of private judgment in the interpretation of the Koran; but he falls under the stigma of heresy if he insists on any interpretation at variance with the traditions of which the Ulemas are the acknowledged guardians and expositors. So again with regard to marriage and funerals ; every Mussulman is theoretically entitled to perform these rites for himself. But the ceremonies connected with them involve questions of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and the services of the Ulemas are consequently here also put in requisition. But inasmuch as the precepts of the Koran, with the glosses supplied by the traditional sayings of the Prophet, pervade the life of man in all its departments, the Ulemas naturally obtained footing in private and domestic life. For a time their influence, though great, was informal. But they gradually worked their way into a recognised position, and have been for a long time all-powerful. The extent of their power may be measured by two facts. The vast proportion of the land of Turkey belongs to them, secure from confiscation and taxation; and the administration of justice throughout the empire is in their hands.

Originally the Ulema, like the Kalif, united the religious and the judicial functions. But in process of time the two elements were gradually separated, and the Ulemas were consequently divided into two branches, one of which devoted itself to the interpretation and administration of the law; the other to the superintendence of public worship and the discharge of the official duties of religion.

The formal constitution of the Ulema dates from the time of Mahomet II. Its hierarchy of ranks is admitted by Ubicini to be extremely complicated' in its details, and little understood even in Turkey;' but its main features are simple enough. It comprehends

CHAP. V.]

THE SHEIK-UL-ISLAM.

237

three classes of functionaries: the judges, or Cadis; the interpreters of the law, or Muftis; and the ministers of religion, or Imaums. Each of these classes is subdivided into several grades, with corresponding titles, upon which it is not necessary to remark more particularly. At the head of the Ulema is the Sheik-ul-Islam or Grand Mufti. His rank is coördinate with that of the Grand Vizier, and his official salary, independently of perquisites and bribes an important exception-is about 12,000l. a year. All the judges of the Empire are practically appointed by him. Some he appoints directly, without consultation either with the Grand Vizier or Sultan; and the rest are all appointed on his nomination or through his nominees. The Sheik-ulIslam and the two Presidents of the High Court of Justice are the only judges who are paid by the State. The rest are paid by a tax of one-fortieth on the expense of all suits submitted to them, and a similar tax on legacies and such transfer of properties as pass through their hands. But the chief part of their emoluments is derived from bribes. Ubicini, for example, mentions the case of a Mollah who returned at the expiration of his year's judgeship, the salary of which was about 8001., with a fortune of 8,000l.

It is, moreover, the privilege of the Sheik-ul-Islam to sanction the political acts of the Government with his Fetvah, or sacred imprimatur, certifying them to be in accordance with the Koran, and therefore obligatory on the faithful. This is a most important power, for without the Sheik-ul-Islam's Fetvah no legislative act of the Government can take effect. Midhat's constitution would have been invalid without it; and the fact that it obtained it is of itself a sufficient proof that it was intended to be, as in fact it is, a sham.

This power of veto by the Sheik-ul-Islam may be explained as follows. 'Spiritual power in Islam,' Ubicini truly observes, begins and finishes with Mahomet.' There is no hint of spiritual succession in the Koran, and Mahomet himself carefully excluded any such idea when he was asked to appoint a successor. He professed to be the last and greatest of the Prophets, and as such incapable of having either a successor or representative. And, as a matter of fact, the early Kalifs never pretended to occupy any such position; nor, indeed, does the Sultan make any such pretension now. He could not, if he would, for such an assumption is repugnant to the Sacred Law. Here are the qualifications of the Kalifate, as laid down in the Multéka:

'The Supreme Head of the Mussulmans must profess the doctrines of the Koran; have attained his majority; be of sound mind, of the masculine gender, and a free man. He is the depositary of the Sacred Code and the guardian of the Canon Law. He presides over public prayer on Fridays and at the two festivals of the Bairam. Entrusted with the general guardianship of the faithful, he alone has the right of appointing all public officers, administering the finances, commanding the armies, making war and peace, watching over the safety of the State, and maintaining public order; in a word, of governing the Empire.

The person of the Sovereign is sacred and inviolable; his supreme magistracy and his absolute superiority over the whole social body place him above the penal laws, and consequently beyond punishment.

'He is forbidden, however, to make the slightest change in any part of the canonical legislation, more particularly if such change, by its nature and object,

CHAP. V.] INFALLIBILITY OF ISLAM AND OF ROME. 239

should tend to alter the condition of the nation-of the servants of God confided to his care and protection.'

The Kalif must also be of the blood of the Koreïshites;' but this is explained to mean no more than 'that he be not of another race.'

The Kalif is, in fact, merely the chosen delegate of the faithful, as indeed the Multéka calls him; and he is under the Law, never above it. He is to be obeyed so long and so far as he conforms to the Cher'iat or Sacred Law. The moment he transgresses it, his subjects have not merely the right, it is their bounden duty, to disobey him. And if he continues to transgress he may be deposed, but only under the sanction of a Fetvah from the Sheik-ul-Islam. This was exemplified in the deposition of the last two Sultans. On the other hand, the Sultan may depose the Sheik-ul-Islam, and has done so several times of late. But he is bound to appoint another at once out of a limited number. So that by getting rid of the Sheik-ul-Islam he cannot get rid of the Law.

In fine, we have in Islam an infallibility as dogmatic as that of Rome since the Vatican Council, and much more rigid. The infallibility of Rome is that of a living voice. You may convict it of logical and historical contradictions and inconsistencies; but solvitur ambulando. While you are arguing the organ of infallibility moves on, and leaves you to pick as many holes as you like in his new decree. But the Infallible Pontiff of Islam has been dead for centuries, and he has no sucWhat seemed to him good to decree twelve centuries ago for the guidance of rude and ignorant Arabs must rule for ever the conduct of his followers; and the inviolable sanctity of his decrees is guarded by a most powerful and wealthy corporation whose

cessor.

interest it is to prevent the introduction into the Empire of European culture and civilization. It is easy to understand,' says Ubicini,1 'that a body so powerfully organized' as the Ulema, which has centred in itself all the vitality of Islamism, and achieved the formation of a sort of aristocracy, in a country where privileges are unknown, must be opposed to all ideas of reform, which would be the utter ruin of its power.'

In the course of some conversation with Dr. Döllinger, soon after the Vatican Council, I remember asking him whether he thought it likely that the successor of Pio Nono, if so disposed, would be able to make any great change in the policy of the Vatican. My dear friend,' he replied, the thing is impossible. The Curial system has been the growth of centuries, and it will take many a reforming Pope to introduce any material change. That the Vatican Council is the highest tide-mark of Ultramontanism, and that the tide is on the turn, I cannot allow myself to doubt. The abolition of the Temporal Power is a good beginning. The Eternal City, as it becomes more and more secularised, will be less and less regarded as the capital of Catholic Christendom; and in proportion to the degree in which that change progresses will the Curial system be seen to be an anachronism and an incubus. But the system is so complex, is made up of so many wheels within wheels, and has the whole Episcopate so completely in its toils, that the change, which I believe to be inevitable, will take a long time to accomplish. Philoctetes has received his wound; but it is impossible to predict the hour of his death.'

Whatever truth there may be in Dr. Döllinger's

1 Vol. i. p. 84.