attended by a small staff, along the whole line of vedettes which covered the front of his divisions. More than an hour was spent in satisfying himself of the reality of the spectacle before him, and in forming a conception of the position occupied by the enemy. While he was thus engaged, his army, in obedience to his orders, formed in order of battle. Vandamme stood in front of Fleurus, with the division of Girard in his rear. Gérard's corps was posted in the centre, on the right of Fleurus, and on his right the two cavalry corps commanded by Pajol and Excelmans. The whole of the Guard and Milhaud's cuirassiers were in reserve, concealed behind a slight elevation of the ground. Napoleon's inspection of the Prussian position had not enabled him to arrive at an accurate conclusion. He saw that there were "troops" on the slopes and in the villages in front of him; he saw that they occupied a large position; but he could not bring himself to believe that threefourths of the Prussian army were drawn up in battle array. Neither his own observations, nor the reports of his officers, convinced him that he had to fight an 'army." But, a little before two, he had formed his plan of attack. Thinking that Blucher was posted in a position parallel to the Fleurus road, instead of directing his blows against Sombref, he determined to assail the villages of St. Amand and Ligny. The army, therefore, changed its position: Vandamme advanced his right brigade, and with the remainder took ground to his left, having Girard in reserve, and his outer flank protected by Domont's cavalry. He thus occupied a broken line on the south and east of St. Amand. Gérard advanced beyond Fleurus, throwing forward his right, and forming his columns in a line parallel with and in front of the chaussée, with a division facing to the right, and drawn up across the road. The cavalry of Excelmans and Pajol were in masses on the right of the

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high road, with detached parties on that flank. In rear, the Imperial Guard stood on the left of Fleurus, a deep mass of infantry, cavalry, and guns; and on the right of Fleurus, Milhaud stood fast with his cuirassiers.

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While the troops were taking up this new front, Napoleon caused Soult to write a despatch to Ney, dated 2 P.M., assigning to that marshal a series of operations differing materially from those enjoined by the despatches forwarded from Charleroi at nine in the morning. Believing he had to deal with only "a body of troops posted between Bry and Sombref," he notified to Ney that an attack would be made upon this force in half-an-hour. Ney was also to attack whatever was before him, and having "pressed" his adversaries vigorously," Ney was to turn aside towards Napoleon, and co-operate in the work of enveloping "the body" of troops to which Napoleon referred. If, before Ney could arrive on the right rear of the Prussians," the body of troops" was broken, Napoleon intimated that he would manœuvre in the direction of Ney's army to hasten his operations. This despatch was addressed to "Gosselies," and it is cited as a further proof that Napoleon, at two o'clock on the 16th, did not even suppose that Ney would be at Quatre Bras. The marshal, it should also be observed, was no longer instructed to push on to Genappe, sending only one division to Marbais. He was, after thrusting back the British, to march with his whole force down the Namur road. Napoleon's plans had thus been modified very considerably. His first scheme was to occupy, by three o'clock, a line stretching from Quatre Bras to Sombref, with advanced posts at Gembloux and Genappe. By two o'clock this scheme had broken down, and the junction of the two wings was to be effected between Quatre Bras and Sombref, as the result of a battle with an unknown force of Prussians who had "dared" to stand in the way.

