lay hold of, come over to, clear up, and many others of this kind, ought to be avoided, if we can employ a simple verb, which will always terminate the sentence with more strength.

Obs. Though the pronoun it, has the import of a substantive noun, and indeed often forces itself upon us unavoidably, yet, when we want to give dignity to a sentence, this pronoun should, if possible, be avoided in the conclusion; more especially when it is joined with some of the prepositions, as, with it, in it, to it.

179. Besides particles and pronouns, any phrase, which expresses a circumstance only, always brings up the rear of a sentence with a bad grace.

Illus. We may judge of this, by the following sentence from Lord Bolingbroke: "Let me therefore conclude by repeating, that division has caused all the mischief we lament; that union alone can retrieve us; and that a great advance towards this union was the coalition of parties, so happily begun, so successfully carried on, and of late so anaccountably neglected; to say no worse.' This last phrase, to say no worse, occasions a sad falling off at the end; so much the more unhappy, as the rest of the period is conducted after the manner of a climax, which we expect to find growing to the last.

*66

Obs. 1. The proper disposition of such circumstances in a sentence, is often attended with considerable trouble, in order to adjust them so, that they consist equally with the perspicuity and the grace of the period. Though necessary parts, they are, however, like unshapely stones in a building, which, to place them with the least offence, try the skill of an artist. "Let them be inserted wherever the happiest place for them can be found; as, in a structure composed of rough stones, there are always places where the most irregular and unshapely may find some adjacent one to which it can be joined, and some basis on which it may rest."t

2. The close is always an unsuitable place for them. When the sense admits their arrangement, the sooner they are despatched, generally speaking, the better; that the more important and significant words may possess the last place, quite disencumbered. It is a rule, too, never to crowd too many circumstances together, but rather to intersperse them in different parts of the sentence, joined with the capital words on which they depend; provided that care be taken, as was before directed, not to clog those capital words with thém.

180. The last rule, which we have to offer, relating to the strength of a sentence, is, that in the members of a sentence, where two things are compared or contrasted with each other; where either a resemblance or an opposition is intended to be expressed; some resemblance, in the lan guage and construction, ould be preserved. For, when the things themselves corrpond to each other, we natur

Letter on the State of Parties at the Accession of King George I. "Jungantur quo congruunt maxime; sicut in structura saxorum rudium, etiam ipsa enormitas invenit cui applicari, et in quo possit insistere." "Quinctilian.

ally expect to find the words also corresponding. We are disappointed when it is otherwise; and the comparison, or contrast, appears more imperfect.

Illus. The following passage from Pope's preface to his Homer, fully exemplifies the rule we have now given: "Homer was the greater genius; Virgil the better artist; in the one, we most admire the man; in the other, the work. Homer huriies us with a commanding impetuo ity; Virgil leads us with an attractive majesty. Homer scatters with a generous profusion; Virgil bestows with a careful magnificence. Homer, like the Nile, pours out his riches with a sudden overflow; Virgil, like a river in its banks, with a constant streain.

And when we look upon their machines, Homer seems like his own Jupiter in his terrors, shaking Olympus, scattering the lightnings, and fuing the heavens; Virgil, Ike the same power in his benevolence, counselling with the gods, laying plans for empires, and ordering his whole creation."

Corol. Periods thus constructed, when introduced with propriety, and not returning too often, have a sensible beauty. But we must be ware of carrying our attention to this beauty too far. It ought only to be occasionally studied, when it is naturally demanded by the compar ison or opposition of objects. If such a construction as this be aimed at in all our sentences, it leads to a disagreeable uniformity; produces a regularly returning clink in the period, which plainly discovers affectation, and tires the ear like the chime of jingling verse.

