10. Hales, part. 2. qu. 108. memb. 2. writes, Corrupt sensuality in man flows from Original Sin; and inordinate delight which proceeds from it (so far as it is corrupt) is called its first motion, and is sin; because it ought to be subjected to reason, and itself is affected in an undue manner contrary to reason, and is countenanced in some measure by reason, not indeed causing, but permitting it, and not suppressing its risings. Three things are here to be noticed: First that Original Sin may attach to human inclination itself, because according to the law of nature, it ought to be subordinate to reason. Secondly, that the irregular motion of this power, with which even the regenerate are molested, is actual sin. Lastly, that reason itself is not free from sin, as often as sensuality is excited and is hurried with undue motion towards the object of delight. From all this it is plain, that sin perpetually remains in the regenerate themselves, whilst they are in this life.

11. Altissiodorensis, lib. 2. tract. 28. cap. 1. says, The working of human lustfulness is voluntary, and is sin, even when it begins to operate before the judgment of reason. And in the same place, cap. 2-But it is called sin because it tends to what is unlawful. For there is an incentive, which inclines the human will to delight in a sensible object, in consequence of which the soul is beclouded and depraved by conjunction with the creature. By this reasoning Altissiodorensis proves both that its first motion and spring has the nature of sin; and that because that motion actually, and the fuel itself habitually, tends and inclines to an unlawful thing.

12. Parisiensis de Sacramento Matrimonii, cap. 7. says, The whole war of the flesh against the Spirit is iniquitous; therefore all the warriors of the flesh against the Spirit are iniquitous. Therefore, both the first rank, namely, that of the first motions; and the second, that of delights without the assent; and the third, that of the consent; and the fourth, that of works, &c. And immediately afterwards he adds, that these motions are to be slain on account of the iniquity of their rebellion against the Spirit, and on account of their culpability. What is more plain than that, according to the opinion of this most learned personage, the old man itself remaining in the regenerate, and all his

troops, are iniquitous and culpable in their own nature; and therefore to be slain and eradicated ?

13. Gerson, in regulis Moralibus, pag. 128. lit. B, observes, All the first inclinations, because they are apt to follow reason, and to be regulated by it, if they shall have outrun it, may be called sins, even in infants and simpletons, because they are against the order of nature as first constituted. With respect to the first inclinations, the same may be said of that proneness or propension to those irregular affections, namely, that it is sin, because it is contrary to the order of nature as first constituted.

And here let our second question end, in which we have proved, that the regenerate are not endowed with so perfect a righteousness, that nothing cleaves to them which has the true nature of sin. We have dwelt the longer on this point, because it is the basis of all those that follow, which we shall discuss with more brevity.

THE THIRD GENERAL QUESTION,

CONCERNING

THE FORMAL CAUSE OF JUSTIFICATION.

CHAPTER XXII.

ON THE WORD JUSTIFICATION, THE CALUMNIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES, AND THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

We now come to the third question, in which the formal cause of man's justification is to be discussed. For whereas we have shewn that a certain inherent holiness is imparted to all the regenerate, which we treated in the first question ;* and whereas we have moreover proved, that this infused righteousness is imperfect and defiled by the filth of sin, which we did by many arguments in the second :† the order of the discussion, and the necessity of our subject itself now demands that we should enquire what, and of what kind, that righteousness is, which justifies man before God, and in the view of which, God himself pronounces man to be free from sin, and the penalty of sin, and accounts him worthy of his favour and eternal life.

Now that we may the more easily understand what this is, I will first examine the word justifying, or justification; then, to shelter ourselves from the calumnies of our adversaries, I will explain what they falsely attribute to us in this controversy concerning the formal cause of justification, and what we really hold: lastly, I will describe the state of the controversy itself, and the defence of the Papists.

As to the word justification, I do not enquire how many
See Chapter iii. p. 8.
Beginning at Chap. iv. p. 14.

significations it has, or may have; but what signification it has in this particular article and doctrine of our faith. But since the sense of words is best gathered from those places in which some doctrine is professedly treated; we must in this matter especially recur to the Epistles of St. Paul, who formally lays down the doctrine of justification, and establishes it most copiously and strongly. With him then it always bears a forensic signification in this controversy, and denotes the act of God, absolving, like a judge, an accused person, pronouncing him just, and accepting him to the reward of righteousness, that is life eternal. Remarkable is that passage Rom. viii. 33, where the very antithesis of justification and condemnation shews, that to justify means, with St. Paul, nothing less than to declare and determine a person free from guilt and condemnation, by a judicial sentence: Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? And in Rom. v. 18, he has the same antithesis between the condemnation which we incur from the fall of Adam, and the justification of life which we obtain by the righteousness of Christ. Nor does the Apostle force the word justification to this sense, but has followed the common usage of it in Hebrew and Greek. For although to justify seeins commonly the same as to render a man just by the implanted quality of righteousness, yet neither among approved Latin authors (that I know of) is it used in this sense; and among the Greeks, the word naíon denotes not the infusion of a quality, but the pronouncing of a sentence. The same may be said of the Hebrew, as appears from Prov. xvii. 15. He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord. Acceptable doubtless, and not abominable, would he be before God, who could implant holiness and righteousness in an ungodly man. It denotes therefore an act of jurisdiction, not of infusion. In this sense Christ himself uses this word in Matt. xii. 27. By thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned.- But, in so plain a matter, there is no need of more words; especially since the Papists themselves cannot refuse this forensic signification of the term, which they themselves acknowledge to be founded in Scripture. For thus says

Naclantus;* There may seem to some a difference between Theological teachers, and the sacred Scriptures, when in the former to justify is to make just, and to be justified is to become just; but in the latter it is rather to declare just, and to be shewn as just, as we may collect from them at large; however, when we accurately examine the matter we find it otherwise. A little after, he grants that this forensic signification of the word is more familiar, and more obvious in the Scriptures, than that other; although he contends that believers are not only declared just, but constituted so before God; which, if correctly understood, may be safely admitted, as we shall presently shew.

Now, in the second place, in order to meet the calumnies of our adversaries, we openly affirm that the righteous God justifies no one, that is (as we have explained) absolves him from guilt, declares him just, and accepts him to life eternal, which is the reward of righteousness, unless by the intervention of a true and perfect righteousness, which also becomes truly the righteousness of the justified person himself. Consequently this assertion is both false and foolish, that the justification of the sinner is, with us, nothing else than a mere fiction of law; since, in the meantime, he who is justified is not made a partaker of true righteousness. On the contrary, we affirm, that no one is justified, but he upon whom God has bestowed a righteousness so complete and perfect, that God in beholding him cannot but regard as righteous the person upon whom the same is bestowed. We also grant that there is in all justified persons, a certain inherent righteousness, which if they lay down as the formal cause of justifaction, making just, (for the coining of a word may be allowed) we will make no objection; but of the aforesaid justification, which answers to the strict scrutiny of the heavenly judge, it can by no means be either the formal or meritorious cause. That infused quality, whereby man is called just, is the formal cause whence man is so denominated; as the quality of heat is the formal cause whence the subject is called hot; but the mode of

• Naclantus in 1. ad Ephes. pag. 58.-NACLANTUS was Bishop of Chiozza (or Chioggia) in the Venetian Territories: his Comment on the Ephesians was published at Venice in 1554. Vide Scriptores Ordinis Prædicatorum, by Echard and Quetif; tom ii. p. 202.