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Пρоoкαρreрéw from thence is most frequently to persevere; Acts i. 14. and ἦσαν δὲ τροσκαρτεροῦντες τῇ διδαχῇ τῶν ̓ΑποσTóλwv, Acts ii. 42. They persevered in the doctrine of the apostles.' Пlpooкapréρnois, once used in the New Testament, is rendered by our translators, 'perseverance;' Eph. vi. 18. In what variety of expression the thing is revealed in the Scripture, is in the treatise itself abundantly declared. The Latin word is classical, persevero, is constanter sum severus ; in that sense as Seneca says, 'Res severa est verum gaudium.' Its extreme in excess is, pertinacy; if these are not rather distinguished from their objects, than in themselves. Varro lib. 4. de ling. Lat. tells us that pertinacia is a continuance or going on, in that, wherein one ought not to continue, or proceed. Perseverantia is that, whereby any one continues in that wherein he ought so to do. Hence is that definition of it commonly given by the schoolmen from Austin; lib. 83. qu. 31. who took it from Cicero (one they little acquainted themselves withal), lib. 2. de Invent: it is say they, In ratione bene fundata stabilis et perpetua per mansio.' And this at present may pass for a general description of it, that is used in an ethical and evangelical sense. Perseverance was accounted a commendable thing among philosophers. Morally, perseverance is that part of fortitude whereby the mind is established in the performance of any good and necessary work, notwithstanding the assaults and opposition it meets withal, with that tediousness and wearisomeness, which the protraction of time, in the pursuit of any affairs, is attended withal. Aristotle informs us that it is exercised about things troublesome; lib. 7. Eth. Nicom. giving a difference between continence with its opposite vice, and forbearance, or perseverance, τούτων δ' ὁ μεν περὶ ἡδονὰς, ἀκρατὴς, ὁ δὲ ἐγκρατής. Ὁ δὲ περὶ λύπας μαλακὸς, ὁ δὲ καρτε pikós. He that abides in his undertaken work, so it be good and honest, notwithstanding that trouble and perplexity he may meet withal is Kaprepiкóc. Hence he tells us that Kapτερικῶς ζῆν as well as σωφρόνως is not pleasant to many; lib. 10. cap. 9. And that because so to live, implies difficulty and opposition. And he also, as Varro in the place above mentioned, distinguishes it from pertinacy; and of men infected with that depraved habit of mind, he says there are three sorts, ἰδιαγνώμονες, ἀμαθεῖς and ἀγροικοι: all these

are in his judgment loxvpoyvéμoves. Nicom. lib. 7. cap. 9. ἰσχυρογνώμονες. Which perverse disposition of spirit he there clearly manifests to be sufficiently differenced from a stable resolved frame of mind, whatever it may resemble it in. Now though there is no question, but that of two persons continuing in the same work, or opinion, one may do it out of pertinacy, the other out of perseverance, yet amongst men who judge of the minds of others, by their fruits, and of the acts of their minds, by their objects, these two dispositions or habits are universally distinguished, as before, by Varro. Hence the terms of pertinacy and obstinacy being thrust into the definition of heresy, by them who renouncing any infallible living judge and determiner in matters of faith, to make way for the inflicting of punishment on the entertainers and maintainers thereof, they take no thought of proving it such, but only because it is found in persons embracing such errors; the same affection of mind, with the same fruits and demonstrations of it, in persons embracing the truth; would by the same men be termed perseverance. But this is not that whereof I treat.

Evangelical perseverance, is from the Scripture at large explained in the book itself. As it relates to our acceptation with God, and the immutability of justification (which is the chief and most eminent part of the doctrine contended for), as it hath no conformity in any thing with the m›ral perseverance before described, so indeed, it is not comprehended in that strict notion and signification of the word itself, which denotes the continuation of some act or acts in us, and not the uninterruptibleness of any act of God. This then is the cause of perseverance, rather than perseverance itself; yet such a cause, as being established, the effect will certainly and uncontrollably ensue. They who go about to assert a perseverance of saints, cut off from the absolute unchangeableness of the decree, purpose, and love of God, attended with a possibility of a contrary event, and that not only in respect of the free manner of its carrying on, whereby he that wills to persevere, may not will so to do, but also in respect of the issue and end itself, will, I doubt not, if they are serious in what they pretend, find themselves entangled in their undertaking. As perseverance is a grace in the subject on whom it is bestowed, so it relates either to the spi

