other equal or superior authority. And hence it follows, that if the miracles of Scripture do clearly evidence a superhuman power; if the doctrines for which those miracles are alleged be doctrines consistent with natural reason, and if also the authority of the superhuman agent performing them be not refuted by any, at least, equal authority, their attestation is an irresistible attestation, or is a strict proof of the divine sanction or authority.

In this view of the subject I agree precisely with Clarke, who of all the writers who have treated this question particularly is by far the closest and most accurate reasoner. He proves distinctly that "a miracle is not rightly defined to be such an event as could not have been produced by any less power than the divine omnipotence". He also proves that “it is not rightly defined to be that which is against the course of nature, or above the natural powers of created agents". He admits that beings inferior to God, he indeed admits explicitly that even evil beings may work real miracles and he shows expressly that the credibility of the

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a Evidences, Prop. xiv. p. 373, edition of 1728.

doctrine is necessary to prove the divine authority of the miracle; or that to prove that authority it may become necessary to show that the doctrine is consistent with the light of nature and reason, and with the doctrines affirmed on the credit of any other miracles [either equally, or] more incontestible". I may remark that Paley also fully recognizes the justice of the same reasoning, where he observes on the "answer" made by the Jews to our Saviour's miracles, namely the answer "that he wrought them by the assistance of Beelzebub". "To this answer no reply could be made, but that which our Saviour did make, by shewing that the tendency of his mission was so adverse to the views with which this Being was by the objectors themselves supposed to act, that it could not reasonably be supposed that he would assist in carrying it on. The power displayed in the miracles did not alone refute the Jewish solution, because the interposition of invisible agents being once admitted, it is impossible to ascertain the limits by which their efficiency is circumscribed."b

a Clarke's Evidences, pp. 379-382.

b Evidences, Vol. II. Part III. Ch. iv.

The whole of this statement is, I think, perfectly clear. Yet it may not be proper to omit here the consideration of a common and, perhaps, a plausible objection. This objection is, that to make our confidence in a miracle dependent on, or qualified by, any condition would paralyze the effect of even those divine miracles which ought to be received without the least hesitation. And on this ground it is contended that, if evil spirits could ever be permitted to work real miracles, no miracles could be decisive of the divine authority: and accordingly that there exists not any adequate evidence that miracles have ever been actually worked except by the special direction of God. But if this be so, if the mere proof that a miracle has actually been wrought in behalf of a doctrine, be enough to prove absolutely the divine authority, it is unwise and unnecessary to encumber the proof with conditions, either with the condition of the reasonableness of the doctrine taught, or the condition that the authority be not refuted.

In answer to this objection, I propose to show in the first place, that to require in miracles the conditions proposed cannot be expected to have the consequence here anticipated :

I propose to show, secondly, that both Scripture and reason appear, in certain cases, to point

out expressly the actual reasonableness of these very conditions:

And then, thirdly, that without entering into the question whether real miracles have been ever performed except by the special authority and direction of God, it is certainly a question which ought not to be introduced into any argument as to their divine authority.

To state the objection, then, more particularly. If miracles, it is said, be not in themselves an absolute test of the truth, the doctrine rested on even God's most signal miracles must come for discussion before they can be accounted decisive. But is not this discussion something more than we can expect from fallible man? Labouring, as he does, under so much darkness of the understanding; educated, as he is, in so many prejudices; and exposed, as we believe, to the influence of temptations urged on him by beings above mortality; how can we expect of him, by the mere aid of his weak reason, to resist an illusion which even real miracles may be worked to countenance? How can we expect of him so to catechise the reasonableness of any

doctrine which he sees to be supported by miracles, as to be able to secure himself either from sometimes admitting the false, or even, haply, from rejecting the true? Seeing man what he is, must we not in such a case say of him, as the eloquent Burnet has exclaimed of Eve yet innocent? "Equi spectatores rerum humanarum haud tulissent tam imparem congressum. Quid enim si dolo malo Dæmonis, multiscii, et in rebus agundis versatissimi, victa fuerit imbellis fœmina!" Under these circumstances, it is said, there can be no value in miracles, if we clog their validity with any condition whatever. If they are any thing, we must be bound to admit them as absolute and unequivocal proofs of the truth.

a

I. To this I answer, first, that these apprehensions are groundless, and that to introduce, as a condition of the validity of miracles, so easy a stipulation as that they shall not be inconsistent with truths otherwise known, and that they shall not be refuted by any counter authority, is by no means calculated to have the evil consequences so anticipated, or to weaken

a Arch. Phil. 1. ii. c. vii. p. 393.