Scholia. The fundamental rule for the construction of sentences, and into which all other rules might be resolved, undoubtedly is, to communicate, in the clearest and most natural order, the ideas which we mean to transfuse into the minds of our hearers or readers. Every ar rangement that does most justice to the sense, and expresses it to most advantage, strikes us as beautiful. To this point have tended all the rules that we have given. And, indeed, did men always think clearly, and were they, at the same time, fully masters of the language in which they write, there would be occasion for few rules. Their sentences would then, of course, acquire all those properties of precis ion, unity, and strength, which we have recommended. "For we may rest assured," says Dr. Blair,* "that, whenever we express our selves ill, there is, besides the mismanagement of language, for the most part, some mistake in our manner of conceiving the subject. Embarrassed, obscure, and feeble sentences, are generally, if not always, the result of embarrassed, obscure, and feeble thought. Thought and language act and re-act upon each other mutually. Logic and rhetoric have here, as in inany other cases, a strict connection; and he that is learning to arrange his sentences with accuracy and order, is learning, at the same time, to think with accuracy and order;" an ob servation which alone will justify all the care and attention which we have bestowed on this subject.

* Lectures on Rhetoric, Lect. XII.

CHAPTER IV.

PERSPICUITY.

181. PERSPICUITY originally and properly signifies transparency, such as may be ascribed to air, glass, water, or any other medium, through which material objects are viewed. From this original and proper sense, it hath been metaphorically applied to language, this being, as it were, the medium, through which we perceive the notions and sentiments of any speaker or writer.

Illus. 1. Now, in natural things, if the medium through which we look at any object, be perfectly transparent, our whole attention is fixed on the object. If, for instance, we look through the panes of glass in any window, we are scarcely sensible that there is a medium which intervenes, and can hardly be said to perceive the medium. But if there be any flaw in the glass, if we see through it but dimly, if the object be imperfectly represented, or if we know it to be misrepresented, our attention is immediately taken off the object, and turned to the medium. We are then desirous to discover the cause, either of the dim and confused representation, or of the misrepresentation of things which the medium exhibits, or that the defect in vision may be supplied by judgment.

2. The case of language is precisely similar. A discourse, then, excels in perspicuity, when the subject engrosses the attention of the hearer, and the diction is so little minded by him, that he can scarcely be said to be conscious that it is through this medium he sees into the speaker's thoughts.

3. On the contrary, the least obscurity, ambiguity, or confusion in the style, instantly removes the attention from the sentiment to the expression, and the hearer endeavours, by the aid of reflection, to correct the imperfections of the speaker's language. Whatever application he must give to the words, is, in fact, so much deducted from what he owes to the sentiments. Besides, the effort which the speaker thus requires his hearer to exert in a very close attention to the language, always weakens the effect, which the thoughts were intended to produce in the mind of the hearer.

4. Perspicuity is, of all qualities of style, the first and most essential. Every speaker does not propose to please the imagination, nor is every subject susceptible of those ornaments, which conduce to this purpose. Much less is it the aim of every speech, to agitate the passions. There are some occasions, therefore, in which variety, and many in which animation of style, are not necessary; nay, there are occasions on which the last especially would be improper. But whatever be the ultimate intention of the orator, to inform, to convince, to please, to move, or to persuade, still he must speak so as to be understood, or he speaks to no purpose. If he do not propose to convey certain sentiments into the minds of his hearers, by the aid of signs intelligible to them, he may as well declaim before them in an unknown tongue. This prerogative

the intellect hath above all the other faculties, that, whether it be or be not immediately addressed by the speaker, it must be regarded by him either ultimately or subordinately; ultimately, when the direct purpose of the discourse is information, or conviction; subordinately, when the end is pleasure, emotion, or persuasion.

5. Besides, in a discourse wherein either vivacity or animation is requisite, it is not every sentence that requires, or even admits, of either of these qualities; but every sentence ought to be perspicuous. The effect of all other qualities is lost without this. But this being to the understanding, what light is to the eye, ought to be diffused over the whole performance. And since perspicuity is more properly a rhetorical than a grammatical quality, we shall point out the different ways in which a writer may fail to produce a style which shall answer the conditions of the definition we have given of perspicuity.