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ritual habit of faith, or the principle of new life they have received from God, or to the actual performance of those duties wherein they ought to abide. In the first sense it consists in the point of being, or not being. Whilst the habit of faith remains, there is in respect thereof an uninterrupted perseverance in him in whom it is; and this we contend for. As it respects actions flowing from that habit and principle; so it expatiates itself in a large field. For as it imports not at all a perpetual performance of such acts without intermission (which were naturally as well as spiritually impossible, whilst we carry about us a body of death), so neither doth it necessarily imply a constant tenor of proceeding in the performance of them, but is consistent with a change in degrees of performance, and in other respects also, not now to be insisted on. Perseverance in this sense being the uninterrupted continuance of habitual grace, in the hearts of believers without intercision, with such a walking in obedience, as God, according to the tenor of the new covenant will accept, upon the whole of the matter, it is in its own nature (as every thing also is that hath not its being from itself), liable and obnoxious to alteration; and, therefore, must be built and reposed on that which is in itself immutable, that it may be rendered on that supposition, immutable also. Therefore is perseverance in this sense resolved into that cause of it before mentioned, which to do is the chief endeavour of the following treatise. Of the groundlessness of their opinion, who granting final perseverance, do yet plead for the possibility of a final apostacy, and an intercision of faith, no more need be spoken, but what upon the account last mentioned hath heen argued already. Some discourses have passed both of old, and of late, concerning the nature of this perseverance, and wherein it doth properly consist. Many affirm it not really to differ from the habit of faith and love itself, for which Bradwardine earnestly contends; Lib. 2. de Cau. Dei. cap. 7. Concluding his disputation, that 'Perseverantia habitualis, est justitia habitualiter perseverantia'; perseverantia actualis, est justitiæ perseverantia actualis, ipsum vero perseverare, est justitiam præservare.' Whereupon ('suo more') he infers this corollary. 'Quod nomen perseverantiæ nullam rem absolutam essentialiter significat, sed accidentaliter, et relative, charitatem vi

delicet, sive justitiam, cum respectu futuræ permansionis continue usque in finem; et quod non inprobabiliter posset dici perseverantiam esse ipsam relationem hujus :' and therefore in the next chapter, to that objection, if perseverance be no more but charity, or righteousness, then every one that hath once obtained these, or true grace, must also persevere; he returns no answer at all: plainly insinuating his judgment to be so; of which afterward. And therefore he spends his thirteenth chapter of the same book to prove, that the Holy Spirit is that auxilium,' as he called it, whereby any per

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And chap. 1. he resolves all preservation from not being overcome by temptation, or not being tempted to a prevalency (the same for substance with perseverance), into the will and purpose of God. 'Quicunque,' saith he, 'non tentatur, hoc necessario est a deo, quod non tentatur. Sicut 11' pars 13 primi probat: et per 22um primi, Deus necessario habet aliquem actum voluntatis circa talem non tentationem, et non nolitionem, quia tunc per decimum primi non tentaretur, ergo volitionem, quæ per idem decimum ipsum tentari non sinit,' &c. Others render it as a gift superadded to faith and love, of which judgment Austin seems to have been, who is followed by sundry of the schoolmen, with many of the divines of the reformed churches. Hence is that conclusion of Alvarez; de Auxil. lib. 10. disp. 103. 'Secundum fidem catholicam asserendum'est, præter gratiam habitualem et virtutes infusas esse necessarium, ad perseverandum in bono usque in finem, auxilium speciale, supernaturale scilicet donum perseverantiæ. And of this proposition he says, 'In hac omnes catholici conveniunt.' Of the same judgment was his master Thomas; lib. 3. con. Gen. cap. 155. Where also he gives this reason of his opinion; 'Illud quod natura sua est variabile, ad hoc quod figatur in uno, indiget auxilio alicujus moventis immobilis; sed liberum arbitrium, etiam existens in gratia habituali, ad huc manet variabile, et flexibile a bono in malum; ergo ad hoc quod figatur in bono, et perseveret in illo usque ad finem, indiget speciali Dei auxilio.' The same argument having been used before him by Bradwardine, though to another purpose, viz. not to prove perseverance to be a superadded gift to saving grace, which (as before was observed) he denied, but to manifest that it

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was immediately and wholly from God. His words are, lib. 2. cap. cap. 8. Corol. Sicut secundum primi docet, omne quod est naturale, et non est per se tale, sed est mutabile in non tale, si manere debeat immutatum, oportet quod imitatur continue alicui per se fixo; quare et continue quilibit justus Deo.' The same school men also (a generation of men exceeding ready to speak of any thing, though they know not what they speak, nor whereof they affirm), go yet farther, some of them, and will distinguish between the gift of perseverance and the gift confirmation in grace. He before mentioned, after a long dispute (viz. 104.) concludes, Ex his sequitur differentiam inter donum perseverantiæ, et confirmationis in gratia (he means that which is granted in via) in hoc consistere, quod donum perseverantiæ nullam perfectionem intrinsecam constituit in ipsa gratia habituali, quam tamen perfectionem intrinsecam illi tribuit confirmatio in gratia.' What this intrinsical perfection of habitual grace, given it by confirmation, is, he cannot tell: for, in those who are so confirmed in grace, he asserts only in impeccability upon supposition, and that not alone from their intrinsical principle, as it is with the blessed in heaven, but from help and assistance also daily communicated from without. Durandus, in 3. d. 3. q. 4. assigns the deliverance from sin which those who are confirmed in grace do obtain unto the Holy Ghost so far well: but he kicks down his milk by his addition, that he doth it only by the removal of all occasion of sin. But of these persons and their judgment in the point under debate, more afterward.

For the thing itself last proposed, on what foot of account it is placed, and on what foundation asserted, the treatise itself will discover. That the thing aimed at, is not to be straitened or restrained to any one peculiar act of grace, will easily appear. The main foundation of that which we plead for, is, the eternal purpose of God, which his own nature requireth to be absolutely immutable and irreversible. The eternal act of the will of God designing some to salvation by Christ, infallibly to be obtained, for 'the praise of the glory of his grace,' is the bottom of the whole; even that foundation which standeth for ever, having this seal, The Lord knoweth who are his. For the accomplishment of this eternal purpose, and for the procurement of

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