his deeds have no relation to blessedness, but are merely idly to exhibit their presence?

I answer :-This is to trifle idly; not to argue. Our Divines do not teach, that good works have no reference to blessedness; but that they have not that which the Papists falsely ascribe to them. Neither do we assert that good works make a mere shew of existence, but that by a presence which is active, they cause the doers of them to advance in the way of salvation. But as respects the Apostle's words, James intends to intimate nothing else than that that faith is dead, hypocritical, and by no means saving, which does not bring forth good works; but that they will be inheritors of blessedness, who in reality give themselves to works of piety. By sayings of this kind he shews who will be blessed in the end, and whence they may gather the certainty of future blessedness; not by what causes, or merits, the blessedness itself is attained.

*

Let these replies suffice as to the testimonies of Scripture. What Bellarmine brings against us in this case from the Fathers we shall altogether pass by; not because I think that the Fathers agree with him in this controversy; but because all testimonies cited from them may easily be explained by what has already been stated.

But since he has subjoined to the testimonies of the Fathers one special argument, that we shall briefly refute. Thus then he argues against us, De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 9,—If faith alone saved, and works were not necessary, except in the way of presence, as signs of faith,† it would follow that faith could save even if it were deficient of every good work, and was allied to all kinds of sin. For if works are not, strictly speaking, required in the act of salvation; all good works being set aside, faith would save. For like as fire, because it warms by heat alone, if all other qualities were separated from fire, it would without doubt still warm; so the Christian, because he apprehends salvation by faith alone, could be saved, faith remaining, although he should have acquired no good qualities, and had many bad ones. Now it is evident faith may be separated from works, because works are the effects and fruits of faith; and a cause may De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 8.

+ Vide Bellarm. de Justif. cap. 14. lib. 1.

be without its effect, and a tree without fruit. Since therefore a faith altogether destitute of works does not save, it is from hence proved, that works are necessary to salvation, not only in the way of presence, but of some efficiency, not less than faith itself.

I answer-In this argumentation there lurk almost as many errors as words. First, Bellarmine errs in this, that he supposes it to be our opinion that faith alone saves. We say indeed that it is the office of faith alone to apprehend and apply to us the meritorious cause of salvation; but that we may be led to the possession of salvation, we consider that many other things are necessary. Secondly, he charges us falsely also with asserting that good works are not otherwise necessary than under the character of a sign, to announce the presence of faith; as a bush suspended is no otherwise necessary to a tavern, than as a sign, namely to indicate to travellers that wine is to be had there. But we abhor such doatings as these with our whole soul, and openly affirm that good works have, in reference to salvation, a necessity of their own, not significative only, but active; because (as has been before shewn by us more than once) by means of the practice of good works are we advancing and make progress towards the kingdom of heaven. Thirdly, were I disposed to concede to our adversary, that according to the doctrine of our Divines faith alone saves, and that works are no otherwise necessary than in the way of presence; yet still this inference of Bellarmine would not follow-Faith therefore could save although it should be void of every good work, and be allied to all sins; for instance, with hatred of God, with a settled purpose of adultery, and the like. This inference will not hold good, for though a source of action may exist, needing not the aid of anything else to produce certain effects, nevertheless it cannot exist alone apart from the effects which itself has produced; and consequently if there exist no signs of operation, there has been no power in actual exercise, for to effect pre-supposes to exist. For example: if the eyes alone perceive colours, and the neck, the chest, the arms, the belly, and the feet are not necessary to this operation, except by way of presence; yet it would be wrong to infer from hence-The eyes alone therefore will be able to see, although a person should be

deprived of neck, chest, arms, belly, feet, and all the rest of the human members. For although the eyes can see, without the concurrence of these members in the office and act of seeing, yet these members being removed, as to the verity of their existence, the eyes will not remain eyes (unless by an equivoque). The same we assert respecting the efficacy of faith, and its existing apart from all good works. It can apprehend salvation without their concurring in the very act of apprehending it; yet it cannot, if they are separated as to their existence; for by such separation faith itself will be destroyed.

