Fayt-lez-Seneffe; and

Callaert's cavalry behind the Haine, that is, in the direction of Binche and Maubeuge. Perponcher deserves credit for taking on himself the responsibility of moving his second brigade to Quatre Bras, instead of obeying the order of concentration upon Nivelles. But it must be remembered that Perponcher absolutely knew that a strong force was at Frasne, whereas Wellington, when he issued the order of concentration, only knew that Thuin had been attacked. When we give great praise to commanders of divisions and brigades for assembling their men in the face of the enemy without waiting for a formal order, we praise them for executing the especial business which they were appointed to perform. We do nothing

more.

The criticism of Colonel Charras on the conduct of Wellington during the 15th is influenced throughout by the knowledge Colonel Charras had of the actual movements of Napoleon. The conduct of Wellington was dictated by the knowledge Wellington had of the movements of Napoleon; and we have seen that it was not until ten or eleven o'clock in the evening that full information reached the head-quarters at Brussels. The degree to which the knowledge of the movements of Napoleon influenced Colonel Charras is shown in his violent assertion that Wellington should have transferred his headquarters to Braine le Comte or Nivelles on the morning of the 15th, that is, before he knew that the French army had made any movement in any direction whatever!

These considerations show that there is no accurate military criticism, except that which rests on a clear chronological conception of events; and no correct method of writing military history, except that which enables the writer to shut his eyes to the future, and to fix his whole attention resolutely and impartially on the present.

It may be an open question to this day whether Wellington's disposition of his army in cantonments was good or bad, but it can no longer be doubted that his movements on the 15th were sound and judicious, and such as were warranted by the information he received from time to time. The explanation of the delay in the transmission of the Duke's orders, for delay there was, has never been afforded us to this day (1864). Not one divisional commander should have been, at a later hour than 4 A.M. on the 16th, without orders to march. explanation, perhaps, lies in the defective staff arrangements, or it may be some mismanagement of the letter parties and relays. The Horse Guards of 1815 did not supply the Duke with the best kind of men for his staff.

The

TH

CHAPTER V.

THE MORNING OF THE 16TH OF JUNE.

§ 1. Napoleon: Charleroi and Fleurus.

HE French army was aroused from its slumbers at daybreak on the 16th. The troops still occupied the positions we have described. The sun rose, and the hours sped on, but no order of movement came from the imperial head-quarters. Six o'clock arrived, seven struck. The army remained motionless, except that, in the Prussian front, Grouchy and his outposts were on the alert, eagerly watching the gathering of masses of troops above the plain of Fleurus. It is written that the old soldiers, and there were many in the army of Napoleon, stood in not mute astonishment at this inactivity. We have shown that Napoleon, his wearied troops having rested for five hours, might have concentrated, one mass near Fleurus, and another in front of Gosselies, by five in the morning. Yet at seven, some say at eight, not a man had moved from the bivouac of the preceding night.

This inactivity is admitted to be one of the puzzles of the campaign. Napoleon, whose motions were wont to be so swift, was now a laggard. He who the day before had pushed on his columns for five-and-twenty miles, now left them to fret in their bivouacs, and wonder at the delay of

the Emperor. It is the more remarkable because the several corps had been ordered to hold themselves ready to march at any moment after two.

Whatever may be the explanation of Napoleon's conduct it must be found in the facts or not at all. In this search the "Memoirs of St. Helena" afford no aid. Napoleon has not deigned to account for the use he made of his time on the morning of the 16th, but has rapidly passed over that important period, not without stating in a few lines much that is untrue, and entirely without a hint as to his own delay, or the causes thereof. Those causes must be sought elsewhere.

It will be remembered that Ney, when he quitted Frasne, passed through Gosselies and rode on to Charleroi. Here he found Napoleon where we left him on his return from Gilly, but somewhat recovered from his fatigue, and taking supper. Ney sat with him until two o'clock in the morning. It may be assumed that they conversed much during the period of Ney's visit. What was the substance of their conversation? This is precisely what no one can now tell

us.

That Ney rendered an account of the position of his advanced troops on the Brussels road is a matter of course. He must also have referred to the occupation of Gosselies by Foy and Jerome; to the position of D'Erlon, between Jumet and Marchienne, and to the fact that Kellerman was still on the right bank of the Sambre. Nor could he have neglected to describe the kind of resistance he met with at Frasne, to frame some estimate of the number of the troops opposed to him, and to point out how dangerously far in advance of the Emperor was the column on the road to Brussels. But this is all conjecture. An ingenious French author 2 has imagined the nature of the conversa1 Heymés: "Relation de la Campagne de 1815." 2 Edgar Quinet.