H

6

During the interval between the arrival of Napoleon at Fleurus and his final resolve to fall upon his enemy, Wellington had ridden over from Quatre Bras, to communicate in person with Blucher. Lord Hardinge, then Sir Henry, had been requested by Blucher to proceed to Quatre Bras and solicit some assistance from the Duke. "I set out," he says, "but I had not proceeded far, when I saw a party of horse coming towards me, and observing that they had short tails, I knew at once that they were English, and soon distinguished the Duke. He was on his way to the Prussian head-quarters, thinking they might want some assistance; and he instantly gave directions for a supply of cavalry. How are they forming?' he inquired. In column, not in line,' I replied; the Prussian soldier, Blucher says, will not stand in line.' Then the artillery will play upon them, and they will be beaten damnably,' was the comment of the Duke." Wellington rode on and found Blucher near the mill of Bussy. There, while Napoleon was reconnoitring the Prussian position, and deciding upon measures intended to rout them by turning their right, Wellington and Blucher were concerting a similar plan for the destruction of their adversary. It was agreed that Blucher should receive battle, and that Wellington, as soon as possible, should move up from Quatre Bras troops which should be directed upon the left flank of the French. At this moment, there is reason to believe, Wellington calculated, and on good grounds, that more than one half of his army would be in line at Quatre Bras by three o'clock. From the heart of the Prussian position he rode back to Quatre Bras to find an enterprising and powerful force bent on seizing that post of vantage. He was disappointed in his anticipation of the numbers that would assemble there by three o'clock. But this is not the significant fact which should be commended to

the reader's notice. That fact is, that Napoleon had failed at the outset to separate the two armies, for there they were in close and solid communication-the two commanders-in-chief, though he knew it not, were conferring together on the hills overlooking his position; and we are justified in asserting that the foundation of the coming victory at Waterloo was laid in the memorable interview between Wellington and Blucher at the mill of Bussy.

§ 2. Ney: Gosselies and Frasne.

The position of Ney on the morning of the 16th was most perplexing. He had returned to Gosselies from Charleroi, after having engaged in a fruitless conversation with Napoleon. At seven o'clock he had not received any orders from the Imperial head-quarters, and not a man. under his command had moved. He was still imperfectly informed of the strength of the force verbally placed at his disposal on the afternoon of the 15th. He did not know even the names of the colonels of his regiments. All he knew, in fact, was that his advanced posts were in front of Frasne, that the rear of his column was still on the right bank of the Sambre, that Girard's division, nominally under Reille's orders, was really detached, and that he was to make no use of the light cavalry of the Guard. It was only during the morning that, aided by Colonel Heymés, he obtained a correct "state" of Reille's corps.

After his conversation with that active officer, Ney rode off to Frasne. Arrived there, he collected all the information he could obtain, surveyed the front from his outposts, then skirmishing with the enemy, and, rather impatiently, as we may suppose, waited for orders from Napoleon. We may try to picture the country-side on which Ney was about to be so conspicuous an actor.

Before him lay an extensive plain, stretching away towards the north, very slightly broken by undulations, and traversed by the high road from Charleroi to Brussels. It was covered with rich crops, above which the roofs of the scattered homesteads were visible, and it was shut in by the wood of Delhutte on the east and by the distant wood of Bossu on the west. Three large farms, at nearly equal distances, diversified the monotony of the prospect: Péraumont on the east, at the extremity of the wood Delhutte, and not far from the Namur road; Gemioncourt in a little valley in the centre; and Pierpont on the west, at the southern extremity of the long and irregularly-shaped wood of Bossu. In this wood a tiny rivulet had its source, which, flowing through the Gemioncourt ravine, spread out into large pools farther to the eastward, and thence sluggishly went on to increase the waters of the Dyle. Beyond Gemioncourt, a good three-quarters of a mile, the Charleroi road crosses the highway from Nivelles to Namur, and the group of farmhouses at this point of intersection is called Quatre Bras, or the Cross Roads. Thence northwards towards Brussels the character of the country remained unchanged as far as Genappe, where the upper waters of the Dyle flow through a deeper valley, and where the elevations may be called hills or heights. Ney found this position of Quatre Bras occupied in greater force than it was on the night of the 15th; for the British army was in movement from Ath, Grammont, Enghien, Braine le Comte, Nivelles, and Brussels, and one division of the first corps was already in front of Quatre Bras.

At daybreak, the French were the more numerous ; but at five, as we have stated, General Perponcher had arrived with part of his second brigade from Nivelles. Instead of obeying the strict letter of Wellington's first order, issued when the Duke was not aware of the attack