6. A man may, in respect of grammatical purity, speak unexceptionably, and yet speak obscurely and ambiguously; and though we cannot say, that a man may speak properly, and at the same time speak unintelligibly; yet this last case falls more naturally to be considered as an offence against perspicuity, than as a violation of propriety. (Art. 112, 117, and 124.) For when the meaning is not discovered, the particular impropriety cannot be pointed out. In the three different ways, therefore, just now mentioned, perspicuity may be violated.

182. The obscure, from defect, is the first offence against perspicuity, and may arise from elliptical expressions. This is the converse of precision. (Art. 118.)

Illus. In Greek and Latin, the frequent suppression of the substantive verb, and of the possessive and personal pronouns, furnishes instances of ellipses, which the idiom of most modern tongues, English and French particularly, will seldom admit. (Illus. 2. Art. 119.)

183. Often, indeed, the affectation of conciseness, often the rapidity of thought, natural to some writers, will give rise to still more material defects in the expression.

Example. "He is inspired with a true sense of that function, when chosen from a regard to the interests of piety and virtue."*

Analysis. Sense, in this passage, denotes an inward feeling, or the impression which some sentiment makes upon the mind. Now a function cannot be a sentiment impressed or felt. The expression is therefore defective, and ought to have read thus: "He is inspired with a true sense of the dignity, or of the importance, of that function."

Obs. Obscurities in style arise not merely from deficiency, but from excess of expression, and often from the bad choice of words. (See Art. 118, 119, and 123.)

184. Bad arrangement is another source of obscurity. In this case, the construction is not sufficiently clear. One often, on first hearing the sentence, imagines, from the turn of it, that it ought to be construed one way, and on reflection finds that it must be construed another way. (Art. 143, 144, and 145.)

* Guardian, No. 53.

Example. "I have hopes, that when WILL confronts him, and all the ladies in whose behalf he engages him, cast kind looks and wishes of success at their champion, he will have some shame.”*

Analysis. It is impossible not to imagine, on hearing the first part of this sentence, that WILL is to confront all the ladies; though afterwards we find it necessary to construe this clause with the following verb. This confusion is removed at once, by repeating the adverb

when.

"I have hopes, that when WILL confronts him, and when all the ladies cast kind looks," &c.

Corol. Bad arrangement may be justly termed a constructive ambiguity. The words are so disposed, in point of order, as would render them really ambiguous, if, in that construction, which the expression first suggests, any meaning were exhibited. As this is not the case, the faulty order of the words cannot properly be considered as rendering the sentence ambiguous, but obscure.

185. The same word used in different senses in the same sentence, is another source of obscurity.

Example. "That he should be in earnest, it is hard to conceive; since any reasons of doubt, which he might have in this case, would have been reasons of doubt in the case of other men, who may give more, but cannot give more evident, signs of thought, than their fellow. creatures."t

Analysis. This errs alike against perspicuity and elegance. The first word, more, is an adjective, the comparative of many; in an instant it is an adverb, and the sign of the comparative degree. As the reader is not apprized of this, the sentence must appear to him, on the first glance, a flat contradiction. (Art. 122. Illus. 1 and 2.)

Correction. "Who may give more numerous, but cannot give more evident signs:" or thus, "who may give more but cannot give clearer signs."

186. It is but seldom that the same pronoun can be used twice, or oftener, in the same sentence, in reference to different things, without darkening the expression. The signification of the personal, as well as of the relative pronouns, and even of the adverbs of place and time, must be determined by the things to which they relate. To use

them, therefore, with reference to different things, is, in ef fect, to employ the same word in different senses; which, when it occurs in the same sentence, or in sentences closely connected, is rarely found entirely compatible with perspicuity. (See Art. 152. Illus.)

Example. "One may have an air which proceeds from a just sufficiency and knowledge of the matter before him, which may naturally produce some motions of his head and body, which might become the bench better than the bar."+

Analysis. The pronoun which is here thrice used in three several senses; and it must require reflection to discover, that the first de

Spectator, No. 20. † Bolingbroke's Ph. Ess. I. Sec. 9.

Guardian, No. 43.