But let us consider the simile, by which Bellarmine himself has illustrated his own case. He says-Just as because fire warms by heat alone, it would still also undoubtedly warm, if all other qualities were removed from the fire; so the Christian, because he apprehends salvation by faith alone, could be saved whilst his faith continued, although he should possess no good works, and might have many bad ones, suppose hatred of God and his neighbour, a desire of fornicating, stealing, blasphemy, &c.

I answer :-Although fire effects warmth by its own heat alone, yet if you take away transparency and lightness from it, and put to it opacity and weight, it will no longer be able to warm; because those qualities being removed, it no longer retains the essence of fire. In the same way, although faith alone apprehends salvation, yet if you take away from the regenerate love, and the other infused graces, and impart to him hatred of God and men, and a desire of adultery and blasphemy, the efficacy of faith is immediately extinguished, because the subject matter itself is changed and destroyed; for qualities can effect nothing unless they have some ground on which to work.

Let us lastly proceed to Bellarmine's argument, by which he endeavours to shew that this hypothesis of his was not an impossibility. And here he asserts that it is sufficient for him, if faith can even be imagined to be without good works, or can be separated from them in thought only. Nay, this will not by any means suffice. For there are many things which the intellect may, without error, consider separately, which it cannot. without manifest error, think of as actually separated. We grant, therefore, that faith may

be mentally viewed separately from good works, that is, alone and without works co-operating in the office of justifying, or of apprehending Christ; but deny that it can or ought to be understood as a separated thing, that is alone, and destitute of all other graces and good works, and moreover accompanied with all bad works in the justified subject,

Lastly, Bellarmine argues, that all good works may be separated from true and living faith, because works bear the same relation to faith as fruit to a tree, or the effect to its cause; but a tree can be considered as without fruit, and a cause without effect; therefore faith also without works.

I answer the question is not here about the separate act of understanding it, but of its existing. The intellect may conceive of works, and not of faith, or the contrary; but it never can think truly, nor determine with itself that true justifying faith is in act and reality separated from all good works. Nor is this argument of Bellarmine of any weight. For proper and genuiue fruits cannot be considered apart from a living tree, nor opposite and contrary fruits be even imagined upon it. For although the production of grapes does not make a vine, yet that cannot be a living vine which has ceased to bring forth grapes, and now produces thorns. For as to produce effects implies existence, so to produce effects in a certain mode, implies a corresponding mode of existence. Where then the proper operation is seen to be extinct, and the contrary plainly arises, there the very nature also is understood to be changed into one of a contrary description. Add to this that good works are the fruit of the same Spirit, of which also faith itself is the fruit. Therefore, while faith remains, the Spirit of faith remains; but the Spirit remaining and indwelling, the works not of faith only, but of the other graces also (which are the fruits of the same Spirit) will follow. Hence that conditional proposition of Bellarmine is vain and false-If faith alone should save, it would operate as a thing actually separated from all good works, and actually joined with all evil ones. The conclusion likwise is unsound: If such faith does not save, therefore works are necessary by the necessity of efficiency. For they are necessary as the way to the kingdom, not as the causes of reigning.

And here we shall terminate the question of the necessity of good works; that which respects the truth or reality of them will be the next point for our consideration.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

QUEST. II-OF THE REALITY OF GOOD WORKS.

HAVING established the necessity of good works, we must discuss their truth or reality.

Now when we say that any work is truly good, we mean,* that it has in itself a goodness truly supernatural, is truly pleasing and acceptable to Him, who is now become our reconciled God and Father, and is truly destined by Him for the rewards both of this life and of that which is to come.

And the good works of the regenerate are distinguished by this three-fold difference from those works of civil righteousness, which are performed sometimes by the ungodly, unbelievers, and the unregenerate. For however splendid the works of these persons may appear; they are not truly good in the theological sense; inasmuch as they are works which neither flow from the supernatural goodness of the agent, nor are truly pleasing to God, nor properly appointed by the promise of God for the rewards of life.

But now lest any one should confound this truth of good works with their perfection, we also add that these very good works, which are called truly good for the reasons just alleged, are, notwithstanding, imperfectly good, on account of that indwelling sin which clings and adheres to the doer, and besmears with its dust, and infects his works. And in this consists the difference between the good works which are wrought by the regenerate in a state of regeneration and inchoate righteousness, and those which could have

• Vide Lutherum, tom. 5. præfat. in Epist. ad Rom. pag. 97.