Obs. When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they are capable of being rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is ultimately determined, by comparing them with the general taste of inankind.

377. In every composition, what interests the heart pleases all ages and all nations. There is a certain string to which, when properly struck, the human heart is so made as to answer.

Illus. 1. Hence the universal testimony which the most improved nations of the earth have conspired, throughout a long succession of ages, to give to some few works of genius; such as the Iliad of Homer and the Eneid of Virgil.

2. Hence the authority which such works have acquired as standards, in some degree, of poetical composition; since from them we are enabled to collect what the sense of mankind is, concerning those beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which, therefore, poetry ought to exhibit.

378. Uniformity of taste and sentiment, resulting from our conviction of a common standard, leads to two important final causes; the one respecting our duty; the other, our pastime or amusement.

Obs. Barely to mention the first, shall be sufficient, because it does not properly belong to the present undertaking. Unhappy it would be for us did not uniformity prevail in morals: that our actions should uniformly be directed to what is good and against what is ill, is the greatest blessing of society; and in order to uniformity in action, uniformity of opinion and sentiment is indispensable.

379. With respect to pastime in general, and the fine arts in particular, the following illustrations make the final cause of uniformity abundantly obvious.

Illus. 1. Uniformity of taste gives opportunity for sumptuous and elegant buildings, for fine gardens, and extensive establishments which please generally.

2. The reason is obvious: without uniformity of taste, there could not be any suitable reward, either of profit or honour, to encourage men of genius to labour in such works, and to advance them to perfection.

3. The same uniformity of taste is equally necessary to perfect the arts of music, sculpture, and painting, and to support the expense which they require after they are brought to perfection.

4. Nature is, in every particular, consistent with herself; we are framed by nature to have a high relish for the fine arts, which are a great source of happiness, and friendly in a high degree to virtue: we are, at the same time, framed with uniformity of taste to furnish proper objects for that high relish; and, if uniformity did not prevail, the fine arts would never have made any figure.

380. Another final cause, no less obvious, is the separation of men into different classes, by birth, office, or occupation. How much soever this separation might tend to relax the

connexion that ought to subsist among the members of the same state, its effects are prevented by the access of all ranks of people to public spectacles and amusements. These assemblages of people of one country are best enjoyed in company. In this common fellowship every one partakes of the same pleasures. Such meetings are, therefore, no slight support to the social affections* and to uniformity of

taste.

CHAPTER II.

CRITICISM.

381. TASTE, criticism, and genius, are words currently employed, without distinct ideas annexed to them.

Definition. True criticism is the application of taste and of good sense to the several fine arts. The object which it proposes is, to distinguish what is beautiful and what is faulty in every performance; from particular instances to ascend to general principles; and so to form rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beauty in works of genius.

Illus. The rules of criticism are not formed by any induction, a priori, as it is called; that is, they are not formed by a train of abstract reasoning, independent of facts and observations. Criticism is an art founded wholly on experience; on the observations of such beauties as have come nearest to the standard which we before established; that is, of such beauties as have been found to please mankind most gener ally. (Art. 371.)

2. For example; Aristotle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic composition, were not first discovered by logical reasoning, and then applied to poetry; but they were rules drawn from the practice of Homer and Sophocles: they were founded upon observing the superior pleasure which mankind received from the relation of an action which was one and entire, beyond what they received from the relation of scattered and unconnected facts.

3. Such observations taking their rise at first from feeling and experience, were found, on examination, to be so consonant to reason, and to the principles of human nature, as to pass into established rules, and to be conveniently applied for judging of the excellency of any performance. This is the most natural account of the origin of criticism.

382. A masterly genius, it is true, will of himself, untaught, compose in such a manner as shall be agreeable to

*On works of taste, the student may now consult Dr. Gerrard's Essay on TasteD'Alembert's Reflections on the use and abuse of Philosophy in matters which relate to taste-Reflections Critiques sur la Poesie et sur la Peinture-Kames' Elements of Criticism-Hume's Essay on the Standard of Taste-Introduction to the Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful-Blair's Lectures, and Allison on Taste.

the most material rules of criticism; for as these rules are founded in nature, nature will often suggest them in practice.

Illus. It is more than probable that Homer was acquainted with no systems of the art of poetry. Guided by genius alone, he composed in verse a regular story, which all posterity has admired. But this is no argument against the usefulness of criticism as an art. For as no human genius is perfect, there is no writer but may receive assistance from critical observations upon the beauties and faults of those who have gone before him. No observations or rules can indeed supply the defect of genius, or inspire it where it is wanting. But they may often direct it into its proper channel; they may correct its extravagances, and point out to it the most just and proper imitation of nature. Critical rules are designed chiefly to show the faults that ought to be avoided. To nature we must be indebted for the production of eminent beauties. (See Corol. 1. p. 59,)

383. From what has been said, we are enabled to form a judgment concerning those complaints which it has long been fashionable for petty authors to make against critics and criticism.

Illus. 1. Critics have been represented as the great abridgers of the native liberty of genius; as the imposers of unnatural shackles and bonds upon writers, from whose cruel persecution they must fly to the public, and implore its protection. Such supplicatory prefaces are not calculated to give very favourable ideas of the genius of the author. For every good writer will be pleased to have his work examined by the principles of sound understanding and true taste.

2. The declamations against criticism commonly proceed upon this supposition, that critics are such as judge by rule, not by feeling. This is so far from being true, that they who judge after this manner are pedants, not critics. For all the rules of genuine criticism will be found to be ultimately founded on feeling; and taste and feeling are necessary to guide us in the application of these rules to every particular instance.

3. As there is nothing in which all sorts of persons more readily affect to be judges, than in works of taste, there is no doubt that the number of incompetent critics will always be great. But this affords no more foundation for a general invective against criticism, than the number of bad philosophers or reasoners affords against sound philosophy and logic.

384. An objection more plausible may be formed against criticism, from the applause that some performances have received from the public, which, when accurately considered, are found to contradict the rules established by criticism.

Illus. Now, according to the principles laid down in the last chapter, the public is the supreme judge, to whom the last appeal must be made in every work of taste; as the standard of taste is founded on the sentiments that are natural and common to all men. But with respect to this, we are to observe, that the sense of the public is often too hastily judged of. The genuine public taste does not always appear

in the first applause given upon the publication of any new work. There are both the great vulgar, and the small vulgar, who are apt to be catched and dazzled by very superficial beauties, the admiration of which in a little time passes away: and sometimes a writer may acquire great temporary reputation, merely by his compliance with the passions or prejudices, with the party spirit or superstitious notions, that may chance to rule for a time almost a whole nation. In such cases, though the public may seem to praise, true criticism may with reason condemn; and it will in progress of time gain the ascendant: for the judgment of true criticism, and the voice of the public, when once become unprejudiced and dispassionate, will ultimately coincide.

385. There are some works that contain gross transgressions of the laws of criticism, which, nevertheless, have acquired a general, and even a lasting admiration.

Illus. 1. Such are the plays of Shakspeare, which, considered as dramatic poems, are irregular in the highest degree. But then they have gained the public admiration, not by their being irregular, not by their transgression of the rules of art, but in spite of such transgressions. They possess other beauties which are conformable to just rules; and the force of these beauties has been so great as to overpower all censure, and to give the public a degree of satisfaction superior to the disgust arising from their blemishes.

2. Shakspeare pleases, not by his bringing the transactions of many years into one play; not by his grotesque mixtures of tragedy and comedy in one piece, nor by the strained thoughts, and affected witticisms, which he sometimes employs. These we consider as blemishes, and impute them to the grossness of the age in which he lived. But he pleases by his animated and masterly representations of characters, by the liveliness of his descriptions, the force of his sentiments, and his possessing, beyond all writers, the natural language of passion; beauties which true criticism no less teaches us to place in the highest rank, than nature teaches us to feel.

CHAPTER III.

OF GENIUS.

386. TASTE and GENIUS are two words frequently joined together; and therefore, by inaccurate thinkers, confounded. Taste consists in the power of judging; genius, in the power of executing.

Illus. 1. One may have a considerable degree of taste in poetry, eloquence, or any of the fine arts, who has little or hardly any genius for composition or execution in any of these arts; but genius cannot be found without including taste also. Genius, therefore, deserves to be considered as a higher power of the mind than taste.

2. Genius always imports something inventive or creative; which does not rest in mere sensibility to beauty where it is perceived, but

which can, moreover, produce new beauties, and exhibit them in such a manner as strongly to impress the minds of others. Refined taste forms a good critic; but genius is farther necessary to form the poet, or the orator.

3. Genius is a word, which, in common acceptation, extends much farther than to the objects of taste. It is used to signify that talent or aptitude which we receive from nature, for excelling in any one thing whatever. Thus we speak of a genius for mathematics, as well as a genius for poetry; of a genius for war, for politics, or for any mechanical employment.

387. This talent or aptitude for excelling in some one particular, is what we receive from nature. By art and study, no doubt, it may be greatly improved; but by them alone it cannot be acquired.

nius. 1. As genius is a higher faculty than taste, it is ever, according to the usual frugality of nature, more limited in the sphere of its operations. It is not uncommon to meet with persons who have an excellent taste in several of the polite arts, such as music, poetry, painting, and eloquence, all together: but to find one who is an excellent performer in all these arts, is much more rare; or rather, indeed, such an one is not to be looked for.

2. A sort of universal genius, or one who is equally and indifferently turned towards several different professions and arts, is not likely to excel in any. Although there may be some few exceptions, yet in general it holds, that when the bent of the mind is exclusively directed towards some one object, there is the fairest prospect of eminence in that, whatever it be. The rays must converge to a point, in order to glow intensely. This remark is the more necessary, on account of its great importance to young people, in leading them to examine with care, and to pursue with ardour, the current and pointing of nature towards those exertions of genius in which they are most likely to excel.

388. A genius for any of the fine arts, always supposes taste; it is clear, that the improvement of taste will serve both to forward and to correct the operations of genius.

Illus. 1. In proportion as the taste of a poet, or orator, becomes more refined with respect to the beauties of composition, it will certainly assist him to produce the more finished beauties in his work. Genius, however, in a poet, or orator, may sometimes exist in a higher degree than taste; that is, genius may be bold and strong, when taste is neither very delicate, nor very correct.

2. This is often the case in the infancy of arts; a period when genius frequently exerts itself with great vigour, and executes with much warmth; while taste, which requires experience, and improves by slower degrees, hath not yet attained to its full growth.

3. Homer and Shakspeare are proofs of what is here asserted. In the admirable writings of those two great poets are found instances of rudeness and indelicacy, which the more refined taste of later writers, of far inferior genius, would have taught them to avoid.

4. As all human perfection is limited, this may very probably be the law of our nature, that it is not given to one man to execute with vig